Ruffin v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2012
• Docket Number: 4:12CV3058
• Parties: LAMONT RUFFIN, Plaintiff, v. NEBRASKA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

LAMONT RUFFIN, Plaintiff,

v.NEBRASKA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

4:12CV3058

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

Dated: June 11, 2012

MEMORANDUMAND ORDER

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on March 29, 2012. (Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 6.) On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff paid the initial partial filing fee. (See Docket Sheet.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 29, 2012, against Defendants Nebraska Department of Corrections, Director Robert P. Houston, Warden Diane Sabatka-Rine, psychologist Dr. S. Bruhn, Paul Rodriguez, Dr. Kari Perez, and three psychologists from the Lincoln Correctional Center. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.) All Defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.)

Condensed and summarized, Plaintiff's Complaint relates entirely to his desire to gain access to mental health programming prior to his parole eligibility date. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by refusing to provide him with mental health programming in accordance with his "personalized plan." (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 6-7.) This failure to provide Plaintiff with mental health programming prior to his parole eligibility date has deprived him of a liberty interestin violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 7-9.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to his unspecified, serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying him mental health programming. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 8.) Plaintiff requests relief in the form of a declaratory judgment, an injunction requiring Defendants to provide him with mental health programming, and compensatory and punitive damages, including pay he would receive if paroled and costs to receive treatment upon parole. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 9.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Therefore, where a pro se plaintiff does not set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed" for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007) (overruling Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1967), and setting new standard for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff's complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff's allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against a state, state instrumentalities and an employee of a state sued in the employee's official capacity. See, e.g., Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1995). Any award of retroactive monetary relief payable by the state, including for back pay or damages, is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of immunity by the state or an override of immunity by Congress. See, e.g., Dover Elevator Co., 64 F.3d at 444; Nevels v. Hanlon, 656 F.2d 372, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1981). Sovereign immunity does not bar damages claims against state officials acting in their individual capacities, nor does it bar claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 which seek equitable relief from state employee defendants acting in their official capacity.

Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against state employees in their official and individual capacities. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2, 9.) As set forth above, Plaintiff may not sue a state employee in his or her official capacity for monetary relief absent a waiver of immunity by the state or an override of immunity by Congress. The record before the court does not show that Nebraska waived, or Congress overrode, sovereign immunity in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff'sclaims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges Defendants have denied him due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Thus, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been deprived of a liberty interest in order to successfully claim that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process has been violated. Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). A liberty interest can arise out of the Due Process Clause itself or be state-created. Id. (citing Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)) (quotations omitted).

A liberty interest arises under the Due Process Clause when the consequences of the state's actions are "stigmatizing" and "qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479 n.4 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980)); see also Harper v. Washington, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1980). However, an inmate does not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole. Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr., 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). Further, an inmate has no liberty interest in the possibility of parole if the action was within the original sentence imposed. As set forth in Persechini:

Without question, treatment for inmates who suffer from drug addictions may provide significant benefits. But denying or terminating drug abuse treatment, like denial or termination of other discretionary prisonprograms, does not result in either an atypical or a significant hardship in relation to the remainder of the prison population. Thus, there is no protected liberty interest, for example, in the sentence reduction that may be granted upon completing a Bureau of Prisons drug treatment program, Giannini v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 405 Fed. Appx. 96, 97 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); or in halfway-house placement after completing a drug-treatment program, Staszak v. Romine, 2000 WL 862836, at *1 (8th Cir. June 29, 2000) (unpublished); or in remaining in a work release program, Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 668 (8th Cir. 1996); or in participating in a drug treatment program to qualify for early release, Koch v. Moore, 1995 WL 141733, at *1 (8th Cir. April 4, 1995) (unpublished); or in remaining in a discretionary "shock incarceration program," Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1995); or in participating in Missouri's sex offender treatment program, Jones v. Moore, 996 F.2d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 1993).

Persechini, 651 F.3d at 807 (emphasis added). Put simply, "[t]he general rule" is that "the Due Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence imposed." Id. at 808 (finding that termination from a drug treatment program that was mandatory for parole, but discretionary with prison officials, was not outside of the punishment originally imposed).

Moreover, a state-created liberty interest arises when a statue or regulation imposes an "atypical or significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84; see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). A state-created liberty interest also arises when a state's actions will inevitably affect the duration of the sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. In Nebraska, taking advantage of self-improvement opportunities, such as completion of mental health treatment, is only one among a multitude of factors that the Nebraska Board of Parole considers in determining if a prisoner should be paroled. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114(2). Failure to complete a personalized program plan, which may includesex offender treatment as a requirement, may be considered by the Nebraska Board of Parole as a factor in their decision, but denial of parole on those grounds is not mandatory. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,107(1)(b).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that his chance at parole will be...