Ruffin v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 83-640.,No. 83-733.,83-640.,83-733.
• Citation: 524 A.2d 685
• Parties: Antone D. RUFFIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. James IL SHAW, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 685

524 A.2d 685

Antone D. RUFFIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

James IL SHAW, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 83-640.

No. 83-733.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued in No. 83-640 December 11, 1984.

Submitted in No. 83-733 December 11, 1984.

Decided April 16, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bruce Kleinman, for appellant Antone D. Ruffin.

Martin S. Echter, Washington, D.C., for appellant James R. Shaw.

Kenneth J. Melilli, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before MACK, FERREN and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted appellant Ruffin of second degree murder, D.C.Code § 22-2403 (1981), and mayhem, D.C.Code § 22-506 (1981), and convicted his co-defendant, appellant Shaw, as an accessory after the fact to simple assault, D.C.Code § 22-106 (1981). The trial court sentenced Ruffin to concurrent sentences of ten years to life in prison for the murder and of three to nine years for the mayhem. It imposed on Shaw a prison sentence of six months.

Ruffin appeals the denial of his pretrial motions (1) to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, based on the 33 months between his arraignment and trial, and (2) to suppress oral and written statements, as well as physical evidence, allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments. He also asserts that (3) the mayhem and second-degree murder convictions merged, requiring vacation of the mayhem conviction, and (4) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter.

We reject Ruffin's arguments save two. The government concedes, and we agree, that on this record the mayhem merged into the second degree murder, since a single injury produced both a permanent disability and death. Thus, Ruffin's mayhem conviction must be vacated. We also agree with Ruffin that the police obtained his written statement in violation of the fifth amendment right to counsel. We conclude, however, that this constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the written statement was cumulative of Ruffin's admissible oral statement and of other evidence impeaching his testimony. Moreover, the evidence against Ruffin was overwhelming. Accordingly, we affirm Ruffin's conviction for second-degree murder.

Shaw attacks (1) the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction as an accessory after the fact. He also argues that (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of portions of statements of three government witnesses under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), and (3) the court's instruction to the jury that the defendant has a vital interest in the outcome of the trial was prejudicial. None of Shaw's arguments has merit; thus, his conviction as an accessory after the fact to simple assault is affirmed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Following a party on the night of February 2, 1980, appellant Ruffin's sister accepted a ride home from Clifford Wilson. Ruffin, who had attended the party, returned to his mother's house. When he arrived, he was advised that his sister had been raped. He drove to his sister's apartment, found her crying, and then searched the building. He found Wilson on the second-floor landing above the sister's apartment. Wilson, following his encounter with Ruffin, was left in an unconscious or semi-conscious state. He subsequently died. At trial, Ruffin admitted he struck Wilson but did so in self-defense.

Appellant James Shaw, a police officer on administrative leave who was a friend of Ruffin, arrived on the scene and called the police. According to the testimony of several witnesses, Shaw told Ruffin not to talk to the police and also advised Ruffin to wipe the blood from his shoes. Shaw said he would handle the problem by telling the police that Wilson's injuries were caused in the course of his apprehension by Shaw. Six police officers testified that Shaw told them he had struck Wilson in self-defense during a struggle following a rape. Shaw also told one officer that Wilson's injuries had resulted from a fall in which Wilson had struck his head against the wall.

The police transported several witnesses from the scene to the homicide office to give statements, but that group did not include Ruffin. Later, on the morning of February 3, the police decided to question Ruffin, but, as the government concedes, there was no probable cause to arrest him at that time. Instead, Detective Hosea Dyson telephoned Ruffin and told him the police wanted to interview him. Dyson arranged to have Ruffin picked up at his sister's home by Officer James Brown at around noon that day.

At some time between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., Dyson brought Ruffin to an interrogation room in the homicide office where Dyson told him he was not under arrest and read him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Ruffin did not sign a waiver of those rights at that time. He did, however, give an oral statement to Dyson, admitting that he had assaulted Wilson but maintaining that he had done so in self-defense. Dyson then called in Detective Clarence Muse, who, beginning at 2:30 p.m., took a written statement after Ruffin had signed a waiver of Miranda rights. The written statement was completed at 3:48 p.m. The police then took Ruffin's trousers and shoes for examination. Ruffin left the police station at about 6:00 p.m., after the arrival of a relative who brought Ruffin a change of clothes.

Ruffin later was charged with the murder of Wilson. Before trial, he moved to suppress his oral and written statements to the police, as well as the physical evidence (clothing), as the fruits of unlawful seizures under the fourth amendment. He also moved to suppress the statements on the ground they had been obtained in violation of his fifth amendment rights under Miranda. The trial court denied the suppression motion. The court also denied Ruffin's motion to dismiss the indictment based on an asserted violation of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial by virtue of the 33 months between arraignment and trial.

II. RUFFIN: SPEEDY TRIAL

Ruffin has established a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation: 33 months between arraignment and trial. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 865-66 (D.C. 1984) (delay of more than one year creates a prima facie case of violation). The burden has therefore shifted to the government to rebut that showing. Tribble v. United States, 447 A.2d 766, 768 (D.C. 1982). We employ in our analysis the factors addressed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-93, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

Having noted the length of the delay, we next must determine reasons for that delay. Approximately seven and one-half months were directly attributable to continuances requested by Ruffin. None of this time is chargeable to the government. Another four months were the result of continuances obtained by Ruffin's codefendant, Shaw. The government bears some responsibility for the delay of Ruffin's trial attributable to the continuances requested by Shaw, in light of the fact the government chose to try the two defendants jointly. See Gaffney v. United States, 421 A.2d 924, 928 (D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 2026, 68 L.Ed.2d 330 (1981). Nevertheless, in light of the policy considerations favoring joinder, this responsibility does not weigh heavily against the government. Adams v. United States, 466 A.2d 439, 444-45 (D.C. 1983). This is especially true where, as here, Ruffin failed to object to any of the continuances his codefendant requested. Another nine months are attributable either to the unavailability, on four occasions, of the trial judge, or to other "normal" delay unavoidable in a criminal case. This nine months is attributable to the government but carries little weight. White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558 (D.C. 1984). The government did request one continuance, made necessary because several witnesses under subpoena failed to appear. This continuance resulted in a delay of three months, which is directly chargeable to the government. Since this delay was not a "deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense," however, but is "a valid reason, [i.e.] missing witness[es], [which] should serve to justify appropriate delay," it is not given great weight. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. In sum, approximately 25½ months of the 33 were attributable to the government, but the reasons were typical of a congested criminal court calendar, in the context of a joint trial, and thus reveal nothing extraordinary.

We next determine whether there has been prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Since Ruffin remained on personal recognizance until he failed to appear for trial on February 1, 1983 (trial then recommenced on March 14, 1983), he did not suffer the "oppressive pretrial incarceration" that the speedy trial right is designed, in part, to avoid. Reed v. United States, 383 A.2d 316, 320 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871, 99 S.Ct. 203, 58 L.Ed.2d 183 (1978). A speedy trial will also minimize two other types of prejudice that may result from delay: the possibility that the defense will be impaired as a result of the lapse of time and the accused's anxiety attributable to the delay. Ruffin has not alleged that his defense was in any way impaired, and "the absence of this most serious form of prejudice weighs heavily in our determination of whether appellant was deprived of his [speedy trial] right." Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1103 (D.C. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986). For the first time on appeal, counsel asserts that Ruffin suffered anxiety as a result of the delay. If Ruffin did...