Ruffridge v. Ruffridge, 96-1999
| Decision Date | 27 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1999,96-1999 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D343 Kerry RUFFRIDGE, Appellant, v. Susan Blaisdell RUFFRIDGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
E. Jane Brehany of Myrick, Davis & Brehany, for Appellant.
Keith A. McIver, James L. Chase & Associates, P.A., for Appellee.
In this appeal and cross appeal we have for review the child custody and support provisions of a final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties. Kerry Ruffridge, the husband, contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to pay child support. Susan Blaisdell Ruffridge, the wife, contends in the cross appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering rotating custody of the children. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption against rotating child custody and therefore we reverse on the cross appeal. The matter of child support, which is now moot in the present appeal, can be reconsidered on remand when the trial court resolves the issues of custody and visitation.
The parties had been married for fourteen years at the time of their dissolution of marriage. They have two children, a twelve-year-old girl, and a five-year-old boy. Ms. Ruffridge is employed as a Navy nurse in a career she has pursued throughout the marriage, and Mr. Ruffridge works part time remodeling houses. During the marriage, Mr. Ruffridge spent a large part of his time at home with the children. Each party requested shared parental responsibility of the children and each requested to be designated the primary residential parent.
On June 2, 1995, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing on the issues of temporary custody and support. The court deferred consideration of these issues until the start of the next school year. Meanwhile, the court directed that the children would live with one parent for six weeks and then with the other for six weeks. A second temporary hearing was held on August 8, 1995, and at the close of the proceedings on that day, the parties agreed to rotate custody of the children every week until the final hearing. The trial court approved the agreement and entered a temporary order rotating custody.
The parties each sought physical custody of the children in the final hearing on January 23, 1995. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court designated Ms. Ruffridge as the primary residential parent and ordered that the physical custody of the children be rotated between the parents weekly. Neither party had requested rotating custody and neither had presented evidence that it would be in the best interest of the children. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that it could find "no reason to disturb the rotating physical custody arrangement" in the temporary order. The court reasoned that the children had not suffered any detriment from the existing weekly rotating physical custody arrangement and that they were well adjusted and had thrived under the agreement.
Having settled the custody issue, the trial court made certain findings concerning the income of the parties to resolve the issue of child support. According to the final judgment, Mr. Ruffridge earns a net income of $1,368.00 per month from his renovation work and Ms. Ruffridge earns a net income of $4,396.00 per month from her employment as a nurse. Despite this disparity in earnings and the equal division of time with the children, the trial court ordered Mr. Ruffridge to pay $450 per month in child support to Ms. Ruffridge.
Trial courts have authority in family law cases to order or approve of plans for rotating child custody. However, the practice of alternating child custody between parents is not favored. Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, does not include rotating child custody among the appropriate methods of sharing parental responsibility. In the Interest of S.M.H., 531 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). On the contrary, the statute states in section 61.13(2)(b)(1) that each child should have a "primary residence," and explains in section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a), that providing a primary residence is but one of the many parental responsibilities to be shared. Consequently, the Florida courts have recognized that rotating child custody is presumptively not in the...
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