Ruggieri v. Big G Supermarkets, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73-258-A,73-258-A
• Citation: 330 A.2d 810,114 R.I. 211
• Parties: Emma RUGGIERI v. The BIG G SUPERMARKETS, INC. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 810

330 A.2d 810

114 R.I. 211

Emma RUGGIERI v. The BIG G SUPERMARKETS, INC.

No. 73-258-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 21, 1975.

[114 R.I. 217] Monti & Monti, A. David Tammelleo, Providence, for plaintiff.

Francis V. Reynolds, Paul V. Reynolds, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The defendant, as its name implies, operates a chain of supermarkets. One of its enterprises is located in the town of North Providence on Mineral Spring Avenue. On October 19, 1967, the plaintiff and her friend entered the North Providence premises to make some purchases. During the course of their shopping, the pair walked along an aisle past a refrigerated case displaying vegetables to a platform on which were stacked bags of potatoes. The platform measured some 4 to 5 feet in width and between 4 and 5 inches in height. There was some question as to whether on this particular day the defendant was selling 5 or 10-pound bags of potatoes. However, there is no question that as the plaintiff stepped onto the platform to pick up a bag from the back row, her left foot went through a 3-inch space in the platform. According to the plaintiff and her friend, this unexpected development caused the plaintiff to lose her balance and fall against the refrigerated case. The evidence indicates that the platform upon which the potatoes were stacked was in fact a wooden pallet whose top was composed of a series of wooden slats, each of which was set about 3 inches from the next. Store personnel, apparently with the aid of a crowbar, extricated plaintiff's foot and then escorted her home. Thereafter, she sought medical assistance. Her orthopedic surgeon testified on her behalf.

A jury trial was held in the Superior Court. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant rested without presenting any evidence and moved for a directed verdict. The trial justice, acting under the provisions of Super.R.Civ.P. 50(b), reserved decision on the motion and submitted the case to the jury. In his charge, the trial justice remarked to the members of the jury that they were first to consider the question of defendant's negligence and from there to go on and resolve the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. When announcing the jury's verdict, the foreman reported, 'We, the jury, find the defense not guilty of negligence.' Later, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict and granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The denial of defendant's motion and his grant of plaintiff's are the basis for this appeal.

The defendant concedes that in negligence cases a grant of a directed verdict on contributory negligence is the exception rather than the rule. It argues that plaintiff's admitted conduct is the exception. The plaintiff conceded that she did not look down as she placed her foot on top of the pallet. The defendant argues with great vigor that one who does not 'look down' before he 'steps up' is automatically barred from recovering damages. We cannot agree.

While the potatoes may not have been selling like hot cakes, the evidence shows that at the time plaintiff and her friend approached what they called the 'platform,' there was consumer acceptance of the product. The front portion of the pallet was bare. The potatoes available to plaintiff were stacked on the back row. She saw people step onto the platform, take one of the back-row bags, and continue on their way to other portions of the store. We think it highly unrealistic that today's shopper should be expected to enter a merchandising establishment, such as a supermarket, and then cast his or her eyes in a downward direction as he or she travels through the store. Such a posture, while perhaps becoming to a postulant while walking and meditating behind the monastery walls, is most inappropriate for the shopper who is expected to keep a sharp eye out for the bargains of the day. If we were to embrace a hard and fast rule requiring that the shopper, as he makes his way about the premises, keep his eyes cast downward, the incidence of injury at the supermarkets might decline, but this in turn would produce another casualty as sales revenues plummet because the shoppers would fail to see what specials await their inspection and ultimate purchase. The defendant has cited in support of this facet of its appeal cases involving intersectional automobile collisions. However, plaintiff is not a motorist but a patron to whom defendant has opened its doors and extended an invitation to come in and shop around its store.

A somewhat similar contention to that now being pressed by defendant was presented to us in Cofone v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 103 R.I. 345, 237 A.2d 717 (1968). During a sudden heavy rainfall, the plaintiff was struck in the head by an unattended, descending, overhead door just as he was about to complete a dash from the track's turnstiles to the sheltered interior of its grandstand. The track, in relying on one of the cases now being cited to us by the supermarket, declared that had Cofone looked up, as he said he did, he would have seen the door making its descent and hence he was guilty of...