Ruggiero v. City of Providence
| Decision Date | 03 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-376-Appeal.,2004-376-Appeal. |
| Citation | 893 A.2d 235 |
| Parties | Camille RUGGIERO v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Lauren E. Jones, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.
Caroline C. Cornwell, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
The plaintiff, Camille Ruggiero, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion for summary judgment of the defendant, City of Providence. The material facts in this case are not in dispute and we are called upon to interpret § 17-191 of Providence's Code of Ordinances as it relates to this former city employee's right to collect the full extent of her disability retirement pension.
On August 4, 1997, while she was an employee of the City of Providence, Ms. Ruggiero sustained an injury that rendered her permanently disabled and unable to return to work. Because her injury arose from, and in the course of, her employment, Ruggiero received workers' compensation benefits from the city.1 Ruggiero also applied for, and was granted, a disability retirement pension from the city in the amount of $1,530.68 per month, which commenced in November 2001.
In addition, Ruggiero settled with the third party tortfeasor responsible for the injuries she sustained. She received $300,000 from this settlement, and tendered $78,699.50 of it to the city to satisfy its lien against her for workers' compensation benefits paid to that point. See G.L. 1956 § 28-35-58(a).2 Thereafter, the city ceased paying workers' compensation benefits to her, as it is statutorily authorized to do under § 28-35-58(a), which gives an insurer (or, in this case, the city) the right to suspend the payment of workers' compensation benefits when the injured employee recovers damages from a liable third party.3
In addition to suspending workers' compensation payments, the city also reduced Ruggiero's disability retirement pension. The city relied on § 17-191 of the City of Providence's Code of Ordinances, which provides in pertinent part:
"Any amounts paid or payable under the provisions of any worker's [sic] compensation law, or as the result of any action for damages for personal injuries against the city, on account of death or disability of a member, shall be offset against and payable in lieu of any benefits payable out of funds provided by the city under the provisions of this article on account of the death or disability of the member." (Emphases added.)
The city asserted that it had the right to offset Ruggiero's disability retirement pension by the amount of the workers' compensation benefits to which she was entitled, although not currently receiving because of the suspension.
In response, Ruggiero initiated an action in the Workers' Compensation Court, asking the court to discontinue her statutory entitlement to workers' compensation benefits so that she could, instead, receive the full amount of her disability retirement pension. The Workers' Compensation Court denied this request, ruling that it was constrained from discontinuing benefits except as statutorily authorized, and that Ruggiero's circumstances did not satisfy the conditions set forth in the statute. We granted Ruggiero's petition for certiorari but upheld the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court. Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 889 A.2d 691 (R.I.2005) (Ruggiero I).
Ruggiero also began the instant action, in which she challenged the city's interpretation of § 17-191 of the Providence Code in a situation such as hers, in which workers' compensation benefits have been suspended. The hearing justice below ruled in favor of the city, holding that even though the benefits payable to Ruggiero were suspended pursuant to § 28-35-58, those benefits were nonetheless "payable." Accordingly, the hearing justice found that the city properly fulfilled its obligation under § 17-191 to offset the amount of money to which Ruggiero is entitled under her disability retirement pension.
On appeal, Ruggiero argues that the hearing justice erred when he determined that there are benefits "payable" to her under the Workers' Compensation Act. She maintains that the workers' compensation benefits to which she would have been entitled no longer are "payable" to her because the city suspended those benefits pursuant to § 28-35-58(a). On the other hand, the city argues that the hearing justice's interpretation of the word "payable" in § 17-191 was correct.
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court employs the same standard on review as the hearing justice. Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 969 (R.I.2000). "We conduct such a de novo analysis `to decide whether an issue of material fact exist[s] and whether the moving party [is] entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. at 969-70. (Emphasis added.) This Court also applies de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation. State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 60 (R.I.2005).
What does the word "payable" mean as it appears in § 17-191 of the Providence Code? When interpreting an ordinance, we employ the same rules of construction that we apply when interpreting statutes. Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I.1981). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce it as written by giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Menard, 888 A.2d at 60. In addition, "[t]his [C]ourt has long applied a canon of statutory interpretation which gives effect to all of a statute's provisions, with no sentence, clause or word construed as unmeaning or surplusage." Local 400, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 747 A.2d 1002, 1005 (R.I.2000) ().
The drafters of § 17-191 chose to use both "paid" and "payable" in the retirement ordinance to delineate the circumstances in which the city can offset pension benefits: "Any amounts paid or payable under the provisions of any worker's [sic] compensation law * * * shall be offset against and payable in lieu of any benefits payable out of funds provided by the city under the provisions of this article * * *." (Emphases added.) Because we must presume that the drafters intended every word of the ordinance to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect, Defenders of Animals v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541 (R.I.1989), we believe that here, "payable" and "paid" have separate and distinct meanings.
The term "paid," the past tense of "pay," ordinarily refers to the satisfaction of a debt by transferring...
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