State v. Menard

• Decision Date: 27 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-169-C.A.,2004-169-C.A.
• Citation: 888 A.2d 57
• Parties: STATE v. Thomas MENARD.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

888 A.2d 57

STATE v. Thomas MENARD.

No. 2004-169-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 27, 2005.

Jane M. McSoley, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Todd S. Dion, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice WILLIAMS, for the Court.

The state appeals a Superior Court grant of a motion to dismiss a criminal charge in favor of the defendant, Thomas Menard (defendant), for lack of probable cause to prosecute. The trial justice found that the defendant's prior conviction for arson in Arizona could not qualify as a predicate "crime of violence" to bring the defendant within the ambit of G.L.1956 § 11-47-5, which proscribes the possession of firearms by any person previously convicted of certain enumerated crimes. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

On January 19, 1981, defendant set ablaze the Palace Bar in Willcox, Arizona. He was indicted on February 20, 1981, and convicted in a Cochise County, Arizona, Superior Court of class 4 felony arson, in violation of § 13-1703 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. The defendant's judgment of guilt and sentence states that this offense was "not of a dangerous nature" as prescribed by Arizona law.¹

Twenty-two years and some 2,600 miles later, defendant found himself in Rhode Island with his Charter Arms .44-caliber "Bulldog" revolver. Suspicions in connection with a separate police investigation prompted police to obtain a search warrant for his West Warwick residence. The warrant was executed on March 12, 2003, and the search uncovered said revolver. Evidence tied defendant to the firearm, and he was arrested on March 20, 2003. A criminal information formally charged defendant with possession of a firearm having been previously convicted of a crime of violence in violation of § 11-47-5; the predicate crime of violence was defendant's 1981 Arizona arson conviction.

On February 5, 2004, a Rhode Island Superior Court trial justice entertained defendant's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge, pursuant to Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant argued that Rhode Island's statutory definition of "crime of violence," found in § 11-47-2(2), was irrelevant; according to him, Arizona's characterization of class 4 felony arson as a nondangerous felony should control the "crime of violence" determination. Thus, defendant maintained, Arizona law should govern whether defendant's prior arson conviction should qualify as a triggering crime under § 11-47-5. The trial justice found § 11-47-5 ambiguous as to whether prosecution may be had when the convicting state—here, Arizona—designates the crime as nonviolent, yet the sentencing state—here, Rhode Island—deems the subject conduct a crime of violence. Applying the rule of lenity, the trial justice interpreted the ambiguity in favor of defendant and granted his motion to dismiss that count. The state filed a timely notice of appeal.²

II Analysis

On appeal the state reiterates arguments it made in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss the charge. First, the state claims that the Legislature's decision to include second-degree arson as a "crime of violence" capable of triggering prosecution under § 11-47-5 evinces a broad, unambiguous intent to keep firearms from any individual previously convicted of conduct that would have been proscribed under Rhode Island's second-degree arson statute. See G.L.1956 § 11-4-3. The state follows by urging that, if we should agree with the first point, at the time defendant set fire to the Palace Bar in 1981, the implicated Arizona arson statute was sufficiently similar to its Rhode Island counterpart, thereby qualifying as a permissible predicate offense under § 11-47-5.

A Standard of Review

The issue before this Court is one of statutory interpretation,³ and we review such questions de novo. State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1110 (R.I.2005); State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 516 (R.I.2004).

B Interpretation of § 11-47-5

In ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial justice found § 11-47-5 to be ambiguous. In essence, she found that the statute lacked adequate instruction as to whose law should govern the determination of whether a crime committed elsewhere is a permissible predicate crime of violence in this state. Put in the context of this appeal, the ambiguity, as perceived by the trial justice, lay in the enactment's alleged failure to articulate unequivocally which state's law should control whether defendant's Arizona arson conviction is a permissible predicate offense under § 11-47-5: the Arizona Legislature's characterization of defendant's prior conviction as a class 4, nondangerous felony; or the Rhode Island General Assembly's designation of second-degree arson as a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Firearms Act.

It is well established that when this Court interprets a statute, "our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. * * * The best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute." Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I.2003); see also State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 694 (R.I.2004) (Williams, C.J. and Flaherty, J. dissenting) (citing Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 516). "`When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.'" Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 811 (R.I.2005); see also State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I.2005). "[W]hen we examine an unambiguous statute, `there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.'" Id. (quoting State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998)). In addition, "it is axiomatic that `this Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448-49 (R.I.2000)). Regardless, under no circumstance will this Court "construe a statute to reach an absurd result." Id. at 1032 n. 5 (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)).

Our analysis in the present case begins and ends with the statutory language as written. Section 11-47-5(a) reads, in pertinent part:

"No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of a crime of violence or who is a fugitive from justice shall purchase, own, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession any firearm." (Emphasis added.)

Section 11-47-2(2), the formal definition section for the Rhode Island Firearms Act, supplies the meaning of "crime of violence" as it appears in § 11-47-5(a), reciting a multitude of specific offenses, including "first and second degree arson."⁴

Upon carefully considering the plain statutory language, it is clear to us that the General Assembly has indicated that Rhode Island law must govern which convictions, either domestic or adjudged "elsewhere," qualify as predicate offenses under § 11-47-5. A fair reading reveals that only convictions for "crimes of violence," as defined by § 11-47-2(2), suffice as predicate offenses under § 11-47-5. The clause "in this state or elsewhere" expands the universe of permissible predicate offenses to include out-of-state as well as domestic convictions. The only conclusion to draw from this language is that the General Assembly intended all convictions "elsewhere" to align with at least one enumerated "crime of violence" before being considered a permissible predicate under § 11-47-5.

The defendant's insistence that § 11-47-5 is just as susceptible to the interpretation that out-of-state law should dictate which out-of-state convictions qualify as predicate offenses necessarily implies the rather unlikely proposition that our General Assembly intended to subordinate Rhode Island penal law and its accompanying policies to the various criminal laws and court systems of the several jurisdictions.

First, it would be absurd to intimate that our Legislature intended to accord another state's lawmakers the ability to determine the propriety of firearm prosecutions in Rhode Island. The defendant's construction of § 11-47-5 would essentially allow out-of-state law to steer prosecutorial discretion in Rhode Island, since that state's law would dictate whether a multiple offender could be prosecuted under § 11-47-5. These are precisely the offenders our Legislature clearly intended to target in § 11-47-2(2).

In addition, it is simply untenable that the General Assembly could have intended Rhode Island's penal law to be at the mercy of another state's criminal policy. Certainly the unique public policy of Rhode Island has resulted in an equally distinct body of criminal law.⁵ The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has aptly conveyed this sentiment by noting that

"[c]utting cacti in California, uprooting the state flower (rhododendron) in West Virginia, or desecrating a Confederate cemetery in Mississippi may be felonies punishable by imprisonment in those states. We, however, would not consider such acts as proper bases for mandatory sentencing, no matter how they are viewed by the several jurisdictions." Mitchell v. State, 56 Md.App. 162, 467 A.2d 522, 533 (Ct.Spec.App.1983).

Likewise, our Legislature enacted § 11-47-5 with the knowledge that sister jurisdictions do not uniformly proscribe the behaviors deemed "crimes of violence" in § 11-47-2(2). Therefore the General Assembly intended Rhode Island law to govern whether an out-of-state conviction is a permissible predicate crime under § 11-47-5.⁶ See Ashley v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (concluding that because "many jurisdictions * * * do not classify their crimes in the same manner as our legislature has chosen," Indiana law should govern whether a...