Ruggiero v. Long Island R.R.
| Decision Date | 14 May 1990 |
| Parties | Margaret RUGGIERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD, Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff; The Town of North Hempstead, Third-Party-Defendant; Long Island Railroad, Second Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; The Town of North Hempstead, Manhasset Park District, Second Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
George W. Kelly, Rockville Center (Michael V. Flanagan, of counsel), for second third-party plaintiff-appellant.
Devitt & Spellman, Smithtown (Vincent A. Malito, of counsel), for second third-party defendant-respondent.
Before JAMES MANGANO, P.J., and KUNZEMAN, RUBIN and BALLETTA, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Long Island Railroad (hereinafter LIRR) appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), dated March 27, 1989, which granted the motion of the second third-party defendant the Town of North Hempstead, Manhasset Park District, for reargument, and, upon reargument, granted its motion for summary judgment dismissing the second third-party complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The appellant's contention that the court erred in granting reargument is without merit. Although the second third-party defendant may not have technically met the requirements for reargument, the granting of this relief is discretionary with the court in the interest of justice (see, Rodney v. New York Pyrotechnic Prods. Co., 112 A.D.2d 410, 492 N.Y.S.2d 69; Esa v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 89 A.D.2d 865, 453 N.Y.S.2d 247).
The appellant entered into a written lease with the second third-party defendant with respect to land located in Manhasset, New York. An accident occurred on a sidewalk which was adjacent to the leased premises, but did not fall within the boundaries of the premises. The second third-party defendant was obligated under the lease to indemnify the appellant for any injury to person or property "arising in any manner or under any circumstances whatsoever from the condition, use or occupancy of said demised premises including any appurtenant sidewalk " (emphasis added). The term "appurtenant" in a lease is defined to include "everything which is necessary and essential to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the thing leased or granted" (Greenblatt v. Zimmerman, 132 App.Div. 283, 285, 117 N.Y.S. 18; Oberfest v. 300...
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