Ruggiero v. Prack

Decision Date11 March 2016
Docket Number12-CV-147(HKS)
Citation168 F.Supp.3d 495
Parties Anthony Ruggiero, Plaintiff, v. Albert Prack, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

Anthony Ruggiero, Elmira, NY, pro se.

Kim S. Murphy, NYS Attorney General's Office, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR., United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, an inmate at Southport Correctional Facility, asserts that he was denied due process at two disciplinary hearings, retaliated against for successfully appealing his first disciplinary sanction, and subjected to cruel and inhumane conditions of confinement related to the use of mechanical restraints and exposure to unnecessary health risks. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. #1. By Decision and Order signed September 5, 2012 (“Screening Order”), the Hon. David G. Larimer granted plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis , dismissed several of plaintiff's claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and directed that many of the named defendants be terminated from the case. Dkt. #3.

Plaintiff's amended pro se complaint asserts claims against the following parties in the specified capacities: Albert Prack, the Director of Special Housing and Inmate Discipline for New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 6); Patrick Griffin, Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility (“Southport”), in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 7); M. Sheahan, Deputy Superintendent of Security at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 8); A. Bartlett, Deputy Superintendent of Programs at Southport, in her individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 9); H. Hetrick, Jr., Correction Captain at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 10); K. Signor, Correction Captain at Southport during the relevant time period, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 11); R. Donahue, Correction Lieutenant at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 12); N. Sampsell, Correction Sargent at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 13); R. Granger, Correction Officer at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 14); M. Labar, Correction Officer at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 15); R. Fluman, Correction Officer at Southport, in his individual capacity (Dkt. #10, ¶ 16); Brian Fischer, DOCCS Commissioner, in his individual and official capacities (Dkt. #10, ¶ 17).

On August 7, 2013, the parties consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to have the undersigned conduct any and all further proceedings in this case. Dkt. #27. Thereafter, on March 2, 2015, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #100. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on or about the same date. Dkt. #102. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff's cross-motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint (Dkt. #10), Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. #100-1), Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (Dkt. #102); Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment (Dkt. #103), Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts (Dkt. #112); and Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (Dkt. #109-1). Plaintiff was confined to Southport (“Southport”) from February 26, 2010 through March 14, 2011. Dkt. #10, ¶ 32. Southport is the first all special housing unit (“SHU”) facility in the entire DOCCS system. Dkt. #100–10, ¶ 5. Because of its “unique status,” there are certain security measures in place at Southport that are not implemented anywhere else in the DOCCS system. Dkt., ¶ 5.

Southport employs a “Progressive Inmate Movement System” (“PIMS”) through which inmates earn “privileges” within the facility. Dkt. #10, ¶¶ 33, 35; Dkt. #100–14, ¶¶ 8–9 & pp. 55-56. “PIMS” consists of three levels, level one being the most restrictive or “lowest” level and level three being the least restrictive or “highest” level. Dkt. #10, ¶ 33, 35. Each level has designated cell blocks or “companies.” Dkt. #100–14, ¶ 9. The criteria for moving to the next level include 30-day status without any disciplinary infractions. Dkt. #100–14, ¶ 9. An inmate's physical transfer to the next level “company” can only take place as space permits. Dkt. #100–14, ¶ 9.

As an inmate moves up through the levels, he receives extra “privileges,” including the removal of mechanical restraints. Dkt. #10, ¶ 33; Dkt. #103, ¶ 46. All inmates on level one must remain handcuffed with a waist chain even when secured alone in the exercise cage.1 Dkt. #100–14, ¶ 10 & p. 20; Dkt. #103, ¶ 46. Plaintiff asserts that level one inmates at Southport are the only SHU inmates in the DOCCS system that are bound in mechanical restraints inside the exercise cage without an individual restraint order. Dkt. #102, ¶ 44. Defendant Prack, DOCCS Director of SHU Housing and Inmate Discipline, averred that he was unaware of any other SHU that has this blanket policy. Dkt. #103, ¶ 49. Inmates on level two must be handcuffed with a waist chain until they are secured within the exercise cage, and those on level three are handcuffed with no waist chain until they are secured in the cage. Dkt. #102, ¶ 42; Dkt. #103, ¶ 46; Dkt. #112–1, ¶ 46. For level two inmates, the procedure for entering or leaving the cell and exercise cage is as follows: the inmate sticks his hands out of the feed up hatch, handcuffs are applied, he then turns around and exits the cell backwards, at which time two staff members apply the waist chain. Dkt. #103, ¶ 45.

A level two or three inmate who commits a disciplinary infraction, whether violent or non-violent, is returned to a level one company where he is subjected to the mechanical restraint policy and the requirement of serving 30 days without a disciplinary infraction. Dkt. #100–14, ¶ 13 & pp. 14, 56; Dkt. #102, ¶ 55; Dkt. #103, ¶ 53. At every other SHU operated by DOCCS, the only way an inmate may be bound in mechanical restraints inside the exercise cage is by a written individual restraint order stating the reasons why the removal of restraints in the exercise area would, in light of the particular circumstances relative to the affected inmate, present a threat to the safety or security of the inmate, other persons or state property. See NY DOCCS Directive No. 4933, § 305.4(e)(5) (codified at 7 N.Y.C.R.R. 305.4(e)(5) ); Dkt. #102, ¶ 56; Dkt. #103, ¶ 54. Section 305.4(c) provides an appeal mechanism for any SHU inmate subject to a written individual restraint order. Dkt. #102, ¶ 57; Dkt. #103, ¶ 55. Southport's level one mechanical restraint policy does not require a written justification and does not provide an appeal mechanism. Dkt. #102, ¶ 58; Dkt. #103, ¶ 56; 7 N.Y.C.R.R. 305.4(e)(5) (stating [t]his paragraph [permitting inmates under a restraint order to be released from mechanical restraints while in the exercise area absent a written justification] does not apply to Southport Correctional Facility”).

Southport was a general population facility converted into a SHU facility. Dkt. #10, ¶ 35. For this reason, the cells are not comprised of four solid walls and a door as they are in modern SHU facilities; rather, the front of the cell is covered by cross-hatched iron bars about one and one half inches apart. Dkt. #10, ¶ 36. On level one companies, the entire front of the cell (other than the door) is covered with plexiglass. Dkt. #10, ¶ 36. The feed up slots on levels two and three are built into the cell doors, enabling the occupant of a given cell to reach his arm through the feed up slot and throw water, urine, or feces on the occupant of the neighboring cell. Dkt. #10, ¶¶ 38-39.

On July 8, 2010, plaintiff was housed in a level three cell, having progressed through levels one and two. Dkt. #10, ¶ 40. Plaintiff claims that the inmate in the neighboring cell was throwing liquid, which plaintiff believed to be urine, into his cell. Dkt. #10, ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges that he covered the front of his cell with his blanket to protect himself from being pelted with urine. Dkt. #10, ¶ 43. Correctional officer Diehr,2 who was on rounds on the company, told plaintiff to remove his blanket from the bars. Dkt. #10, ¶¶ 43-44. According to Diehr, plaintiff responded to his direct order by yelling: “what the fuck is wrong with you, I'll throw a cup of shit in your face you fat hillbilly faggott!” Dkt. #100–3, p. 8. Plaintiff claims that he explained to Diehr that he could not remove the blanket because he had to defend himself from being hit with urine, the officer became belligerent, and fabricated the allegation that plaintiff verbally threatened to throw feces on him. Dkt. #10, ¶ 46. As a direct result of that allegation, plaintiff was moved to a shielded level one cell, where he claims he remained for hours, without his property, sitting on a bare mattress. Dkt. #10, ¶¶ 48-50.

According to plaintiff, defendant R. Fluman, the officer on his level one company that evening, did not issue plaintiff his in-cell property or his dinner tray. Dkt. #10, ¶¶ 51-52. Fluman alleges that while he was on his “count round,” he discovered that plaintiff had ripped apart his mattress and covered the front of his cell. Dkt. #100–3, p. 10. When Fluman directed plaintiff to remove the mattress from the front of his cell, plaintiff did not respond. Dkt. #100–3, p. 10. Plaintiff then stated that he was “going to kill himself” several times, prompting a nurse to place him on suicide watch. Dkt. #100–3, p. 10; Dkt. #10, ¶ 54. Plaintiff was ultimately escorted off the block without incident, permitting defendant Fluman, in his words, to “continue[ ] on my count rounds.” Dkt. #100–3, p. 10; Dkt. #10, ¶ 54. All of these events were memorialized in a second Inmate Misbehavior Report authored by defendant Fluman on July 8, 2010. Dkt. #100–3, p. 10.

The following day, July 9,...

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