Ruh's Ex'rs v. Ruh
Decision Date | 03 December 1937 |
Citation | 110 S.W.2d 1097,270 Ky. 792 |
Parties | RUH'S EX'RS et al. v. RUH et al. |
Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County.
Action under the Declaratory Judgment Act by Alfred Ruh's Executors and others against Rosa Ruh, the Security Trust Company, as trustee for Alfred Joseph Ruh, and others. From the decree, the executors appeal, and the Security Trust Company cross-appeals.
Affirmed.
John B Shannon and Hunt & Bush, all of Lexington, for appellants.
Wilson & Harbison, of Lexington, for appellees.
This appeal involves the propriety of the construction, decreed by the learned chancellor of the Fayette circuit court, of the will of Alfred Ruh in an action brought by his executors under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Civ.Code Prac. § 639a--1 et seq.), asking a construction of his will and advice as to the distribution of his estate.
In June, 1933, Alfred Ruh, of Fayette county, died leaving his wife, Rosa Ruh, a daughter, Florence Ruh Wagner, and three sons, Elmer J. Ruh, Walter A. Ruh, and Alfred Ruh, Jr. surviving him. He also had surviving him a grandson (the child of his son, Elmer J. Ruh) named Alfred Joseph Ruh, an infant under 14 years of age who appears to have been the special object of his grandfather's affectionate concern and to whom he bequeathed a large part of his estate.
Shortly after his death, the decedent's will was duly probated in the Fayette county court.
The will named the sons, Walter A. Ruh and Alfred Ruh, Jr., as executors, who thereupon qualified and entered upon the administration of the estate.
The provisions of the will, the lower court's construction of which we are asked to review as being erroneous, to the extent here urged, are as follows:
In December, 1933, following the probate of the will, the deceased's widow, Rosa Ruh, filed her renunciation of the will, whereby she relinquished what was given her by it, electing to take, in lieu thereof, her dower and distributable share of her deceased husband's estate under the statute of descent, as if no will had been made.
In November, 1934, the executors of the estate, after selling the live stock and other tangible personalty and paying the testator's debts and funeral expenditures, brought this suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act against the widow and all other beneficiaries under the will, asking for a construction of the will, and advice as to the distribution of the estate, for the reason that they had been unable to agree with the beneficiaries as to its proper distribution, due to (1) the widow's renunciation of the will; and (2) their uncertainty as to (a) whether certain life insurance policies found in the testator's box at the bank should be included in the gift of its contents to the grandson, made by the will, of "other securities," and (b) the effect of the widow's renunciation on the testamentary power given the executors to sell the real estate.
Upon the cause coming on to be heard before the Hon. King Swope, the regular judge of the court, upon the pleadings and exhibits therewith, the court handed down a very comprehensive and carefully prepared written opinion, and directed that, in accordance therewith, a judgment be entered, incorporating the opinion as a part thereof.
After a careful study and consideration of the whole record and of the contentions of both the appellants and cross-appellants, seeking modification or reversal of certain of the rulings pronounced by the judgment, we find and have concluded that the learned chancellor's strong and ably written opinion, showing his thorough analysis made of the case and the questions here again presented, fortified by liberal citation of authority supporting his conclusions, voiced in his judgment, furnishes a correct decision, exposition, and application of the law supporting his opinion and judgment pronounced on the questions here presented, and does itself fully dispose of and answer the criticisms made of his decree.
Being of such opinion, we are led to adopt the learned chancellor's opinion, in so far as we may, though to some extent abridged by reason of its extended length, as our own, thus affirming the judgment both upon the appeal and cross-appeal.
This opinion of the chancellor, pursuant to which his decree was made, and some of the provisions of which are here challenged, sets out first the provisions of the five paragraphs of the will, and then proceeds to set out the stocks, bonds, notes, and...
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...chattels; property that is not attached to real estate." Id. at 1144 (6th ed. 1990). In Kentucky, the Court in Ruh's Ex'rs v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d 1097, 1101-02, (1937), reaffirmed the principle first adopted in Towery v. McGraw, 22 Ky. L. Rptr.155, 56 S.W. 727, 982 (Ky. App. 1900),......
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