Ruiz v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., Civ.97-1612DRD.
Decision Date | 09 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. Civ.97-1612DRD.,Civ.97-1612DRD. |
Citation | 54 F.Supp.2d 97 |
Parties | Luz N. RUIZ, Plaintiff, v. CARIBBEAN RESTAURANTS, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the Court is Defendant's, Caribbean Restaurants, Inc. ("CRI"), Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket No. 22), which Plaintiff, Luz N. Ruiz ("Ruiz"), opposed (Docket No. 23).1 For the succeeding reasons, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Consistent with the well-settled standard for summary judgment, the Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to Ruiz, and grants to her all reasonable inferences that can be adduced therefrom. See Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir.1999). CRI is a corporation which operates in Puerto Rico the fast-food restaurant chain known under the tradename of "Burger King." During Ruiz' employment with CRI, she alleges her supervisor, Rafael Rivera,2 sexually harassed her. Furthermore, within two months following Ruiz' transfer away from her alleged harasser's supervision, Ruiz claims the sexual harassment culminated in her discharge from CRI. Ruiz filed suit for the following violations: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a et seq.; Puerto Rico Law 17, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 155 et. seq. (1988); Puerto Rico Law 100, 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 146 et. seq. (1991); and Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1956).
Ruiz began working for CRI as a part-time general employee on September 11, 1992. A year later, on September 26, 1993, she was promoted to manager trainee by the Regional Operations Manager, Rafael Rivera.3 Ruiz worked within Rafael Rivera's region for about the next year and eight months, that is until May 15, 1995. Ruiz was promoted to district assistant manager on December 24, 1993, and as such she began a rotation through restaurants in the region including Plaza Centro, Oriental Plaza, Villa Blanca, and Vista del Río. Plaintiff was assigned to the Vista del Rio location, under the supervision of restaurant manager Maribel Diaz, on December 4, 1994, where Ruiz alleges Rafael Rivera first began to subject her to sexual harassment. By the end of March 1995, Ruiz was transferred to the Villa Blanca restaurant and was supervised by Jorge Rivera. Finally, on April 30, 1995, she was transferred out of Rafael Rivera's region to a region under the supervision of Operations Manager, William Sierra. Ruiz was assigned to the Caguas III (Burger King) restaurant supervised by the restaurant manager Margarita Nieves. While within this newly assigned region, Ruiz was discharged from CRI on July 10, 1995.
Ruiz alleges the harassment by Rafael Rivera consisted of offensive gestures, invitations to engage in sexual relations, and sexually explicit commentaries, wherein Rafael Rivera described his sexual fantasies to her. She contends that the harassment was continuous, unwelcome, and met by rejection. Ruiz further asserts that each rejection was reciprocated by retaliatory measures from Rafael Rivera and other agents of CRI. The retaliatory measures included written reprimands, transfers to different restaurants, suspensions, and finally termination of Ruiz.
During her tenure of employment, Ruiz received nineteen (19) written reprimands. Thirteen (13) written reprimands and three (3) suspensions occurred when Ruiz was under Rafael Rivera's supervision including five (5) reprimands and two (2) one-week suspensions which came directly from Rafael Rivera. She also received deficient evaluations from the unidentified mystery client4 and from Frank Velázquez of CRI's quality assurance division. After Ruiz' transfer from Rafael Rivera's region and placement into William Sierra's, Ruiz received the remaining six (6) warnings from Margarita Nieves, the restaurant manager for the Caguas III restaurant. Additionally, Ruiz received her fourth and final one-week suspension in the new region under Nieves.
It is undisputed that while Ruiz was still a general employee, she followed CRI's sexual harassment procedures and filed a written complaint with Human Resources Director Manuel Marrero on January 27, 1993, against a restaurant manager Gerardo Diaz. She alleged Diaz had made obscene jokes to her and commented on her buttocks. Ruiz was transferred and Diaz was investigated and subsequently terminated from CRI's employment.
Local Rule 311.2 provides that, 5 Local Rule 311.2. Further, pursuant to Local Rule 311.12, the proponent of a summary judgment motion shall serve and file "annexed to the motion a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and the basis of such contention as to each material fact, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Local Rule 311.12.
6 Local Rule 311.5. Additionally, for an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the movant's statement of contested facts are deemed to be admitted unless the nonmoving party controverts by filing, in addition to motion in opposition and a brief, a "separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which it contends that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Local Rule 311.12. "[A] district court [is] entitled to insist upon compliance with its local rule...." Corey v. Mast Road Grain & Bldg. Materials Co., Inc., 738 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir.1984); see also United States v. Proceeds of Sale of 3,888 Pounds Atlantic Sea Scallops, 857 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.1988).
The Chief Judge of the District, Hector M. Laffitte, recently underscored the importance of this rule in "lay[ing] out the material facts in dispute clearly for a district court that is swamped with an overwhelming number of civil and criminal dispositive motions." Dominguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R.1997). Id. (quoting Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930-31 (1st Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, Id. Accordingly, failure to comply with the "anti-ferreting rule" can have severe consequences. Indeed, as "Stepanischen warns ... that the failure to make specific references to the Record `would, where appropriate, be grounds for judgment against the party.'" Dominguez, 958 F.Supp. at 727 (quoting Stepanischen, 722 F.2d at 931).
In the instant case, Defendant filed a Statement Of Uncontested Facts, which comports with Local Rule 311.12 accompanying the Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket No. 22).
The Plaintiff, on the other hand, did not file a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The Court has searched the entire opposition and has found in the brief under the heading "CONTENTION OF FACTS" what appears to be an attempt to set-forth a statement of contested facts. However, Plaintiff has strewn additional facts, which the Court believes should be proffered as contested facts, throughout the opposition. Local Rule 311.12 specifically warns that the movant's statement of contested facts are deemed to be admitted unless the nonmoving party controverts by filing, in addition to a motion in opposition and a brief, "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Local Rule 311.12 (emphasis added). The Court reminded Plaintiff, in the Order Setting Initial Scheduling And Case Management Conference (Docket No. 9, p. 4), that not only is the movant required to file the statement of uncontested facts as an annex to the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must similarly file a statement of contested facts in compliance with Local Rule 311.12. Separate means a separate document, not inserted in the opposition brief. None was provided by Plaintiff. Instead, giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, Plaintiff has inserted its statement of contested facts within the brief. Short, and concise statement of material facts, however, means just that-as opposed to the Plaintiff's statement, which is riddled with arguments, reiterations of Defendant's rendition of the facts, and other superfluous information. Further, the Plaintiff places voluminous references to the record in the support of her arguments. The Court cannot engage in an endless expedition ...
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