Ruiz v. Flexonics

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 902,902
• Citation: 517 S.W.2d 853
• Parties: Ray RUIZ et al., Appellants, v. FLEXONICS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 853

517 S.W.2d 853

Ray RUIZ et al., Appellants, v. FLEXONICS et al., Appellees.

No. 902.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1975.

Steve Q. McManus, Kilgore, Cole & Seerden, Victoria, for appellants.

O. F. Jones, Victoria, for appellees.

OPINION

NYE, Chief Justice.

This is a products liability case. The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant, Flexonics, a division of Universal Oil Products Company, alleging damages caused by fire to their home, personal injuries to Maria Ruiz, and damages for the death of Yolanda Menchaca due to the dangerous and defective rubber hose manufactured by the defendant and used on a space heater in plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs alleged that the heater hose was not suited for its intended use and the defendant failed to warn the plaintiffs of its inherent dangers which caused the damages and injuries complained of.

The case was tried before a jury which answered special issues from a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) the defendant manufactured the hose in question intending that it be used on a space heater; 2) the defendant's manufacturing of the hose in question with the rubber connector rendered said hose unfit for use on a space heater; 3) it was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, by and through its principal agent, that users of the hose in question might attempt to use it to connect a space heater to the source of fuel; (4 and 5 not applicable); 6) defendant failed to give adequate warning of the danger in using the hose in question in connecting a space heater to the source of fuel; and 7) the defendant's failure to give an adequate warning of the danger of using the hose in question to connect a space heater to its source of fuel exposed the user to an unreasonable risk of harm. (The court properly defined 'unreasonable risk of harm'.) ¹

In the next three (3) special issues, the jury was asked to find from a preponderance of the evidence that the use of the hose in question with a space heater was A producing cause of: (8) damages to the house and its contents; (9) injuries and damages sustained by Maria Ruiz; and (10) the death, injuries and damages of Yolanda Menchaca. The jury answered 'We do not' to the last three issues. Based on these answers, the court entered judgment for the defendant from which the plaintiffs have appealed.

The plaintiffs were Ray Ruiz and wife, Maria, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Yolanda Menchaca, Ernest Menchaca and his wife, Otelia Menchaca. Ray and Maria Ruiz purchased their home in 1967 and lived there until the house was destroyed by the fire on November 28, 1971. Sometime in October of 1971, the Ruiz' employed a plumber by the name of Guadalupe C. Martinez, who removed and reinstalled a gas line that supplied gas to the front two bedrooms on the west side of the house . After he finished the work on the gas line, Mrs. Ruiz asked Martinez to hook up the gas line to a space heater she had by using a new hose which had been manufactured by the defendant and which she had recently purchased. Martinez connected the gas pipe to the space heater using the new heater hose. He tested it, and finding nothing wrong, turned off the gas jet at the wall in the bedroom and left the premises. The fire and explosion took place some three or four weeks later.

The heater had not been used prior to the evening of the 28th and this was to be the first time it was to be used with the heater hose . The heater was located approximately one foot from the south wall of the bedroom and approximately two to three feet from the gas jet on the west wall of the bedroom. Somewhere behind the heater in question (the exact distance not known) was an open closet (without doors). Mrs. Ruiz lit the space heater around 9:00 o'clock p.m. Her daughter, Otelia Menchaca, and her two children, Yolanda and Ernest, were moving in with the Ruiz' as Otelia had just given birth to Ernest and needed some help from her mother until she recovered her health. Mrs. Ruiz went back after lighting the stove to help Otelia unpack her things. At about 11:00 o'clock p.m., Otelia noticed a fire near the connector to the heater. After an unsuccessful attempt to put out the fire, Maria thereupon took her son, Ray, outside, then she went back in picked up Yolanda and Ernest, and took them out of the house. After she had gotten completely out of the house with all three children, for some unexplained reason, she re-entered the house with her two grandchildren, Yolanda and Ernest, at which time there was an explosion, knocking Otelia outside the house, but leaving Maria and the two grandchildren, Yolanda and Ernest, in the house. Maria was able to get Ernest out but was unable to rescue Yolanda. Yolanda was finally rescued but died approximately four hours later due to severe burns. Maria received severe burns requiring hospitalization for eighteen (18) days.

Appellants' first point of error was that the trial court erred in not granting the plaintiffs' motion for mistrial in that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the jury's answers to special issues numbered 8, 9 and 10 and the jury's answers to the damage issues numbered 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15; and that the court erred in rendering and basing a judgment on the jury's answers to said special issues.

The plaintiffs argue that each of the damage issues have causation built into them and they, therefore, conflict with the producing cause issues 8, 9 and 10. The damage issues are as follows:

11. What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate Maria Ruiz and her husband, Ray Ruiz, for her injuries, if any, which you find from a preponderance of the evidence resulted in whole or in part from the use of the hose in question? Answer: $2,500.

(The court instructed the jury as to what elements of damages they could consider.)

12. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that wholly or partly as a result of the use of the hose in question, Otelia Menchaca was required to render nursing services to Maria Ruiz? Answer: We do.

Special Issue No. 13 was conditionally submitted:

13. What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the reasonable value of the nursing services rendered to Maria Ruiz by Otelia Menchaca resulting in whole or in part from the use of the hose in question? Answer: $1,000.00.

14. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that wholly or partly as a result of the use of the hose in question, Otelia Menchaca was required to render maid services to Maria Ruiz? Answer: We do.

Special Issue No. 15 (conditionally submitted).

15. What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the reasonable value of the maid services rendered to Maria Ruiz by Otelia Menchaca resulting in whole or in part from the use of the hose in question? Answer: $500.00.

The plaintiffs contend that an irreconcilable conflict exists between the jury's answers to special issues 8, 9 and 10, (finding that the hose was not a producing cause of the damages and injuries) and the jury's answers to special issues 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 wherein the jury found that the plaintiffs were entitled to monetary damages 'which resulted in whole or in part from the use of the hose in question'. The plaintiffs argued that because of this conflict, the trial court should have granted them a mistrial. We disagree.

Special issues 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 are damage issues and not liability issues. See Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Whittenburg & Alston, 424 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Sup.1968); Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Van Zandt, 159 Tex. 178, 317 S.W.2d 528 (1958); Garza v. San Antonio Transit Co., 180 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1944, writ ref'd w.m.); Wilkinson v. Southern Farm Supply Association, 409 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Special Issues 8, 9 and 10 submitted in conjunction with the prior issues (1, 2, 3, 6 and 7) were submitted to determine specifically and directly whether plaintiffs established liability on the part of the defendant. Special Issues 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 were submitted and understood by the jury as value or damage issues. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Whittenburg & Alston, supra; Garza v. San Antonio Transit Co., supra. Because special issues 8, 9 and 10 are a part of the liability issues and 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 are the damage issues, no irreconcilable conflict exists requiring a mistrial. Where special issues on liability are answered against a party, the answers to the issues on damages become immaterial. Garza v. San Antonio Transit Co., supra; Jones v. State Fair of Texas, 127 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1939, writ dism'd judgm . cor.); Gavrel v. Young, 407 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Neill v. Craig, 493 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rampy v. Allstate Insurance Company, 492 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Since the damage issues are rendered immaterial by a failure to find specifically a producing cause, no conflict exists. Where there are Specific issues on proximate causation such as those in 8, 9 and 10, the specific issues control over the general issues of causation in the damage issues. Therefore, an irreconcilable conflict does not exist. See Garza v. San Antonio Transit Co., supra; Benson v. Missouri, K. & T.R. Co., 200 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e., cert. den. 332 U.S . 830, 68 S.Ct. 206, 92 L.Ed. 403); Wilkinson v. Southern Farm Supply Association, supra; Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand and Gravel Company, 387 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Sup.1965). Appellants rely on the case of Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949) for their proposition that an irreconcilable conflict exists between the liability and damage issues....