Ruiz v. Lavine
| Decision Date | 18 July 1975 |
| Parties | Application of Pedro RUIZ and Flora Ruiz, Petitioners, v. Abe LAVINE, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services and James Reed, Director of the Monroe County Department of Social Services, Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Rochester (Peter D. Braun, Rochester, of counsel), for petitioners.
Ruth Kessler Toch, Sol. Gen., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany (Paul O. Harrison, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent Lavine.
William J. Stevens, County Atty., Rochester (Sam DiLalla, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent Reed.
Before MARSH, P.J., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, GOLDMAN and WITMER, JJ.
Petitioners Pedro Ruiz and Flora Ruiz brought this Article 78 proceeding to review a determination, made by respondent Abe Lavine in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, which affirmed the determination of respondent James Reed as Director of Monroe County Department of Social Services. The Monroe County agency, after a fair hearing, denied petitioners' application for medical assistance. Petitioners contend that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence and, that even if it is, the statute under which the determination was rendered is unconstitutional as to them. 1
The evidentiary facts are not disputed. Petitioners Ruiz came to Rochester, in Monroe County, from Puerto Rico because Mrs. Flora Ruiz was suffering from an illness which could not be properly treated in Puerto Rico. Testimony at the hearing indicated that Mrs. Ruiz' physician in Puerto Rico diagnosed her condition as a 'prima kidney disease' which would require hemodialysis within three months if she were to survive. Although such facilities existed in Puerto Rico, there was a six-month waiting period before they would be available. Since petitioners had a daughter in Rochester who was a social worker at Strong Memorial Hospital, their Puerto Rican physician recommended that petitioners move in with their daughter and try to obtain the necessary treatment in Rochester. From June 20 to June 28, 1973, Mrs. Ruiz was in a hospital in Puerto Rico. On June 28, she was discharged; she flew immediately to Rochester, spent the night with her daughter, and entered Strong Memorial Hospital the next day. The petitioners brought many of their personal belongings to Rochester with them, but both at the time of their original application for assistance and at the time of the fair hearing, they still owned a home in Puerto Rico.
Mrs. Ruiz remained at Strong Memorial from June 29 to August 10, 1973. On August 29, 1973, the Department of Social Services (D.S.S.) denied petitioners' Ruiz application for medical assistance on the ground that they were residents of Puerto Rico and had come to New York State for the purpose of receiving medical assistance or in contemplation of receiving care and treatment under New York's medical assistance program. The D.S.S. contended that since the petitioners had only been here one month at the time of their application for assistance, they 'certainly couldn't have been deemed residents'.
A fair hearing was held on September 25, 1973. Although Mrs. Ruiz had been discharged from Strong Memorial on August 10, 1973, she was still living in Rochester at this time. The D.S.S. representative admitted that no investigation on the application had been made; rather, the D.S.S. apparently deemed the move to be temporary solely because the application was made within one month of their arrival. Mr. Ruiz testified that he and his wife came to Monroe County with the intention of remaining because of the continued treatment required by Mrs. Ruiz and that they intended to make their home in Rochester. Although discharged from the hospital, Mrs. Ruiz was continuing to receive medical treatment at the time of the fair hearing. She was being treated for cancer and the continued treatment was to be for a long and indefinite time. On the other hand, Mr. Ruiz responded to the question: 'If his wife wasn't sick would they intend to go back to Puerto Rico?' by saying: 'If she wasn't ill, they would return'. 2
On November 2, 1973 respondent Lavine affirmed the original denial of assistance. For reasons which will become apparent, we conclude that the focus of the fair hearing was misplaced and remand this case to the D.S.S. for a new hearing as to petitioners' intent to make Rochester their home.
The substantive statutory provision pursuant to which the determination was made to deny petitioners' application for medical assistance is Social Services Law, § 366, (subd. 1, par. (b)):
'Medical assistance shall be given under this title to a person who requires such assistance and who * * * Is a resident of the state, Or, while temporarily in the state, requires immediate medical care * * *, provided that such person did not enter the state for the purpose of obtaining such medical care'. (Emphasis added.)
The statute, then, creates two classes of people: residents and people temporarily in the state. By statute, New York defines state residence to require that a person reside in the state continuously for one year (Social Services Law, § 117). However, this durational residency requirement has been held to be an impermissible infringement upon the constitutional right to travel and migrate between the several states and territories (Matter of Corr v. Westchester County Dept. of Social Services, 33 N.Y.2d 111, 350 N.Y.S.2d 401, 305 N.E.2d 483; Matter of Dillingham v. Lavine, 48 A.D.2d 657, 367 N.Y.S.2d 546; see, also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600).
Rather, residence, for purposes of the Social Services Law, must be determined by reference to the same criteria as are used to determine domicile (Matter of Corr v. Westchester County Dept. of Social Services, 33 N.Y.2d 111, 115--117, 350 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403--405, 305 N.E.2d 483, 485--486, Supra). The issue of domicile is a question of fact (Usher v. Usher, 41 A.D.2d 368, 370, 343 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214), and an individual's intention is the most important factor in determining his domicile (Matter of Trowbridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 289, 194 N.E. 756, 758). ...
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