Ruiz v. Lynaugh

• Decision Date: 23 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-2772,86-2772
• Citation: 811 F.2d 856
• Parties: David RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Interim Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 856

811 F.2d 856

7 Fed.R.Serv.3d 180

David RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Interim Director, Texas Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 86-2772.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 23, 1987.

F. Scott McCown, Melinda Hoyle Bozarth, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellants.

William Bennett Turner, Turner & Brorby, San Francisco, Cal., Joel Berger, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before THORNBERRY, DAVIS, and HILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) appeals the district court's refusal to modify a consent decree that TDC entered into with the plaintiff class of TDC inmates. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I.

After many years of litigation over the overcrowded conditions of TDC, TDC and representatives of the plaintiff class filed the Stipulation Modifying Crowding Provisions of the Amended Decree (Crowding Stipulation). In the Crowding Stipulation, TDC agreed to abide by the capacity limits, housing standards, and confinement requirements as defined in the agreement while the plaintiffs agreed to forego the much more stringent limits on TDC population and changes in conditions that they had earlier requested. On July 15, 1985, the district court approved the Crowding Stipulation, finding it "to be a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of all issues."

Because the Crowding Stipulation defines the parties' obligations involved in this appeal, we briefly summarize the agreement's most pertinent provisions. ¹ The Stipulation is a comprehensive management scheme that seeks to reduce the crowded conditions in all Texas penitentiaries. This goal is to be achieved by a process of renovating existing prisons, building new facilities, and limiting overall system capacity. As the cornerstone of this plan, TDC and the state of Texas agreed to limit the state-wide prison population to 95% of TDC's maximum capacity. Crowding Stipulation Sec. II H, at 6.

In specifying how this 95% population cap was to be observed, the Crowding Stipulation distinguishes between existing and new housing. TDC agreed to limit the population at each existing prison unit to a specified percentage by a particular date. Id. Sec. G, at 5-6. The Stipulation also provides that TDC can only use certain facilities in calculating the maximum capacity of its presently existing system. Only then-existing facilities ² which met or would meet after renovation the Stipulation's standards could be counted in figuring TDC's capacity. Id. Sec. II, at 2-9. The Stipulation works basically on the principle that overcrowding in then-existing units would be reduced through the building of new facilities which comply with the agreement's standards.

While providing for new housing additions to the Texas prison system, the Crowding Stipulation limits the type of facilities which can serve as new housing. Id. Sec. III, at 9-16. Any new housing must be either non-dormitory prisons, trusty camps, or approved additions to existing units. New prison facilities cannot contain dormitories. Id. Sec. III, A, at 9. The use of temporary housing to relieve overcrowding is strictly prohibited. Id. Sec. IV D, at 21-22. Prisoners may be housed in temporary facilities only if they are part of a roving work crew or displaced by renovation of existing regular housing. Id. Sec. IV D(3), at 22.

Both new and existing facilities must meet the spacing and condition requirements set out in the Crowding Stipulation. Minimum living space area for each inmate is established; the amount of space required is dependent on where the inmate is housed. See Id. Secs. III B(3), C(1), IV A(1) at 10, 12, 13-14. The Stipulation provides that each facility must have a recreational area, educational and work opportunities, and medical facilities. Adequate toilet, lavatory, and shower facilities, as defined in the Stipulation, must also be provided. Finally, TDC is obligated to provide adequate visitation time, sufficient clothing, linens and towels, and staffing at each facility, again as defined in the agreement. Id. Secs. VI, VII, IX, at 25-28, 30-33.

As the above synopsis indicates, the Crowding Stipulation embodies an ambitious policy to eliminate the overcrowded conditions at TDC. In implementing this policy and agreeing to the capacity and housing restrictions contained in the Stipulation, the parties acknowledged the role certain factors could play in the implementation of the agreement. The parties stated:

In entering into this Stipulation, the parties acknowledge that the safety and security of prisoners and staff is a matter of mutual concern. The parties further acknowledge that certain conditions and eventualities are within the contemplation of the parties. These include the possibility that TDC may experience a substantial increase or decrease in its population; that the rate of crime and/or conviction within the state of Texas may continue at its current rate or increase or decrease substantially; that the incidence of parole may increase or decrease substantially; that the cost of construction of new facilities and/or renovation of existing facilities may increase or decrease substantially; that substantial difficulty may or may not be encountered by TDC in attracting and employing security and non-security staff; and that substantial construction delays may or may not occur with respect to the renovation of existing units or the construction of new facilities, units or additions thereto.

Id. Sec. X A, at 33. When approving the Crowding Stipulation, the district court emphasized that "none of these eventualities, should they occur, will affect the scope of defendants' obligations under the Crowding Stipulation." We note the Stipulation does provide, however, that either party reserves the opportunity by appropriate motion to modify the provisions of the agreement. Id. Sec. X B, at 34.

As of July 1985 the court-adopted Crowding Stipulation made it appear that the long dispute over prison population and housing conditions at TDC was to be resolved. As one counsel remarked: "We indeed are entering a new day in the Department of Corrections...." The optimistic view that "[t]his Stipulation resolves all issues with regard to those provisions and obviates the need for further hearing on crowding issues contemplated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals," ³ however, was premature and short-lived.

The source from which this appeal springs is TDC's request for relief from the Crowding Stipulation. On September 12, 1986, TDC moved the district court for temporary relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), seeking a modification of the Crowding Stipulation so that it could increase capacity of the prison system without new construction. TDC asserted that an unforeseen and extraordinary 12.02% increase in 1985-86 inmate admissions to the prison system justified the modification. The plaintiffs objected to the motion, and the district court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting TDC from taking any action to expand its capacity before a formal hearing could occur on September 15.

At the formal hearing TDC requested the following modification of the Crowding Stipulation:

(1) that TDC be allowed to use 95 beds at the TDC Hospital at Galveston for 180 days;

(2) that TDC be allowed to exceed the population cap the Crowding Stipulation set for the Wynne unit by 305 beds for 180 days; and

(3) that TDC be allowed to use 300 beds at the Fort Wolters National Guard Armory at Mineral Wells, Texas, for 180 days.

TDC had in fact added these 700 beds to its capacity figures on September 11 so as to avoid surpassing the Stipulation's 95% population cap. ⁴ The plaintiffs opposed the use and counting of all seven hundred beds and requested a permanent injunction against their use and consideration by TDC.

The district court heard both motions together by consent of the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing on September 16, the district court extended the temporary restraining order for ten days. On September 19 the district court denied TDC's motion to modify and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting TDC from using any of the facilities for housing inmates and from incorporating the 700 beds in TDC's capacity figures after October 1, 1986. ⁵ In denying TDC's motion to modify, the district court found that the use of the proposed facilities violated the Crowding Stipulation because they were substandard and/or not facilities authorized for use under the Stipulation; that TDC had entered into the Stipulation knowing that increases in admissions and population could occur; that increases in admissions and population had occurred, but that these increases were not unforeseen nor extraordinary so as to justify relief in favor of TDC.

TDC filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the denial of its motion to modify and the granting of plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction. ⁶

II.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying TDC's request for modification of the Crowding Stipulation. As we explain below, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion.

It is well-settled that consent decrees once entered are not inviolate. See Systems Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650, 81 S.Ct. 368, 372, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961); Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir.1981). See generally 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2961, at 598 (1973). Where a court is supervising a case involving continually changing conditions, the court retains the power to modify a consent decree. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d...