Ruiz v. Ringling Coll. of Art & Design

Decision Date17 February 2023
Docket Number8:22-cv-1684-CEH-MRM
PartiesMEGAN ROSE RUIZ, LAUREN WILSON, LYRA WILSON, CAITLIN HENNING, NICKOLAS BERGER, ROXEANNE ZINSSER, DYLAN BONNER and BRYAN PAUL PATTERSON, Plaintiffs, v. RINGLING COLLEGE OF ART AND DESIGN, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER

Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs', Megan Ruiz et al., Motion to Remand (Doc. 20). Defendant Ringling College of Art and Design, Inc. (Defendant or “Ringling”) removed this action from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, asserting that subject matter jurisdiction exists based upon diversity of citizenship and a federal question (Doc 1). Plaintiffs now move to remand, arguing that Defendant has not established either type of jurisdiction (Doc. 20). Defendant has responded in opposition (Doc. 24).

Having reviewed the parties' submissions and being fully advised in the premises, the Court will grant in part the Motion to Remand because Defendant has not established that the case arises under federal law, and has not proved its theory of fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and costs, however, is due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are a group of eight former students or student-employees of Defendant Ringling. On June 21, 2022, they filed a complaint in state court alleging various state law causes of action against Defendant either jointly or individually. Doc. 11-1. Each Plaintiff alleges that one or more adverse experiences occurred during their time at Ringling that involved Christopher Shaffer, former Associate Dean of Students for Residence Life, either alone or in combination with other Ringling employees. Their accounts range temporally from 2008 to 2020, and their alleged experiences vary significantly. Primarily, they allege either an inadequate response to their report of student-on-student misconduct, or discrimination due to their sexual orientation, income, or disability. Based on these experiences, they contend that Ringling misrepresented the safety of its campus in its Title IX reporting and engaged in policies and practices that impeded reports of student-on-student misconduct, fraudulently inducing them to matriculate (Counts I and II); that Ringling negligently failed to supervise Shaffer when he engaged in discrimination, retaliation, or violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) (Counts III through VII); and that Ringling breached its implied contract with and fiduciary duty to students when it failed to abide by its policies against discrimination and its Title IX reporting obligations (Counts VIII and IX).

Defendant removed this action on July 26, 2022. Doc. 1. In its Notice of Removal, Defendant argues there are two bases for subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. First, it contends that there is jurisdiction based on a federal question. Although Plaintiffs allege what are ostensibly state law causes of action, their claims are explicitly and repeatedly predicated on violations of federal law, particularly Title IX and the ADA. Id. at 2, 8-25. Defendant asserts that the claims “are in fact federal claims masquerading as state law claims,” and that the Plaintiffs' artful pleading cannot disguise the federal questions being raised. Id. at 2. Second, Defendant argues that the Court also has diversity jurisdiction. Two of the Plaintiffs, Caitlin Henning and Nickolas Berger, are citizens of Florida, as is Defendant, while the other Plaintiffs are domiciled elsewhere. But Defendant contends that the claims of all eight Plaintiffs, including Henning and Berger, are improperly and fraudulently joined “solely to avoid diversity” jurisdiction. Id. at 3, 25-39. Under the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder, Defendant argues that the Court may disregard the citizenship of the non-diverse Plaintiffs and find that diversity jurisdiction exists. Id.

Soon after removing the case, Defendant filed a Motion to Sever and Dismiss (Doc. 17), in which it argues that all Plaintiffs' claims are misjoined and due to be dismissed on various grounds, including the statute of limitations and the failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs have responded in opposition, and Defendant has replied (Docs. 26, 29). Concurrently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand in which they dispute Defendants' arguments that federal jurisdiction exists on either diversity or federal question grounds (Doc. 20). They also assert that the Motion to Remand must be decided before the Court may consider the Motion to Sever and Dismiss. Id. at 2223; Doc. 26 at 1-2. Defendant has responded in opposition to the Motion to Remand, elaborating on the arguments in its Notice of Removal. Doc. 24.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court's competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties.” Jackson v. Seabord Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th Cir. 1982). The bases for federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction are confined, as federal courts are “empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution or otherwise authorized by Congress.” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).

Congress granted district courts original subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions sitting in diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Diversity jurisdiction exists where a lawsuit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. Id. § 1332(a)(1). District courts also have original jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is the burden of the party seeking federal jurisdiction to establish that it exists by a preponderance of the evidence. See McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002).

A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to the district court of the United States for the district and division within which the action pends, as long as the district court has subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, since removal “raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999). “Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Although two motions are pending before this Court, the Court must resolve the Motion to Remand before considering the merits of Defendant's Motion to Sever and Dismiss. It is well-settled that a federal court must examine its jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of an action. See, e.g., Univ. of South Ala., 168 F.3d at 410-11 ([W]hen an action is removed from state court, the district court must first determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. [ ] If there is jurisdiction, then removal is appropriate and the court may proceed to the merits of the case. [ ] Moreover, a federal court must remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of other motions pending before the Court.”). Defendant asks the Court to consider its Motion to Sever and Dismiss contemporaneously with the Motion to Remand because the issues they raise are interrelated. Doc. 24 at 20-21. But Defendant has provided no authority demonstrating that the Court may consider the merits of the Motion to Sever and Dismiss before it determines whether it has jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the Court will consider the issues raised in the Motion to Sever and Dismiss only to the extent that they bear on the jurisdictional question.

Defendant has raised two grounds for federal jurisdiction. Each will be addressed in turn.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Defendant first asserts that federal question jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although all Plaintiffs' claims are brought under state law, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs “disguised [ ] federal claims as state law claims” “in a calculated effort to evade federal court.” Doc. 24 at 1. It argues removal was proper because each of the claims actually arises under federal law.

Federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether such jurisdiction exists, “a court must look to the well-pleaded complaint alone. Thus, to meet their burden, the defendants must show that the plaintiffs' complaint, as it existed at the time of removal, provides an adequate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

1) “Arising Under” Federal Question Jurisdiction

As a general rule, a case “arises under” federal law only if it is federal law that creates the cause of action. Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Only a “special and small category” of cases will arise under federal law where a claim finds its origins in state law. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006). Wary of “herald[ing] a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts,” courts have declined to interpret this category broadly. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 319 (2005). Even the fact that a federal issue is an...

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