Ruiz v. Safeway, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A132202.,A132202. |
| Citation | 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 809,209 Cal.App.4th 1455 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Michael RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SAFEWAY, INC., Defendant and Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1071 et seq.
Abbey, Weitzenberg, Warren & Emery, Patrick W. Emery and Matthew R. Lilligren, Santa Rosa, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dillingham & Murphy, LLP, John N. Dahlberg, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.
Appellants Michael and Lydia Ruiz filed a complaint against Safeway, Inc., (Safeway) under Business and Professions Code section 25602. 1, 1 seeking damages for their son's death in a car accident. Safeway filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to prevail, as a matter of law, because it did not furnish or cause to be furnished alcohol to the minor who caused the accident within the meaning of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to Safeway. Appellants now appeal contending the trial court interpreted section 25602.1 incorrectly. We disagree and will affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2009, appellants' son Alexander was killed when his car was struck by a vehicle driven by an 18–year–old alleged drunk driver named Dylan Morse. Appellants sought to hold Safeway responsible for their son's death because shortly before the accident, a checker at one of Safeway's stores sold a 12–pack of beer to Morse's passenger at the time of the accident, Ryne Spitzer. The essential facts are as follows.
Spitzer was a student at Sonoma State University in Rohnert Park. Spitzer and Morse apparently were friends and on February 13, 2009, they made plans to attend a fraternity party. Spitzer and Morse drank beer and rum both before and during the fraternity party. The party was broken up by the police around midnight.
Spitzer and Morse returned to the dorms and sometime thereafter, Spitzer suggested they buy more beer. Morse agreed and he drove both of them to a nearby Safeway store arriving shortly before 2:00 a.m. Spitzer and Morse entered the store and went to the beer aisle. After making their selection, Spitzer and Morse returned to the checkout counter and Spitzer placed the beer on the belt. Spitzer and Morse stood next to each other and chatted with other customers as they waited in line. Spitzer moved forward to pay for the beer when it was his turn. The checker, Amy Gonzalez, who had 12 years of experience, scanned the beer. The store's computer system recognized that alcohol was being sold and reminded Gonzalez that the purchaser must be at least 21 years of age. Gonzalez asked Spitzer for identification. He gave her a California driver's license that indicated he was more than 21 years old. The license had not expired and Spitzer's features matched those on the photograph. The license also included a hologram, something Gonzalez knew was a feature on genuine licenses that are issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Detecting nothing that indicated the license was not genuine and currently in effect, Gonzales went forward with the sale. In fact, the license was forged.
Spitzer paid for the beer using his check card. The store's system processed the transaction and issued Spitzer a receipt. Spitzer and Morse then left the store, Spitzer carrying the beer in his hand.
Spitzer put the beer in the back of Morse's car and Morse began to drive back to Sonoma State. At one point, Spitzer took one of the bottles out of the box and handed it to Morse who estimated he drank about half of it as he drove. Shortly thereafter, Morse allegedly caused the car accident that led to the death of appellants' son.
Based on these facts, appellants filed a complaint seeking damages for wrongful death against Morse, Spitzer, and Safeway. As amended and as is relevant here, the complaint alleged Safeway was liable because it violated section 25602.1 which makes it illegal to sell, furnish, or give, or cause to be sold, furnished, or given, alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor. Appellants alleged Safeway violated the statute by furnishing or causing beer to be furnished to Morse.
Safeway filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to prevail, as a matter of law because (1) it did not furnish or cause beer to be furnished to Morse, and (2) even if it did, neither Morse nor Spitzer was “obviously intoxicated” when Spitzer purchased the beer on the night in question.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and ruled there was “a triable issue of fact as to the question of whether Ryne Spitzer and/or Dylan Morse were ‘obviously intoxicated minors' within the meaning of ... [section] 25602.1....” However, the court went on to rule there was “no triable issue of fact as to whether Safeway ... engaged in ‘... selling, furnishing, giving, or causing to be sold, furnished or given away ...’ alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor, in this case, the driver Dylan Morse.” Accordingly, the court ruled Safeway was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
After the court entered a judgment in favor of Safeway, appellants filed the present appeal.
I. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Safeway.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. The motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A moving defendant has met his burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by establishing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) We independently review an order granting summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 310, 313, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 489.)
Here, appellants' complaint contained a single cause of action against Safeway alleging a violation of section 25602.1, one of California's dram shop laws. To put appellants' arguments in context, we review California's evolving dram shop liability law.
For many years, the law in California was similar to that in other jurisdictions. If someone was injured by a person who was drunk, the proximate cause of the injury was deemed to be the consumption of alcohol by the negligent consumer, not the person who sold him the alcohol. (Salem v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 595, 599, 259 Cal.Rptr. 447 (Salem ).) That changed in the 1970s when our Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that applied a foreseeability analysis to conclude that the furnishing of alcohol to an intoxicated consumer could be the basis for a negligence claim. (Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 158–167, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151;Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, 323–325, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719;Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 149–155, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669.)
The Legislature responded swiftly to the change reflected in these specific decisions. In 1978 it adopted 25602, subdivision (c) that states, “... this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely ... Bernhard ... and Coulter ... be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.” At the same time, similar language was added to Civil Code section 1714.
The immunity granted by section 25602, is subject to one exception. When the Legislature adopted section 25602, it also adopted 25602.1 which sets forth the circumstances under which a licensee who provides alcohol to an intoxicated minor can be held liable for any proximately caused injury or death. As is relevant here, section 25602.1 states: “a cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against any person licensed, or required to be licensed, pursuant to Section 23300 ... who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage ... to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of that beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by that person.”
The latter statute, section 25602.1 is the statute upon which appellants rely. They argue Safeway can be held liable because its checker Gonzalez “furnished” or “caused ... to be ... furnished or given” alcohol to Morse within the meaning of the statute.
We begin our analysis by turning to the statute at issue. “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) We begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. (Ibid.) We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the statute's entire substance in order to determine its scope and purpose. (Ibid.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. (In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 906, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48, 87 P.3d 797.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to appellants' allegations. First, appellants contend Safeway can be held liable because checker Gonzalez “furnished” beer to Morse. The common meaning of the word “furnish” is “to supply with what is needed” (Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dict. (10th ed.2001) p. 473), and here there is no evidence that Gonzalez supplied...
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