Rumford Free Catholic Library v. Town of Rumford
| Decision Date | 13 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-00066-JDL |
| Parties | THE RUMFORD FREE CATHOLIC LIBRARY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF RUMFORD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
The Rumford Free Catholic Library, along with its president, Father Philip M. Stark, and one of its founders, Peter Francis Tinkham (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), bring this action, asserting that seventeen Defendants violated state and federal law during the course of their dealings with the Library over the past several years. The Plaintiffs initiated this action in the District of Rhode Island. It was subsequently transferred to this Court by an order of United States District Judge Mary S. McElroy dated February 25, 2020.
When the case was transferred, a number of motions were pending, and the parties have filed several additional motions since. Altogether, there are twenty-two motions currently pending. In this order, I consider seven of the Plaintiffs' motions, which are primarily related to procedural matters. For the reasons explained below, I deny all seven motions. I conclude by warning the Plaintiffs that filing additional motions lacking a good-faith legal basis will result in contempt proceedings and/or restrictions on their ability to file documents in this action.
Because the Plaintiffs are self-represented, I have recharacterized several motions in order to appropriately address the substance of the claims asserted in each motion and avoid unnecessary dismissal on technical grounds. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381-82 (2003). Before turning to the substance of the Plaintiffs' motions, however, I address the threshold question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to decide them.
On June 30, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of my order denying their motion for a temporary restraining order. "[O]nce a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of 'authority to proceed with respect to any matter touching upon, or involved in, the appeal.'" United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 71 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 455 (1st Cir. 1998)). This "'general rule' . . . is designed to prevent the possibility of inconsistent simultaneous rulings" by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. United States v. Maher, No. 2:04-cr-00093-GZS, 2020 WL 3473637, at *2 (D. Me. June 25, 2020) (quoting United States v. Torres-Oliveras, 583 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the filing of an interlocutory appeal restricts "only trial court proceedings that impinge directly upon the questions presented in the interlocutory appeal." Gladu v. Correct Care Sols., No. 2:14-cv-00384-JAW, 2017 WL 2452289, at *1 n.1 (D. Me. June 6, 2017) (citing Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Me. Attorney Gen., 332 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260 (D. Me. 2004)).
Assuming without deciding that the Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal was proper under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1), I conclude that the filing of the appeal does not affect the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the present motions. My order denying the Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, which the Plaintiffs have appealed, focused on the applicability of the jurisdictional bar contained in the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341. By contrast, the motions I address in this Order relate to questions of venue, removal, and the pretrial conduct of the parties and counsel. Thus, the questions presented in the Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal and those addressed in this Order are substantively unrelated, and there is little, if any, risk of inconsistent simultaneous rulings.
Even if the present motions did touch upon issues presented in the interlocutory appeal, the Court would still retain jurisdiction to decide them because the Plaintiffs' appeal is "transparently frivolous." Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Brooks, 145 F.3d at 456). In a letter informing the Court of their interlocutory appeal, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider any part of their case but did not identify any particular jurisdictional defects or provide any supporting authority or explanation. The Plaintiffs alternatively suggested that their motion for a temporary restraining order should have been granted because they had shown that they were likely to suffer "irreparable harm" and that the Defendants were not likely to suffer "demonstrable harm." ECF No. 91 at 1. In addition to misstating the standard for granting a temporary restraining order,1 this argument does not address the applicability of the Tax Injunction Act's jurisdictional bar, which I relied on in the order denying the Plaintiffs' motion. Indeed, the Plaintiffs admitted that they "did not bother to read [the] long list of cases referenced in support of [the] order, because [they] take the First Amendment view that so-called case law is a construct designed by judges and welcomed by attorneys . . . to abridge the Plaintiffs' right to have their grievances actually heard and redressed by a federal jury." ECF No. 91 at 2. Unsupported and baseless allegations of judicial conspiracy and bias are not legitimate grounds for appeal. Thus, based on the record before me, I conclude that the Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal patently lacks merit and does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to decide the present motions.
I begin with the Plaintiffs' motion to transfer venue to the District of Rhode Island, where the case was originally filed (ECF No. 62). Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 2020), a district court may transfer a civil action to another district if the plaintiff could have originally brought the action in that district.2 See Johnson v. VCG Holding Corp., 767 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (D. Me. 2011) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960)). Similarly, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a) (West 2020) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West 2020) permit courts to cure improper venue or lack of jurisdiction by transferring an action to another district if the plaintiff could have originally brought the action in that district. Plaintiffs may bring a civil action in:
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) (West 2020). "The burden of proving the propriety of a transfer lies with the party seeking it." Johnson, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (citing Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000)).
For the reasons comprehensively laid out in Judge McElroy's February 25th order transferring the case to this Court, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they may properly bring this action in the District of Rhode Island. This case does not involve defendants residing in Rhode Island, events that occurred in substantial part in Rhode Island, or property in Rhode Island, and the Plaintiffs have not established that any of the Defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Rhode Island. See ECF No. 45 at 2-4. Instead, as Judge McElroy found, this case involves "claims against Maine residents . . . about events allegedly taking place almost exclusively in Maine and . . . [concerning] real property located in Maine." ECF No. 45 at 4. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a basis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a), § 1406(a), or § 1631 for this case to be transferred back to the District of Rhode Island.
The Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that they are entitled to a transfer under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Plaintiffs contend that the Petition Clause gives them the right to litigate in the court of their choice, so long as that court has jurisdiction to hear the case.3 This argument is without merit for two reasons.
First, it is not supported by the Petition Clause precedents of the First Circuit or the Supreme Court. "While it is true that the right of petition includes access to the courts," Doherty v. Merck & Co., 892 F.3d 493, 499 (1st Cir. 2018), the right of petition under the First Amendment is not "absolute," McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). The Plaintiffs do not identify any caselaw suggesting that the Petition Clause contains a right of access to the court of their choice, nor do they cite to any caselaw indicating that the transfer and venue statutes cited above violate the Petition Clause. Accordingly, I conclude that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a transfer of this case back to the District of Rhode Island under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.
Second, even if the Petition Clause did permit the Plaintiffs to litigate in any court having jurisdiction, they still would not be entitled to a transfer. As Judge McElroy has already determined, the District Court for the District of Rhode Island does not have jurisdiction to hear this case because it lacks personal jurisdiction over all seventeen Defendants. The Plaintiffs respond that personal jurisdiction is a "red-herring" and argue that it "has never actually been of any legal force or effect." ECF No. 62 at 6. They contend that the District Court for the District of Rhode Island has jurisdiction to hear this case because it has subject-matter...
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