Rump v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1998 |
| Citation | 710 A.2d 1093,551 Pa. 339 |
| Parties | Samuel W. RUMP, Appellant, v. The AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
The sole issue on appeal is whether a person who has selected the "limited tort" option for his automobile insurance policy pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL") 1 is precluded from recovering noneconomic damages (i.e pain and suffering) under the uninsured motorist provisions of his insurance policy where the accident was caused by an uninsured motorist whose vehicle was registered in a state other than Pennsylvania. Because we find that the MVFRL precludes such a recovery, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
The facts for purposes of this appeal are not in dispute. Appellant was a designated insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by appellee, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ("Aetna"). When purchasing this insurance policy, appellant selected the "limited tort" insurance option pursuant to the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705. The purchase of the "limited tort" option allowed appellant to reduce his insurance premium. In return for this reduced premium, appellant was generally precluded from recovering for a noneconomic loss 2 unless he sustained a "serious injury" 3 from the accident. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d).
On April 18, 1991, appellant was involved in an automobile accident. The parties stipulated that the accident was caused by an uninsured driver who was operating a motor vehicle registered in the State of Minnesota. As a result of the accident, appellant filed a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of his automobile insurance policy with Aetna for noneconomic damages. Aetna denied appellant's claim on the grounds that appellant, as a limited tort claimant, was not eligible to recover noneconomic damages because he had not suffered a "serious injury" as defined by the MVFRL.
Appellant responded to Aetna's denial of his claim for uninsured benefits by filing a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that he was not precluded from maintaining a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of his automobile insurance policy with Aetna for noneconomic damages. Appellant's complaint admitted that he did not suffer a "serious injury" from the accident. However, appellant claimed he was entitled to recover noneconomic damages because he fell within the following two exceptions set forth in the MVFRL:
(d) Limited tort alternative--Each person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss, except that:
(1) An individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election who sustains damages in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person may recover damages as if the individual damaged had elected the full tort alternative whenever the person at fault ...
(ii) is operating a motor vehicle registered in another state ... or
(iv) has not maintained financial responsibility as required by this chapter, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect the limitation of section 1731(d)(2) ().
75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(ii) and (iv) (emphasis added). 4 Thus, appellant claimed he was entitled to recover noneconomic damages pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy with Aetna because the person at fault was uninsured and operating a vehicle registered in another state.
Aetna responded to this claim by arguing that the "provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect the limitation of section 1731(d)(2)" language of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(iv) applies to all of the exceptions found in 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1). Thus, Aetna asserted that the limitation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2) 5 applied to appellant and precluded him from recovering uninsured motorist benefits for noneconomic damages.
The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On May 3, 1993, the trial court denied both motions on the basis that there remained genuine issues of material fact still to be determined. On May 24, 1995, the trial court reversed itself and granted summary judgment in favor of appellant. In making this decision, the trial court found that the "provided that" clause in 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(iv), which refers to the limitation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2), only applied to subparagraph (iv). Thus, the trial court concluded that appellant was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits for noneconomic damages pursuant to subparagraph (ii) of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1) ().
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court. After applying principles of statutory construction, the Superior Court found that the "provided that" clause referred to all of paragraph (1) of 42 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d). Thus, the Superior Court concluded that the limitation of75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2) controlled and that none of the exceptions found at75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(i)-(iv) would allow appellant to recover noneconomic damages from the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy.
This Court granted allocatur in order to determine whether the "provided that" language at 42 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(iv) applies only to that particular subparagraph or to all the subparagraphs of paragraph (1) in 42 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d). Our determination of this issue centers on an analysis of the controlling statutory language.
When determining the proper application of the "provided that" language, we are guided by the Statutory Construction Act. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). As this Court has noted, the repeal of the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.101, and the simultaneous enactment of the MVFRL, reflected a legislative "concern for the spiralling consumer cost of automobile insurance and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public highways." Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 Pa. 583, 587, 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 (1994). This legislative concern over the increasing costs of automobile insurance is the public policy which is to be advanced when interpreting the statutory provisions of the MVFRL. Id.
The interpretation of what provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1) are affected by the "provided that" languages entails an understanding of how the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes are arranged. A section of an act like 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705 is subdivided into subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, and such other subdivisions as may be required for clarity of expression and uniformity of style. 1 Pa.C.S. § 301(c). The introduction to the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes contains the following remarks:
To encourage uniformity of style, and to provide helpful suggestions relating to the step-by-step mechanics of drafting a codification bill, the Legislative Reference Bureau has published a detailed Style Manual for the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. See 101 Pa.Code § 21.1 et seq.
Pa.C.S. Introduction. This Style Manual, contained in the Pennsylvania Code, provides the following guidance as to how sections are organized in the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes:
§ 23.26 Internal Divisions of sections.
Whenever internal divisions are necessary, subsections shall be identified by lower case letters, paragraphs by Arabic numerals, subparagraphs by lower case Roman numerals, clauses by capital letters and subclauses by capital Roman numerals, all contained within parentheses, as follows:
Terminology Illustrative Symbol
Subsection (a)
Paragraph (1)
Subparagraph (i)
Clause (A)
Subclause (I)
101 Pa.Code § 23.26. Since, as the parties admit, the legislative history of section 1705 is silent as to the proper scope of the "provided that" language, we are guided by the principles enunciated at 101 Pa.Code § 23.26.
Based on these principles, it is clear that provision (1) of subsection 1705(d) () is a paragraph since it is illustrated by an Arabic numeral. It is also clear that provisions (i) through (iv) of paragraph (1) () are subparagraphs because they are illustrated by a lower case Roman numeral. The language in dispute, which is contained in subparagraph (iv), states "provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect the limitations of section 1731(d)(2)." Thus, the plain meaning of the language in dispute is that the "provided that" language applies to all of the provisions of paragraph (1). Therefore, since we must assume that the General Assembly knew what a paragraph meant in terms of constructing a statutory provision, we hold that the plain meaning of the "provided that" language is that the limitations of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2) apply to all the subparagraphs contained in paragraph (1) of...
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