Runge v. Morriss

• Decision Date: 29 June 1883
• Docket Number: Case No. 1483-4888.
• Citation: 60 Tex. 119
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: KAUFFMAN & RUNGE v. T. W. MORRISS ET AL.

60 Tex. 119

KAUFFMAN & RUNGE

v.T. W. MORRISS ET AL.

Case No. 1483-4888.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jun. 29, 1883.

APPEAL from Burleson. Tried below before the Hon. I. B. McFarland.

Suit brought by the appellee Morriss, joined by the other appellee, Mrs. Connor, against Thos. F. Hudson and others, to set aside a sheriff's sale of land, made under a venditioni exponas based on a judgment owned by the appellees.

The ground on which the appellees sought to set aside the sale was that, without any fault on their part, and owing to circumstances beyond their control, the land was sold for a grossly inadequate price.

The appellants Kauffman & Runge, who had bought out Hudson's interest pending the suit, intervened as defendants.

The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs. Kauffman & Runge alone appealed.

About the 20th of March, 1867, the district court of Burleson county rendered its judgment in favor of W. S. Holmes against B. Boulds Baker for $7,389.86, with a foreclosure of the vendor's lien on a tract of land described in the judgment. The judgment bore interest from its date at ten per cent. per annum.

During the pendency of that suit a three-fourths interest in the notes sued on was transferred to the plaintiff Morriss, and one-fourth to the intervenor, Mrs. Connor. The suit was, however, prosecuted to judgment in the name of the original plaintiff, Holmes.

At the rendition of the judgment, Boulds Baker was insolvent and afterwards went into bankruptcy.

On the 15th of April, 1867, an execution against Baker for costs was issued to Galveston county, which was returned nulla bona. On the 30th of March, 1868, another execution for costs was issued to Burleson county in favor of the officers of court, which was returned satisfied.

On the 3d of April, 1868, the writ was issued under which the sale was made.

The execution and order of sale were not returnable until the second Monday after the first Monday in September, 1868. The sale was made under the venditioni exponas on the first Tuesday in May, 1868, the earliest day at which it could have been made, and two thousand three hundred and fifty-six acres of land, worth from $2.75 to $5 per acre, were sold to Hudson for account of himself and Holmes for twenty-one cents per acre, aggregating $494.76.

The owners of the judgment knew nothing of the issuance of the order of sale until after it was made.

The court found as conclusions:

1. That Morriss and Mrs. Connor were the owners of the judgment against Baker under which the order of sale was issued and the sale made.

2. That Mrs. Connor, who was a daughter of Holmes, was, at the date of the sale, a minor, and that neither Morriss nor Baker was present at the sale. That Morriss had no notice of the issuance of the order of sale, or of the advertisement of sale, until after the sale had been made, and that had he been informed of it, he would have attended and made the land bring the amount of the judgment.

3. That under the circumstances attending the issuance of the order of sale and the advertisement and sale of the land, Morriss was not chargeable with negligence in failing to attend the sale.

4. That Hudson was induced to bid for the land by the representations of Holmes that the land would sell very low, as Morriss was not present. That Hudson's purchase, though made in his own name, was made with a private understanding between him and Holmes that it should be for their joint benefit and to be afterwards divided between them.

5. That the land sold for a greatly inadequate price.

6. That the inadequacy was caused by the manner of issuing the execution and making the sale.

7. That the sale was unfair and inequitable, and was a legal fraud on the plaintiff and intervenor; and that they were legally and equitably entitled to have it set aside and annulled.

The foregoing, in connection with the facts stated in the opinion, will be sufficient for a proper understanding of the case.

Robert G. Street, for appellants, cited: Taul v. Wright, 45 Tex., 395;Hancock v. Metz, 15 Tex., 210;Sydnor v. Roberts, 13 Tex., 598;Howard v. North, 5 Tex., 290;13 Johns., 97; 1 Snow (Tenn.), 10; Wharton v. Sexton, 10 Wheat.

Sayles & Bassett and A. W. McIver, for appellee.

WILLIE, CHIEF JUSTICE.

Mere inadequacy of price is not in itself sufficient to warrant the interference of equity for the purpose of setting aside a sheriff's sale of property made to a bona fide purchaser. 1 Story's Eq., § 245; Rorer on Jud. Sales, § 854.

“But if in addition to such inadequacy there be any appearance of unfairness or any circumstance, accident or occurrence in relation to the sale of a character tending to cause such inadequacy, then the sale will be set aside.” Rorer on Jud. Sales, § 398.

When the disproportion between the value of the property and the price for which it sold is enormous, but slight additional circumstances will justify the inference that the sale is fraudulent. Allen v. Stephanes, 18 Tex., 658.

And in such cases, if “there are circumstances attending the sale which may have operated to prevent the property from bringing a higher price, although at the time they may have been unknown to the purchaser, the sale will be regarded by the court as, in its legal sense, fraudulent.” Chamblee v. Tarbox, 27 Tex., 146.

These are some of the general principles by which the courts of the country, including those of our own state, are governed in setting aside judicial sales when the property has sold for less than its value.

Inadequacy of price is the inducement to the action of the court in disturbing the sale, after the establishment of a cause sufficient to authorize it to interpose. Cohen v. Wagner, 6 Gill, 236.

What causes are sufficient for this purpose cannot well be reduced to any general rule, but they must be such as were calculated to prevent the property from bringing its value, or something reasonably near what it should bring at public sale, and which on the particular occasion have actually produced that effect.

In the case of Hoppock v. Conklin, 4 Sandf. Ch., 582, the court set aside a sale where the property brought one-third of its value, and the defendant was prevented from attending the sale by accidental causes, and had written to an agent to represent him, and had reason to believe that the plaintiff in execution and his solicitor would not let the premises be sold for less than the debt and costs.

In May v. May, 11 Paige, 201, a sale was set aside where the property brought about one-ninth of its value, because the auctioneer was guilty of some irregularities in crying the wrong bid, and suspending the sale temporarily, the judgment creditor being ignorant that the sale was to take place.

In Seaman v. Riggins, 1 Green Ch., 214, the...