Runnels v. Stephens

• Decision Date: 15 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2:12-CV-0074-J-BB,2:12-CV-0074-J-BB
• Parties: TRAVIS TREVINO RUNNELS, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

TRAVIS TREVINO RUNNELS, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

No. 2:12-CV-0074-J-BB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION

March 15, 2016

(death-penalty case)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Travis Trevino Runnels petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence out of Potter County, Texas. State v. Runnels, No. 48950-D (320th Dist. Ct., Potter Co., Tex. Oct. 28, 2005). He contends his conviction and sentence should be set aside because he received ineffective representation from trial counsel and state habeas counsel. He also raises several constitutional challenges to the Texas death penalty statute. For the reasons stated below, it is the opinion of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the petition should be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After pleading guilty, Runnels was convicted and sentenced to death for the 2003 murder of Stanley Wiley, a civilian prison employee. Runnels killed Mr. Wiley while he (Runnels) was incarcerated in the penitentiary. Runnels filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing. (19 RR 25).¹ Direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") is automatic in death penalty cases, and in 2007, the CCA unanimously affirmed the conviction and death sentence in an unpublished opinion. Runnels v. State, No. AP-75,318, 2007 WL 2655682 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2007). The Court takes the following recitation of facts from that opinion:

Appellant did not enjoy working as a janitor at the prison boot factory. On the morning of the day of the murder, he expressed anger at the fact that he had not been transferred to being a barber as he had requested. He told fellow inmate Bud Williams that he was going to be "shipped one way or another" and that "he was going to kill someone." Appellant said that he would kill Wiley if Wiley said anything to him that morning. Appellant told another inmate, William Gilchrist, that he planned to hold the boot-factory plant manager hostage in the office after the other correctional officers had left. Finally, after appellant had arrived at the boot factory, he told fellow inmate Phillip Yow that he was going to do something.

During the first shift at the boot factory, appellant approached Wiley, raised a knife, tilted Wiley's head back, and cut his throat. Appellant then wiped the knife with a white rag and walked back toward the trimming tables. When Yow later asked appellant why he had attacked Wiley, appellant said, "It could have been any offender or inmate, you know, as long as they was white." In response to Yow's explanation that appellant could get the death penalty if Wiley died, appellant responded, "A dead man can't talk."

Wiley did die from the injury. It was later determined that the cut was a twenty-three centimeter long neck wound that transected the external carotid artery and the internal jugular vein and extended in depth to the spine. A medical examiner found that the force required to inflict the wound was "moderate to severe." Appellant was twenty-six years old when he committed the offense.

Runnels filed an application for habeas relief in the convicting court. The trial judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending habeas relief be denied. (1 SHCR 297). The CCA held the application in abeyance, however, and ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiaryhearing on an ineffective-assistance claim and on a claim that Runnels's guilty plea was involuntary. Ex parte Runnels, No. WR-46,226-02 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8, 2011) (remand order). The trial judge conducted the hearing, made supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, and again recommended that relief be denied. (2 SHCR 7). The CCA adopted both the initial and supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied relief. Ex parte Runnels, No. WR-46,226-02, 2012 WL 739257 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2012) (orig. proceeding).

Runnels filed his federal habeas corpus petition on December 28, 2012 ("Petition," doc. 17). Respondent filed its answer on July 8, 2013 ("Answer," doc. 30). At the Court's request, both parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the Supreme Court's opinion in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), which held that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) applies to Texas habeas petitioners. ("Reply," doc. 34; "Surreply," doc. 35). This petition is subject to the amendments of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("AEDPA"), and the Court will address the standard created by the AEDPA where specifically applicable to the issues.²

II. CLAIMS RAISED

Runnels raises the following claims in the federal petition:

1. The state court unreasonably denied his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). (Petition at 15-23).

2. State habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to obtain psychological testing and "meaningfully participate" in the evidentiary hearing ordered by the CCA. (Petition at 24-27).

3. The Texas capital sentencing statute does not permit meaningful appellatereview, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Petition at 27-36).

4. The Texas capital sentencing statute violates the Constitution in multiple ways. (Petition at 36-42).

7.³ The Texas capital sentencing statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. (Petition at 42-45).

8. The Texas death-penalty statute violates the Constitution by preventing jurors from knowing the effect of ahold-out juror at sentencing. (Petition at 45-48).

9. The Texas definition of mitigating evidence prevents the jury from considering all evidence relevant to mitigate the death sentence, such as the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. (Petition at 48-58).

10. The Texas statute violates Equal Protection and the Eighth Amendment by failing to set uniform standards for prosecutors in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in a capital case. (Petition at 38-39, 58-86).

Respondent contends claim 2 and portions of claim 1 are unexhausted and procedurally barred. He contends claims 3, 7, 8, 9, and most of claim 4 are procedurally barred because they were dismissed in state court as procedurally barred. Respondent also asserts all of the claims lack merit. Runnels clarifies in his Reply that claim 2 is not a constitutional claim for relief, but an argument under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) to excuse any procedural default of claim 1 and to allow Runnels to develop and relitigate claim 1 in this Court. (Reply at 3-4, 9). Claims 1 and 2 will be addressed together.

III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (CLAIMS 1 & 2)

Runnels's first claim for relief alleges trial counsel was ineffective. Runnels first contends his trial counsel, Mr. Jim Durham, unreasonably limited or failed to conduct an adequate investigation into potentially mitigating evidence. Specifically, he asserts the report of the trialteam's neuropsychologist, Richard Fulbright, should have indicated to Mr. Durham that more psychiatric testing was needed. Secondly, Runnels contends trial counsel Mr. Durham failed to formulate a viable mitigation strategy with the readily available evidence of Runnels's chaotic childhood, a history of misconduct at an extremely young age and diagnosed while Runnels was still a juvenile, and a complete lack of any attempt by family or institutions to provide help. (Petition at 20-23). In claim two, Runnels asserts state habeas counsel, Mr. Joe Marr Wilson, was ineffective in the manner he litigated the ineffective-assistance claim against Mr. Durham. (Petition at 24-27).

A. Procedural Bar

Before state prisoners may seek federal habeas relief, they must first exhaust their available state remedies in order to give the state courts an opportunity to correct alleged violations of federal rights. See § 2254(b)(1); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). "[T]he petitioner must afford the state court a 'fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.'" Johnson v. Cain, 712 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bagwell v. Dretke, 372 F.3d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 2004)). If a prisoner fails to exhaust a claim, it may be procedurally barred. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).

Respondent contends the particular allegation regarding Mr. Durham's failure to obtain further psychiatric testing was not presented to the state court and is, therefore, procedurally barred. The Court disagrees. The state habeas application specifically asserted that Dr. Fulbright could not administer additional tests because of prison testing conditions. (1 SHCR 18). It further alleged that Dr. Fulbright's report, along with school and juvenile probation records, all contained information that would have prompted competent counsel to "further investigate some of the informationcontained therein." (1 SHCR 16-19). The Court finds these allegations were sufficient to afford the state court a fair opportunity to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon the assertion that Mr. Durham should have obtained more psychiatric testing. Claim one, alleging a failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and a failure to present mitigation evidence, is exhausted.

B. Factual Background

Prior to addressing the allegations of ineffectiveness against Mr. Durham and Mr. Wilson, the facts related to the prosecution and the post-conviction proceedings in this case are set out in some detail below.

1. Pretrial

Stanley Wiley was murdered on January 29, 2003, and the district attorney filed a criminal complaint for the offense of murder. (1 CR 2). The State Counsel...