Runyon v. Bennett
| Decision Date | 04 November 1836 |
| Citation | 34 Ky. 598 |
| Parties | Runyon et als v. Bennett. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MADISON COUNTY.
Mr Turner for appellants.
Mr Breck for appellee.
A supersedeas suspends the efficacy of a judgment, but does not, like a reversal annul the judgment itself. Its object and effect are to stay future proceedings, and not to undo what is already done. It has no retroactive operation, so as to deprive the judgment of its force and authority from the beginning, but only suspends them after and while it is itself effectual. A consequence of this is, that whatever is done under the judgment, after and while it is superseded being done without authority from the judgment, which is then powerless, and against the authority and mandate of the supersedeas, should be set aside as improperly and irregularly done; but that whatever is done according to the judgment, before the supersedeas takes effect, is upheld by the authority of the judgment, and is not overreached by the supersedeas. But the question is, when does the supersedeas take effect so as to suspend the force and authority of the judgment, and render all further proceedings upon it irregular?
A supersedeas suspends the efficacy of a judg't; but does not annul it, as a reversal does.
It takes effect, not at the mement when it is issued; but when the certificate is filed in the office of the clerk of the court below, or when due notice to the officers or party to be restrained by it.
It operates prospectively, not retrospectively.-- Whatever is lawfully done under the judgment before the supersedeas takes effect, is valid and must stand. Anything done afterwards, is unauthorized by the judgment, and must be set aside.
It seems to us, that the judgment of one tribunal can not be deprived of its force, or in any maner affected, by the order of another, until there be some evidence of the order among the records of that tribunal in which the judgment itself remains, or some notice of it given to the officers concerned in executing the judgment, or at least to the parties to be benefitted by it. It would be unreasonable to suppose that either the Court which renders the judgment, or its officers or the party claiming under it, are bound to take notice of the ex parte order for a supersedeas at the moment when it is granted. The law has determined otherwise. It has furnished the party...
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