Runyon v. Com.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1965 |
| Citation | 393 S.W.2d 877 |
| Parties | Woodrow W. RUNYON, Sr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Jean L. Auxier, Pikeville, for appellant.
Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., J. T. Frankenberger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.
Appellant, Woodrow W. Runyon, Sr., was convicted in the Pike Circuit Court under an indictment charging him with submitting a false claim to the Pike County Board of Education. See KRS 434.240. He was given one year in the penitentiary. It is from this conviction and his subsequent sentence that he appeals. The grounds urged for reversal of the judgment are:
1. No public offense was charged: (a) KRS 434.240 does not apply because a school district is not a political subdivision of the state; and (b) the indictment does not charge the offense defined by the statute.
2. There was a variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof.
3. The procedure followed by the Commonwealth denied him his state and federal rights to a speedy trial.
4. He has been subjected to double jeopardy by the herein conviction.
We shall answer each of these questions in the order presented.
Up until the approximate time the indictments hereinafter mentioned were returned by the grand jury, appellant was the supervisor of school buses for the Pike County Board of Education. One of his duties as such was to purchase parts for the repair of the buses owned and operated by the Board and to submit claims therefor to it for approval and payment.
At a date not set forth in the record, he began the practice of submitting false claims from a nonexistent auto-parts firm by the name of 'Curtis Auto Parts' at Williamson, West Virginia. He would present the false invoice to the Board and it would approve it. He would then write the word 'hold' on this invoice, thus instructing the finance officer of the Board (who mailed out the Board's checks) to hold the check for appellant to personally pick up. He would then obtain the check and deposit it in the First National Bank of Williamson, West Virginia, under the fictitious name of 'T. C. Curtis, Curtis Auto Parts.' One spurious invoice dated June 4, 1963, was for $452.25 and it is this transaction that is the basis for the indictment and conviction involved in this appeal. This particular invoice and a check for the amount mentioned were not held to be picked up later by appellant but were mistakenly mailed by the finance officer to 'Curtis Auto Parts' at Williamson, West Virginia. The envelope and its contents came back stamped, 'Addressee Unknown,' and subsequent investigation carried out by the Board unfolded appellant's numerous alleged fraudulent acts.
On January 9, 1963, appellant was indicted by the grand jury for embezzling $18,178.01, this being the total amount he is accused of abstracting from the Board. He entered a plea of not guilty on January 14th. After a general continuance the case was set for trial on June 17, 1963. At some time before June 15th, the grand jury returned thirty-two indictments against him for submitting false claims 'to the Pike County Board of Education, a political sub-division of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.'
On June 15th the Commonwealth's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the embezzlement indictment for the reason that the thirty-two false-claim indictments covered the same money alleged to have been embezzled; and that the offenses of submitting false claims, not the offense of embezzlement, were the alleged crimes for which he should be tried. On June 17th the circuit judge overruled this motion and, over the strenuous objections of the Commonwealth's attorney, proceeded to trial on the embezzlement charge. The Commonwealth's attorney refused to prosecute under this charge and introduced no evidence. Also, no evidence was introduced on behalf of appellant. The jury, after being instructed, retired and came back with a not-guilty verdict.
In November of 1963 Runyon was tried on one of the thirty-two indictments for submitting a false claim, namely, the one mentioned above involving $452.25, and was convicted.
Appellant's contention that KRS 434.240 does not apply because, as claimed, the Pike County school district is not a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, is refuted by both the statutory and the case law of this state. We need only set forth brief statements from some of the authorities in order to settle this issue definitely. KRS 61.420(5), in defining a political subdivision, states that it includes 'counties, municipal corporations, and school districts.' The case of Board of Education of City of Corbin v. City of Corbin, 301 Ky. 686, 192 S.W.2d 951, 952, states as follows: 'Although some of the independent districts are coterminous with cities of the Commonwealth, each is a municipality or political subdivision separate and distinct from such a city.' (Emphasis added.) Board of Education of Louisville v. Society of Alumni of L.M.H.S., Inc., Ky., 239 S.W.2d 931, makes this relevant statement: 'In this state public education has long been recognized as a function of state government, and members of boards of education have been held to be state officers.' See also City of Louisville et al. v. Board of Education of Louisville, 302 Ky. 647, 195 S.W.2d 291, and City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S.W. 411.
Thus, the only conclusion possible is that the Pike County school district is a political subdivision of this state, the members of which are state officers, and it follows that the indictment drawn under KRS 434.240 did charge a public offense.
As a subdivision of his first point appellant also maintains the indictment is defective because it fails to allege a specific intent to commit the crime. KRS 434.240 denounces three things in connection with any claim made against the state or any political subdivision thereof: (a) Making a false and fraudulent statement of an account; (b) fraudulently omitting to make a true statement of an account; and (c) altering a statement after it has been accurately made. This statute then says, in part, there must be a fraudulent intent: First, 'to conceal the true condition of the account;' or secondly, 'to acquit any person of such an account;' or thirdly, 'to obtain or to...
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Ernst v. Com., No. 2002-SC-1088-MR.
...accomplishes this end result [of apprising the accused with reasonable certainty of the offense charged]." Runyon v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ky.1965). Because the indictment gave Appellant sufficient notice of the acts alleged as criminal and the crime charged, it satisfied his s......
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Wolbrecht v. Com., s. 95-SC-229-M
...Ky., 821 S.W.2d 804 (1991). It has additionally been held that reasonable certainty about the charge is required, Runyon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 877 (1965), and that a defendant has the right to rely on the fact that he would only have to rebut evidence of which he was given notice......
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Finch v. Com.
...factual elements. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 21; Hines v. Commonwealth, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 152; Runyan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 877. So we think there was no error here in the overruling of the indictment. But we think it was error to overrule the motion for a bill......
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Wilson v. Com.
...Ky., 419 S.W.2d 146; Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 21; Hines v. Commonwealth, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 152; Runyon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 877. In RCr 6.12 it is stated that an indictment shall not be deemed invalid for any defect or imperfection which does not tend to prejudi......