Runyon v. Smith

• Decision Date: 25 June 1948
• Citation: 308 Ky. 73,212 S.W.2d 521
• Parties: RUNYON, Commonwealth's Attorney, et al. v. SMITH et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

212 S.W.2d 521

308 Ky. 73

RUNYON, Commonwealth's Attorney, et al. v. SMITH et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 25, 1948

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; Will H. Fulton, Special Judge.

Action involving constitutionality of act reorganizing judicial districts between John A. Runyon, as Commonwealth's Attorney, and others, and Daniel Boone Smith and others. From the judgment, John A. Runyon, as Commonwealth's Attorney and others, appeal.

Reversed with directions.

Francis M. Burke, O. T. Hinton, J. P. Hobson, Jr., Edward R. Hays and L. D. May, all of Pikeville, and Astor Hogg and G. E Reams, both of Harlan, for appellants.

R. L Maddox, of Middlesboro, amicus curiae in support of appellants.

Cleon K. Calvert, of Pineville, for appellee.

LATIMER Justice.

This action challenges the constitutionality of an Act of the last biennial session of the General Assembly, which had to do with the dismantling of three existing judicial districts, and reorganizing them into four judicial districts to be: (a) The 26th, composed of Harlan County alone, (b) the 33rd, composed of the counties of Letcher and Perry, (c) the 35th, composed of the county of Pike alone, and (d) the newly created 41st district to be composed of the counties of Bell and Leslie, one taken from the 26th district and the other from the 33rd.

At a special term of the Pike Circuit Court presided over by Special Judge, Honorable Will H. Fulton, the Act was adjudged to be invalid because violative of Section 138 of the Constitution. However, it might be added here that there is the following unchallenged statement in appellants' brief:

'The learned Special Judge was in sympathy with the purpose to be served by the challenged Act and desired to sustain its constitutional validity, but did not feel that as trial Judge he could do so in view of the interpretation placed upon Section 138 of our Constitution by this Court in the cases of Scott v. McCreary, 148 Ky. 791, 147 S.W. 903 and Nolan v. Jones, 215 Ky. 238, 284 S.W. 1054, * * *.'

From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The attack upon the constitutionality of the Act is centered about and based upon the fact that it undertakes to create Pike and Harlan Counties into separate one-county judicial districts. The admitted allegations, proof and stipulations show that there is no city or town in either Pike or Harlan County which contains a population of 20,000 or more within its corporate limits; that in each of the counties the business is so extensive as to require a full time Judge in each county; that the population of Pike County, based on the 1940 Federal census, is 71,122 and Harlan County 75,275; that the area of Pike County is 779 square miles; that the area of Harlan County is 478 square miles; and that the business in each of the districts, including the newly created one, is sufficient to require all the time one Judge can give to court work.

Appellants take the position that the exigencies of the situation demanded action upon the part of the Legislature to meet the judicial necessities in this territory.

Appellees take the view that under Section 138 of the Constitution a single county cannot be made into a separate judicial district, regardless of the exigencies of the situation, unless it has a city with 20,000 population. Consequently, if there is an obstacle in the way of appellants it is Section 138 of the Constitution, which reads:

'Certain counties may constitute separate district; additional judges; practice. Each county having a city of twenty thousand inhabitants, and a population, including said city, of forty thousand or more, may constitute a district, and when its population reaches seventy-five thousand, the General Assembly may provide that it shall have an additional Judge, and such district may have a Judge for each additional fifty thousand population above one hundred thousand. And in such counties the General Assembly shall, by proper laws, direct in what manner the court shall be held and the business therein conducted.'

Appellants insist that it is not the provisions of Section 138 which present the difficulty but the interpretation of that section heretofore made in the Scott and Nolan cases above. There appears to be no attack made on the Act with reference to any of the districts except Pike and Harlan Counties. It is insisted, however, that the entire Act is invalid since it centers in the creation of Pike and Harlan Counties into separate single county judicial districts.

Appellees rest their entire case on the provisions of Section 138 above, and the interpretation thereof as found in the Scott and Nolan cases. A discussion of these cases will appear later.

We not approach the consideration of this Act with reference to Section 138 of the Constitution. In so doing we must marshal the rules of constructions applicable to constitutional interpretation. Immediate difficulty would ensue were we to lift Section 138 out of the Constitution and consider it alone. That no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all others and considered alone is an established rule of constitutional construction. All the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of all the provisions. 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 53; 94 A.L.R. 110. Sections 125 to 138, inclusive, of the Constitution relate to circuit courts. Under the rule of construction above, it then becomes immediately apparent that the road to Section 138 must necessarily lead through Section 125 and following. Thus, the various provisions of the Constitution relating to the creation of districts should be construed together and if possible they should be harmonized. We are likewise bound by the rule that every constitutional provision should be construed, where possible, to give effect to every other constitutional provision. People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N.W. 289, 27 A.L.R. 690; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, page 129.

In following the rules above, we regard only the instrument itself and the words employed therein in seeking to arrive at the meaning. However, there are other important aids to be invoked in helping to clear up any doubts or explain any apparent ambiguities, chief of which is looking at the intent of the framers. In arriving at the proper construction of any specific section we must consider the reason for the provision and the purpose of a convention in adopting it. Rhea v. Newman, 153 Ky. 604, 156 S.W. 154, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 989. And no part of the Constitution should be construed so as to defeat its substantial purpose or the reasonable intent in adopting it. Gaines v. O'Connell, 305 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425. Therefore, we may resort to the Constitutional Debates as an aid in placing the proper construction upon a specific section.

With the above rules in mind, we shall proceed to a consideration of Section 138. Since the road leading to it lies through the preceding sections, we shall first examine those which have to do with the creation of districts and the conditions and limitations placed thereon.

Section 128, dealing with the number and creation of districts, directs what shall be done by the General Assembly at its first session after the adoption of the Constitution. The General Assembly is directed to divide the State into a sufficient number of judicial districts to carry into effect the provisions of the Constitution concerning circuit courts, having due regard to territory, business, and population. There are two mandatory provisions in this section: (1) In making such apportionment no county shall be divided, and (2) The number of districts, excluding those in counties having a population of 150,000, shall not exceed one district for each 60,000 of the population of the entire State. There can be no guess here as to the basis of the apportionment. The thing to be kept in mind within the mandatory limitations is due regard to territory, business, and population. This was recognized in Willis v. Jonson, 275 Ky. 538, 121 S.W.2d 904, 907, when we said:

'(1) It was the duty of the Legislature in the creation of a new district to have due regard to territory, business and population; and (2) it is our duty to examine the facts in order to determine whether or not there was any evidence to support the legislative conclusion that a new district was necessary.'

This was again recognized in Willis v. Jonson et al., 279 Ky. 416, 130 S.W.2d 828, 830, when we said:

'We are of opinion that the constitutional requirement is that the legislature should look to the conditions as a whole and have due regard for the factors of territory, business and population as a unit. And in reviewing the legislature's discretionary action upon the factual conditions, the courts may not tear them apart and treat each separately--as in the fable of the bundle of sticks.'

In this same case we undertook to define due regard, and said:

"Due regard' we interpret as meaning the consideration in a degree appropriate to the demands of the particular case and the importance of the legislation of the three factors of territory, business and population in and of the districts affected.'

Section 132, dealing with the question of the creation of new districts, directs when the General Assembly may establish additional districts. This may be done when deemed necessary but subject to the mandatory provision, as set out in Section 128, that the whole number of districts exclusive of counties having a population of 150,000, shall not exceed at any time one for every 60,000 of population of the State according to the last enumeration. Judge Winn in his dissent ...