Rupley v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 02 October 1953 |
| Citation | 120 Cal.App.2d 548,261 P.2d 318 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | RUPLEY v. JOHNSON, Judge of Placerville Judicial Dist. Civ. 8451. |
Herman D. Jerrett, Sacramento, for appellant.
Robert E. Roberts, Paul J. McClarrinon, Asst. Dist. Atty., Placerville, for respondent.
Petitioner filed in this court a petition for a writ of mandate directing the Judge of the Placerville Judicial District to dismiss certain criminal complaints filed therein. We issued an alternative writ, and following the filing of respondent's answer and return the matter was argued before this court by respective counsel.
The factual situation as it appears from the petition and the return is substantially as follows:
Petitioner is a copartner in the trucking and hauling business. Between April and August, 1952, various drivers of the firm were cited by the California Highway Patrol for certain violations of the traffic laws (principally sections 705 and 711 of the Vehicle Code). Citations were issued to Rupley Bros. and their drivers, and copies of said citations were sent to the then Justice of the Peace Holland, together with signed but unsworn to complaint forms to each citation. These complaint forms were received and retained by the court but it does not appear that they were ever sworn to or filed. Petitioner appeared on the dates set forth in the citations but found the court not open for business. Subsequently, Justice of the Peace Holland sent notice for the reappearance by petitioner on August 25 and 26, 1952, but petitioner communicated with the Justice of the Peace and stated that he wished a few days more so that he could obtain an attorney to represent him, and the appearance date was re-set for September 12, 1952. Thereafter, petitioner's attorney, Herman D. Jerrett, informed Justice of the Peace Holland that he was engaged in a trial at Willows, California, and requested that the appearance and arraignment of petitioner be postponed until November 19, 1952. On said last mentioned date Attorney Jerrett appeared as counsel for petitioner and the persons named in the said citations, but stated to the court that he was only appearing to object to the authority and jurisdiction of the court and of the acting Justice of the Peace, contending that the court had no jurisdiction because it had no dockets, no receipt book, no records, no signed complaints, and could not act in the matter. Petitioner has never appeared personally in response to the citation nor has he entered any plea thereto. It appears that the former Justice of the Peace had committed certain acts and omissions constituting misfeasance and malfeasance in office, that on August 19, 1952, the records, dockets, files and papers of said Justice's Court were subpoenaed by the grand jury and held by them, that the said Justice of the Peace was removed from his office on December 20, 1952, and that respondent was appointed judge of said court effective February 10, 1953. Thereafter, on March 11, 1953, complaints signed by the complaining witnesses, on oath before respondent as judge of said court, were duly filed and petitioner and the other persons mentioned in the said citations were notified to appear on March 18, 1953. On that date attorney Jerrett appeared as counsel for all of said persons and refused to subject them to arraignment, and made a motion to dismiss all proceedings relating to said citations, which motion was denied on April 9, 1953. Respondent then notified the attorney for petitioner that the arraignment would be held on Tuesday, April 14, 1953, and on said date attorney Jerrett appeared as counsel for all defendants, refused to proceed with the arraignment and requested that all of the cases be postponed until after the instant mandamus proceeding had been heard and decided. He then served upon respondent copies of the petition for writ of mandate and points and authorities in support thereof.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a writ commanding that all of said complaints filed on March 11, 1953, be dismissed on the grounds of inexcusable delay, want of prosecution, and the denial of a right to a speedy trial. He cites Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States, and section 13 of Article I of the Constitution of California, which provide that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy trial. He also cites subdivision 3 of section 1382 of the Penal Code which reads, in part, as follows:
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Respondent in reply contends that no complaints were filed until the filing of the complaint on March 11, 1953, and that there is no merit in petitioner's contention that he is entitled to a dismissal of the pending complaints.
Section 739 of the Vehicle Code outlines the procedure by which a person arrested for a violation of the code, but no taken immediately before a magistrate, must be served with a notice to appear in court in answer to the violations. Petitioner in the instant case was served with such notice. Vehicle Code, section 739.1, goes on to provide:
'Whenever written notice to appear has been prepared, delivered and filed with the court, as provided in Section 739 hereof, * * * an exact and legible duplicate copy of said notice when filed with the magistrate specified herein, in lieu of a verified complaint, shall notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1426 of the Penal Code, constitute a complaint to which the defendant may plead 'Guilty.'
'If, however, the defendant shall violate his promise to appear in court * * *, or shall plead other than 'Guilty' of the offense charged, a complaint shall be filed which shall conform to the provisions of said Section 1426, Penal Code, and which shall be deemed to be an original complaint, and thereafter proceeding shall be had as provided by law; provided, that a defendant may, by an agreement in writing, subscribed by him and filed with the court, waive the filing of a verified complaint and elect that the prosecution may proceed upon the written notice mentioned in Section 739 hereof.'
It appears here that the petitioner-defendant pleaded other...
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...sets the Judicial process in motion by going to court. Until that happens, there is no 'judicial proceeding' (see Rupley v. Johnson (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 548, 553, 261 P.2d 318) and the actor's functions do not amount to one. (Vargas v. Giacosa (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 521, 527--528, 263 P.2d ......
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State v. Caffey
...252 F.2d 680, cert. denied 356 U.S. 964, 78 S.Ct. 1003, 2 L.Ed.2d 1071; People v. Jordan, 45 Cal.2d 697, 290 P.2d 484; Rupley v. Johnson, 120 Cal.App.2d 548, 261 P.2d 318; People v. Wilson, 10 A.D.2d 297, 200 N.Y.S.2d 792; People v. Aguirre, 181 Cal.App.2d 577, 5 Cal.Rptr. 477; State v. Bur......
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Stenback v. Municipal Court for San Jose-Milpitas-Alviso Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County
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People v. Clinesmith
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