Rupp v. Grantsville City
| Decision Date | 27 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 16270,16270 |
| Citation | 610 P.2d 338 |
| Parties | George RUPP et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GRANTSVILLE CITY et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Edward A. Watson, Tooele County Atty., Tooele, H. Wayne Green, Deputy Tooele County Atty., Grantsville, for defendants and respondents.
The plaintiffs bring this appeal from the District Court's dismissal of their suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the District Court that certain ordinances passed by the Grantsville City Commission were unconstitutional, and in excess of their statutory authority. They also requested injunctive relief from the mandatory aspects of the ordinance in question. We uphold the District Court's dismissal. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. No costs awarded.
Following a determination by the elected officials of Grantsville City that a municipal sewer system was necessary for the continued health and prosperity of the residents of the city, an ordinance was adopted in 1969. It required mandatory connection with the completed system. This ordinance was enacted to facilitate the procurement of certain federal funds, to defray the cost of construction. In fact, mandatory hook-up to the new system was a condition precedent to the receipt of the federal grants.
After the federal grants were obtained, the citizens of Grantsville approved, through a special election, the issuance of municipal bonds to cover the initial construction and maintenance expenses of the proposed system. Prior to the bond election, the city officials circulated a leaflet to the citizenry which outlined the approximate costs of the new system, and reflected the proposed application of various monies collected. Among the amounts detailed in the flyer was an initial $250 charge for each residence connected to the system. That sum was to be used to reduce the total amount financed by bonds.
Subsequently, bids on the various aspects of the construction were submitted, contracts were awarded, and the construction of the facility commenced. During the construction, the city officials discovered the consulting engineers who designed the system had mistakenly excluded 18,000 linear feet of necessary sewer laterals. To alleviate the financial problems created by this mistake the city officials determined the original connection fee should be increased from $250 to $300. However, before implementing this adjustment, the officials sent letters to the residents of Grantsville advising them of the mistake. The officials also advertised, and held a public meeting concerning the problem. The meeting was well attended. Following open discussion on the matter a vote was taken which endorsed the proposed solution.
The plaintiffs in the present matter are a number of named residents of Grantsville who refused to pay the connection fee. Following several letters notifying the plaintiffs of their failure to pay the fee and the consequences of continuing non-compliance the city officials discontinued water service to the plaintiffs' residences pursuant to a city ordinance allowing such actions for the enforcement of the mandatory sewer connection ordinance.
After reinstatement of their water services, 1 the plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of the mandatory hook-up ordinance, and the assessment of the associated fee. After a hearing on the merits, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
On appeal the plaintiffs present various nonmeritorious claims which will not be discussed. Rather, we direct our attention to the plaintiffs' contentions; (a) the municipality acted beyond its authority in enacting the ordinance mandating connection to the new sewage system, and (b) the termination of plaintiffs' water service because of their failure to pay the initial connection fee constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.
In Utah, municipalities are granted broad powers for the protection of the health and welfare of their residents. Among these powers is the statutory authority to establish and maintain public utilities for the benefit of those residents. 2 Inherent in the power to preserve and protect the health and welfare of municipal residents is the authority to adopt ordinances directed at the effectuation of that protection. This general grant of police power is codified in 10-8-84 which provides:
"They (municipalities) may pass all ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and such as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health and promote the prosperity . . . comfort and convenience of the city and inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; . . ."
The scope of police power conferred on municipal governments by the requirements incident to effective protection of the health and welfare of their citizenry are reflected in statutes such as 10-8-84. The relationship between a mandatory connection ordinance and this police power was recognized in Bigler v. Greenwood. 3 In Bigler, this Court in upholding the mandatory connection ordinance explained:
"Such an ordinance is undeniably proposed to protect the health and welfare and is therefor a valid exercise of authority expressly conferred under the police power."
There is nothing in the present situation which requires a retreat from that position. 4 The Grantsville ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the municipalities recognized police power and therefore is enforceable against the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs aver, however, the city's enforcement procedure represents an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. Concomitant to the mandatory connection ordinance was an ordinance providing for the discontinuation of domestic water service to the residents which failed to pay the initial connection fee or the monthly use fees.
The plaintiffs complain termination of their water service without a hearing deprived them of property without the requisite due process of law. We do not agree with this conclusion.
Several questions arise from this contention including the characterization of municipal water services as an entitlement constituting property under the purview of due process protection 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7, and the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to municipalities engaged in the operation of such public utilities. 6 However, in the present case the resolution of these issues is not required because the procedure available to the plaintiffs in relation to the discontinuation of their water services was sufficient to provide due process of law.
Specifically, prior to termination, the plaintiffs received several letters notifying them of the consequences of their continuing failure to comply with the terms of the ordinance in question. Thus, they were afforded adequate notice of the imminent action. The plaintiffs complain, however, that the failure of the municipality to grant them a pretermination hearing abridged their due process right.
However, "due process" is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances which can be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. 7 Rather the demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. 8
The protections embodied in the requirement of an opportunity to be heard do not necessarily require a pretermination hearing. In the present situation there is no question of fact requiring resolution at a hearing prior to termination of the water service. The amount due and owing is established and the only question involved is the legality of the ordinance. 9 The appropriate forum for a determination of the authority of the municipality to enact and enforce the ordinance in question is the courts of this State. Also in the present...
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...§ 5 (Supp.1989).91 See generally State in re L.G.W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981) (essentials of due process); Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980) (" '[D]ue process' is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances which can be ......
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...of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980). To a member of the bar or even to a layperson experienced with trial proceedings, setting a case for "hearing" could hav......
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