State v. Hutchinson

• Citation: 624 P.2d 1116
• Decision Date: 09 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 16087,16087
• Parties: The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William L. HUTCHINSON, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

Page 1116

624 P.2d 1116

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William L. HUTCHINSON, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 16087.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Dec. 9, 1980.

Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., R. Paul Van Dam, former Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

STEWART, Justice:

Defendant, a candidate for the office of Salt Lake County Commissioner, was charged with having violated § 1-10-4, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, which requires the filing of campaign statements and the disclosure of campaign contributions. That section provides:

Campaign Statements.

1. Every candidate for election or his designated committee secretary shall file with the county clerk on forms furnished by the clerk, full, correct and itemized statements of all monies and things of monetary value received and expended in the furtherance of said candidacy in accordance with the schedule set forth in this section.

5. All statements shall be dated and signed by the candidate and the committee secretary.

Failure to comply with those provisions is a misdemeanor.

A complaint charged defendant in two counts: (1) failure to report the name and address of a $6,000 contributor to his election campaign, and (2) failure to file supplemental campaign disclosures of the discharge of campaign debts and obligations.

Defendant filed a motion in a city court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the ordinance was in violation of the Utah Constitution. The court granted the motion and held that Salt Lake County was without constitutional or statutory authority to enact the ordinance under which defendant was charged and dismissed the complaint.

An appeal was taken to a district court which affirmed the dismissal. That court wrote a memorandum decision observing that "... it may be true that our Utah Supreme Court has not been completely consistent in every case on this issue, (but) the majority of the (Utah Supreme Court) cases have indicated that grants of powers to cities or counties are to be strictly construed to the exclusion of implied powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the purposes of the expressed powers granted." The court noted that, on the other hand, Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938), and Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), "suggest that a county has fairly broad power to enact ordinances ... under the general welfare clause of § 17-5-77 (Utah Code Annotated.)" Nevertheless, the court held that there is no express authority in state statutes authorizing the enactment of § 1-10-4 and that there was nothing that could be "implied from any express power that would justify the enactment of these ordinances." Accordingly, the court held the ordinance unconstitutional, and the State appeals. ¹

Defendant contends that because the Legislature has not specifically authorized counties to enact ordinances requiring disclosure of campaign contributions in county elections, Salt Lake County had no power to enact the ordinance in question. Alternatively, defendant contends that the ordinance is invalid because state statutes have preempted the field of regulation.

Concededly, the district court was correct in holding that the Legislature has not expressly authorized enactment of an ordinance requiring disclosure of campaign contributions in county elections. However, the Legislature has conferred upon cities and counties the authority to enact all necessary measures to promote the general health, safety, morals, and welfare of their citizens. Section 17-5-77, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides:

The board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances ... not repugnant to law ... necessary and proper to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, ... and may enforce obedience to such ordinances ... by fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment .... (Emphasis added.)

The Legislature has made a similar grant of power to the cities. ²

The specific issue in this case is whether § 17-5-77 by itself provides Salt Lake County legal authority to enact the ordinance for disclosure of campaign contributions, or whether there must be a specific grant of authority for counties to enact measures dealing with disclosures of campaign financing to sustain the ordinance in question. Defendant claims that the powers of municipalities must be strictly construed and that because Salt Lake County did not have specific, delegated authority to enact the ordinance in issue, the ordinance is invalid.

The rule requiring strict construction of the powers delegated by the Legislature to counties and municipalities is a rule which is archaic, unrealistic, and unresponsive to the current needs of both state and local governments and effectively nullifies the legislative grant of general police power to the counties. Furthermore, although the rule of strict construction is supported by some cases in this State, it is inconsistent with other cases decided by this Court a situation that permits a choosing from among conflicting precedents to support a particular result.

Dillon's Rule, which requires strict construction of delegated powers to local governments, was first enunciated in 1868. ³ The rule was widely adopted during a period of great mistrust of municipal governments ⁴ and has been viewed as "the only possible alternative by which extensive governmental powers may be conferred upon our municipalities, with a measurable limit upon their abuse." ⁵

The courts, in applying the Dillon Rule to general welfare clauses, have not viewed the latter as an independent source of power, but rather as limited by specific, enumerated grants of authority. See, i. e., American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). More recently, however, reasoned opinion regarding the validity of the rule has changed. One authority has noted the harmful effects that the rule of strict construction has had upon the effective exercise of appropriate municipal authority:

Any vestige of inherent powers or liberality in construing delegated powers was soon swept away by the Dillon Rule. This rule was formulated in an era when farm-dominated legislatures were jealous of their power and when city scandals were notorious. It has been the authority, without critical analysis of it, for literally hundreds of subsequent cases.

As it arose, the strict construction doctrine applied to municipal corporations but it has been extended to local government generally and it must be faced in any approach to liberalizing local powers. This rule sends local government to State legislatures seeking grants of additional powers; it causes local officials to doubt their power, and it stops local governmental programs from developing fully. The strict construction rule stimulated home rule efforts and is largely responsible for the erosion of home rule. Because of its importance the rule should be examined critically from time to time. (Footnotes omitted.) ⁶ As pointed out in Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 Harvard L.Rev. 1059, 1111 (1980):

Most troubling of all to Dillon, cities were not managed by those "best fitted by their intelligence, business experience, capacity and moral character." Their management was "too often both unwise and extravagant." A major change in city government was therefore needed to achieve a fully public city government dedicated to the common good. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)

In a time of almost universal education and of substantial, and sometimes intense, citizen interest in the proper functioning of local government, we do not share the belief that local officials are generally unworthy of the trust of those governed. Indeed, it democratic processes at the grassroots level do not function well, then it is not likely that our state government will operate much better. Frug further states:

The most extensive rebuttal to Dillon was published in 1911 by Eugene McQuillin in his multivolume treatise, The Law of Municipal Corporations. In an exhaustive survey, McQuillin traced the historical development of municipal corporations and found the essential theme to be a right to local self-government. He rejected the suggestion that cities were created by the state, arguing that "(s)uch (a) position ignores well-established, historical facts easily ascertainable." McQuillin strongly criticized courts that failed to uphold the right of local self-government:

The judicial decisions denying the right of local self-government without express constitutional guaranty, reject the rule of construction that all grants of power are to be interpreted in the light of the maxims of Magna Carta, or rather the development of English rights and governmental powers prior to that time; that is, the common law transmuted into our constitutions and laws. They ignore in toto the fact that local self-government does not owe its origin to constitutions and laws.... They disregard the fact that it is a part of the liberty of a community, an expression of community freedom, the heart of our political institutions. They refuse to concede, therefore, that it is a right in any just sense beyond unlimited state control, but rather it is nothing more than a privilege, to be refused or granted in such measure as the legislative agents of the people for the time being determine. (Footnotes omitted.) (Id. at 1113-14.)

If there were once valid policy reasons supporting the rule, we think they have largely lost their force and that effective local self-government, as an important constituent part of our system of government, must...