Rush v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 12 March 1887
• Citation: 71 Iowa 333,32 N.W. 367
• Parties: RUSH AND OTHERS v. MITCHELL AND OTHERS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

71 Iowa 333

32 N.W. 367

RUSH AND OTHERS

v.MITCHELL AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 12, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Fayette county.

Action in chancery to quiet the title of certain lands in plaintiffs. There was a decree in the circuit court granting the relief prayed for in plaintiff's petition. Defendants appeal.J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellants.

Ainsworth & Hobson, for appellees.

BECK, J.

1. The parties to this suit claim the land in controversy under conflicting titles. Plaintiffs claim as the widow and heirs of Henry Rush, who they allege acquired title under a sheriff's deed executed and recorded April 18, 1882. It appears that the title thus acquired is good, unless it be defeated by defendants' title, which is based upon the following facts: The sheriff's deed to Rush was not executed until 30 days after the expiration of the full time for redemption from the sheriff's sale, April 17, 1882. Hathway, the defendant in the judgment upon which the land was sold, conveyed it by quitclaim to Rogers. The deed was recorded April 18, 1882. On the seventeenth day of April, 1882, defendant Rogers conveyed to defendant Louisa Mitchell the land in question by deed of warranty. On the same day she executed a mortgage to Rogers to secure the payment of the purchase money, $900. The deed and mortgage were recorded on the eighteenth of April, 1882. Defendants insist that their title is paramount to plaintiffs', and base this position on two grounds, which we will proceed to consider.

2. The sheriff's deed was made to Rush upon a redemption made by him under a junior lien, being a decree of foreclosure of a junior mortgage. It is claimed the evidence shows that he did not own this decree, having before assigned it. Upon these facts it is insisted that his redemption was void, and the sheriff's deed to him as a redemptioner is void. It is difficult to discover a ground upon which the defendant in execution, Hathway, or his grantee, can base an objection to Rush's redemption. It is not claimed or shown that Hathway was prejudiced by the redemption of Rush. If he be not prejudiced, he and his grantee ought not to object to the redemption. But without further inquiry into the right of the defendants to show that Rush had no right to redeem, and refraining from announcing any conclusions upon the question, we are clear in the opinion that, if it be held that he had no right as the owner of the judgment to redeem, his sheriff's deed is nevertheless valid. Before it was made, the certificate issued by the sheriff upon the sale under the senior judgment was assigned to Rush. If he was not a redemptioner as the holder of the junior judgment, he was, by virtue of the assignment, the holder of the certificate of sale, and as such was entitled to the sheriff's deed, under Code, § 3101. This precise point is decided in Wilson v. Conklin, 22 Iowa, 452. We conclude, therefore, that the sheriff's deed to Rush is a valid instrument.

3. Defendants insist that the sheriff's deed to Rush does not defeat the title of defendant Mitchell, for the reason that she acquired it without notice of adverse rights under the sale and deed upon which plaintiffs base their title. Before considering this point, it may be remarked that, as Rogers acquired the land by a quitclaim deed, and paid nothing for it, which is shown by his own evidence, he was not a good-faith purchaser, and is chargeable with notice of the rights of Rush. The evidence clearly shows that Rogers had also actual notice...