Ruspantini v. Steffek, 32476

• Decision Date: 22 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32476,32476
• Citation: 110 N.E.2d 198,414 Ill. 70
• Parties: RUSPANTINI v. STEFFEK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 198

110 N.E.2d 198

414 Ill. 70

RUSPANTINI v. STEFFEK.

No. 32476.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1953.

Thomas C. Hollywood and Philip E. Ryan, both of Chicago (Ode L. Rankin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Crowe & Abrahamson, of Chicago (Burt A. Crow, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

HERSHEY, Justice.

The appellant, Samuel Steffek, on leave granted by this court, appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Court reversing a judgment rendered in his favor against the appellee in the sum of $10,000 in the superior court of Cook County.

The principal suit was instituted by the appellee, Lela J. Ruspantini, Executrix of the estate of Italo Ruspantini, deceased, to recover damages from appellant for the wrongful death of her husband. The defendant in that suit, the appellant here, filed a counterclaim against the original plaintiff and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad for injuries sustained by him in the collision. The original suit and the counterclaim against the railroad company were dismissed, leaving for disposition only the counterclaim of the appellant against the appellee. For convenience, the appellant is hereafter referred to as plaintiff, and the appellee as defendant.

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court without remanding the cause for a new trial. This action apparently was based upon the theory that even though the evidence did establish negligence on the part of the defendant, there was no proof of due care on the part of the plaintiff and the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant or have entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The rule is well settled that this court will not review the facts as found by the Appellate Court unless the facts so found, in themselves, show that, as a matter of law, a wrong conclusion was reached. Walden v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 411 Ill. 378, 104 N.E.2d 240. See citations. The rule is also equally clear that where the Appellate Court's judgment reverses a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action at law, without remanding the cause for a new trial, it becomes the duty of this court to review the evidence for the purpose of determining, as a matter of law, whether or not there is any evidence which, taken with its intendments most favorable to plaintiff, tends to establish plaintiff's cause of action. Walden v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 411 Ill. 378, 104 N.E.2d 240; Mueller v. Elm Park Hotel Co., 398 Ill. 60, 75 N.E.2d 314.

It becomes necessary, therefore, in order to determine the question of law involved in this case, to review the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any evidence which, taken with its reasonable intendments most favorable to the plaintiff, tends to establish negligence on the part of the defendant and the exercise of reasonable care for his own safety on the part of the plaintiff. Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Ill. 36, 174 N.E. 901.

The collision occurred sometime after midnight of December 20, 1947, on an overpass crossing the tracks of the Indiana Belt Railroad Company south of the city of Chicago. The street and overpass were paved with asphalt. The night was cold and frosty. The plaintiff was driving south and the defendant north. The highway was a four-lane highway. There was no eyewitnesses to the collision except the plaintiff and the decedent, who died immediately after the occurrence. The plaintiff is barred from testifying by section 2 of the Evidence Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, c. 51, § 2, because the defendant is sued as executrix. There is no evidence of the health or habits of plaintiff creating a presumption of due care. The position of the defendant is that there is no evidence tending to establish due care by the plaintiff and that the Appellate Court is correct in reversing the judgment without remanding the cause to the trial court.

The evidence discloses that a few minutes after the collision both cars were located on the west side of the roadway on the down grade on the south half of the overpass, and that there were skid marks 60 to 80 feet extending diagonally from the northbound lane to the southbound lane and to within a few feet of the plaintiff's car. One witness, Tieri, was driving...