Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker
| Decision Date | 07 February 1933 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 24072 |
| Citation | 162 Okla. 216,19 P.2d 582,1933 OK 75 |
| Parties | RUSSELL PETROLEUM CO. v. WALKER et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Corporation Commission -- Exclusive Jurisdiction to Review Orders of Commission Vested in Supreme Court.
Exclusive jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any action of the Corporation Commission within the scope of its authority and to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the Corporation Commission in the performance of duties within the scope of its authority, is vested in the Supreme Court by the provisions of section 20, art. 9, and sec. 2, art. 7, of the Constitution of Oklahoma.
2. Oil and Gas--Statutory Authority of Corporation Commission for Prevention of Waste of Crude Oil.
The provisions of sections 7954 to 7963, inclusive, C. O. S. 1921 [O. S. 1931, secs. 11565-11574], authorize the Corporation Commission to promulgate rules and regulations for the prevention of waste of crude oil, as, thereby defined.
3. Same--Authority to Require Proportionate Taking of Oil From Common Source of Supply.
The provisions of sections 7954 to 7963, inclusive, C. O. S. 1921 [O. S. 1931, secs. 11565-11574], authorize the Corporation Commission to require proportionate taking of crude oil from a common source of supply thereof, under the circumstances therein stated, to wit, when the full production of crude oil from any common source of supply can only be obtained under conditions constituting waste.
4. Same--Constitutional Law -- Executive Orders of Governor Calling Out and Using Militia to Enforce Oil Proration Laws Held not to Constitute Due Process of Law.
The executive orders of the Governor, shown by the record in this case, calling out the militia for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the state do not constitute due process of law or authorize the militia to deprive an owner of his property without due process of law.
5. Same--Injunction--Equitable Relief by Courts to Prevent Militia's Unlawful Interference With Property Rights.
Where there is no adequate remedy at law, equity will afford relief to an owner of property to prevent the militia from unlawfully interfering therewith, and the district courts of the state are authorized to grant such relief.
6. Same--District Court Held Without Jurisdiction to Enjoin Corporation Commission From Enforcing Legal Orders, but With Jurisdiction to Enjoin Militia From Interfering With Oil Property of Plaintiff.
Record examined, and held: The district court of Oklahoma county erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the militia from unlawfully interfering with the property of the plaintiff, and it did not err in holding that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the Corporation Commission from attempting to enforce orders which were made within the scope of its authority.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.
Injunction by the Russell Petroleum Company against Paul Walker and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Sid White, for plaintiff in error.
Hayes, Richardson, Shartel, Gilliland & Jordan, and E. S. Ratliff, for defendants in error.
¶1 The plaintiff in error commenced an action against the defendants in error in the district court of Oklahoma county. The trial court held that it was "* * * without power, jurisdiction or authority to enjoin the Corporation Commission or the defendants Paul Walker, Roy Hughes, and C. C. Childers, constituting said Commission, from trying the plaintiff upon any charge, * * *" and that it was "* * * without power, jurisdiction, or authority to enjoin the defendant Cicero I. Murray, his agents, and servants, and those acting under his direction as prayed in plaintiff's petition. * * *" From the judgment based thereon the plaintiff appealed to this court. Hereinafter the parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants.
¶2 The first question presented by the plaintiff is:
"Does the district court of Oklahoma county, Okla., sitting in equity, have jurisdiction to enjoin the Corporation Commission from closing an oil well for a violation of its orders or some one of them, in a proper case?"
¶3 The plaintiff says that the trial court renounced jurisdiction as to the orders of the Corporation Commission upon the theory that section 20, art. 9, of the Constitution forbade its exercise thereof. That section provides that:
"* * * No court of this state (except the Supreme Court, by way of appeals as herein authorized) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any action of the Commission within the scope of its authority, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the Commission in the performance of its official duties: Provided, however, that the writs of mandamus and prohibition shall lie from the Supreme Court to the Commission in all cases where such writs, respectively, would lie to any inferior court or officer."
¶4 That provision is applicable only to actions of the Corporation Commission which are within the scope of its authority. That provision and the provisions of section 2, art. 7, of the Constitution, when construed together, vest this court with exclusive jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any action within the scope of the authority of the Corporation Commission. By the provisions of section 10, art. 7, of the Constitution, district courts have jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, except where exclusive jurisdiction was, by this Constitution, or is, by law, conferred on some other court. Since exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon this court by the constitutional provisions, supra, the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the orders of the Corporation Commission which were within the scope of its authority.
¶5 This court in Russell v. Walker, 160 Okla. 145, 15 P.2d 114, held that the Corporation Commission had jurisdiction, under the provisions of sections 11565 to 11574, inclusive, O. S. 1931 (sections 7954 to 7963, inclusive, C. O. S. 1921), to impose and enforce reasonable regulations for the production of oil from a common source of supply. That decision was based on the decision of this court in C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841, and the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062, in each of which decisions the legislative act, supra, was held neither to be repugnant to the provisions of the federal nor the state Constitution.
¶6 In the trial court the plaintiff contended that the Corporation Commission was assuming and claiming the right to order the wells of the plaintiff closed for violation of certain orders theretofore made by the Corporation Commission. The plaintiff contended then and contends now that the orders said to have been violated were void for the reason that they operated as a discrimination against the plaintiff. Those orders were legislative in character and were made under the authority granted to the Corporation Commission by the Constitution and the authority delegated to the Corporation Commission by the Legislature. They were not orders judicial in their character.
¶7 The making of the legislative orders, supra, was within the scope of the authority of the Corporation Commission. This court will assume that the Corporation Commission will act within the scope of its authority when it proceeds, if it ever does, to make an order judicial in character with reference to the property of the plaintiff. From that order an appeal may be taken to this court or this court may exercise its general superintending control over the Corporation Commission and issue a writ of prohibition. If either procedure is followed, this court will review any judicial order so made, and, at the same time, it will review the legislative orders upon which the judicial orders are based. Thereby the plaintiff is afforded an adequate remedy.
¶8 We have not overlooked the decision of this court in Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 40 Okla. 417, 138 P. 1033, cited by the plaintiff.
¶9 The district court did not err in denying the application for injunction against the Corporation Commission and its judgment thereon is in all things affirmed.
¶10 The second question presented by the plaintiff is:
"Did the district court err in holding that, because of the orders of the Governor hereinbefore set forth, it had no jurisdiction or authority to control the defendant in error Cicero I. Murray and those who acted with him and under his command and direction?"
¶11 It appears from the record that, while the Corporation Commission had made an order fixing the allowable flow of all wells in the Oklahoma City oil field and other orders legislative in their character for the prevention of waste, no charge of overproduction by the plaintiff had been filed with the Corporation Commission; that the Corporation Commission had made no order directing the search, breaking or entering into, or the seizure of any of the property owned or operated by the plaintiff, and that Cicero I. Murray was not an agent of the Corporation Commission.
¶12 In a brief the defendants state:
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