Russell, Sheriff v. County Bd. Ed. Logan Cty.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1933
• Citation: 247 Ky. 703
• Parties: Russell, Sheriff, v. County Board of Education of Logan County.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

247 Ky. 703

Russell, Sheriff, v. County Board of Education of Logan County.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided February 24, 1933.

1. Taxation. — Statute which repealed and re-enacted statute relating to sale of land for nonpayment of taxes and extended redemption period and reduced interest and penalties held not

invalid because other tax and revenue statutes harmonized with repealed statute in original form (Acts 1932, c. 142; Ky. Stats., secs. 4021, 4153, 4154, 4256).

2. Statutes. — Title to act relating to sale of land for nonpayment of taxes extending redemption period and reducing interest and penalties held not unconstitutional because omitting reference to "possession" dealt with in body of act (Acts 1932, c. 142; Constitution, sec. 51).

3. Statutes. — Repeal by implication where other statutes are inconsistent with later statute is as effectual as if later statute had expressly so provided.

4. Statutes. — Title need not be index to or synopsis of contents of act, or set out details or result thereof, but is sufficient if it gives reasonable notice of general contents and scope of act (Constitution, sec. 51).

5. Statutes. — Title of act need not state that other statutes or parts thereof in irreconcilable conflict with act are repealed (Constitution, sec. 51).

6. Constitutional Law. — General Assembly is exclusive judge of whether penalties to be imposed upon delinquent taxpayer will produce sufficient revenue, so long as statute infringes no constitutional rights.

7. Constitutional Law. — Constitutional provision that General Assembly shall provide by law sufficient annual tax is not self-executing, nor can it be enforced by judicial process, since matter rests within discretion of General Assembly (Constitution, sec. 171).

Appeal from Logan Circuit Court.

B.P. WOOTTON, Attorney General, S.H. BROWN, Assistant Attorney General, and JOHN A. WHITAKER for appellant.

COLEMAN TAYLOR and J.D. STANDARD for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE THOMAS.

Reversing.

The appellee and plaintiff below, County Board of Education of Logan County, filed this declaratory judgment action against the appellant and defendant below, George C. Russell, the sheriff of the county, attacking the validity of chapter 142, page 670 of the Session Acts of 1932, and sought an injunction against defendant from purchasing real estate for and on behalf of plaintiff at his sales of land sold by him to recover taxes due plaintiff. As indicated in the title of the 1932 act, its purpose was to repeal and re-enact section 4151-2 of the 1930 editions of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, which is a part of the chapter of that publication on Revenue and Taxation. After reciting such purpose, there is added as a part of the title these words "And providing for interest and penalty on lands sold for taxes and providing for redemption thereof." The body of the 1932 act repeals and re-enacts the former section 4151-2 (and which will be hereinafter referred to as the "old act") and makes some alterations therein, and it will hereinafter be referred to as the "new act." Only a portion of the old act as substituted in the new one is attacked, and which part relates to the penalty and interest to be exacted of the delinquent tax payers, the time for his redemption of his land, and the time when the purchaser at the tax sale (whether by the tax gathering authority, or a private individual) becomes entitled to the possession of the land if not redeemed by the taxpayer within the time provided for that purpose.

The old act prescribed that if no individual bid the amount of taxes, interest, commission, and costs at such sales, then the sheriff or collector making it was directed to buy the land for such total sum for and on behalf of the public agency levying and collecting the tax. He was then required to make certain returns and reports manifesting that fact to designated officials. It was then prescribed therein that the owner of the land should have the right to redeem it "within two years after the day of sale," but when done he would be required to pay 10 per cent. per annum on the amount with a penalty of 15 per cent. It was further provided that if the land was purchased for and on behalf of such public agency it "shall have the right to possession * * * at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the giving of the notice provided for in the next section"; but if the purchase was made by an individual, he could obtain possession at any time after the expiration of six months from the giving of such notice.

The new act with reference to such matters prescribes that the delinquent taxpayer, or owner of the land sold, may redeem his land "within five years after the day of sale," and reduced the annual interest to be paid by him to 6 per cent. and the penalty to 2 per cent. It also provided that if the land was purchased for any such public agency its right to possession would accrue "at any time after the expiration of five years allowed for redemption by giving thirty days' notice to the owner"; but if the purchaser was a private individual then his right to possession would not accrue until after "six months' notice to the owner" following the expiration of the five-year period for redemption. It will, therefore, be noticed that the only changes made in the old act by the new one concerned the period for redemption, the amount of the interest and the penalty, and the time when the right to possession by the purchaser would become perfected so as to entitle him to proceed under the remedies provided by law to obtain possession.

One attack made on the new act in the petition, and argued by learned counsel for appellee in his brief, was and is, that it conflicts with parts of sections 4021, 4153, 4154, and 4156, all of which (as well as the old section 4151-2 of the 1930 Edition of our Statutes) are parts of chapter 108 of the same edition of our Statutes relating to "Revenue and Taxation." Section 4021 gives to the taxing authority a lien upon the property assessed for taxation. Section 4153 is partly remedial and prescribes when and how either class of purchaser at the tax sale may obtain possession of the property purchased, and which may be done by the purchaser before the two-year period of redemption by the taxpayer expired by complying with the terms of the statute to obtain that relief. Section 4154 provides for the vesting of title in the purchaser, and which ipso facto happens thereunder if the taxpayer does not redeem the land within the two years given him for that purpose. Section 4156 makes provision for redemption by certain persons laboring under legal disability. The petition alleged in setting out this ground, and counsel so argues in this court, that the new act is invalid because it is in conflict with such parts of the sections supra of our statute to such an extent as to render the body of the law relating to the sale of real estate for taxes incapable of enforcement because of the confusion and perplexity introduced by the new act; but with which we cannot agree. We have hereinbefore pointed out the only changes made in the old act by the new one. None of them affect in the remotest degree the lien given by section 4021, which remains intact and the sale provided for by the new act is the procedure by which that lien is enforced. The only conflict between the new act and the remedial portions of section 4153 concerns the time when the purchaser may obtain possession of the land he purchased at the tax sale. Under the terms of that section he might do so (by following its provisions) before the period for redemption expires, which was two years instead of five years as provided in the new act. The same remedies may still be pursued under the new act when the time arrives entitling the purchaser to possession. That time was simply postponed by the new act until the lengthened time for redemption expires, but the procedure for obtaining possession when the time therefor arrives is left intact as contained in the present section 4153.

Section 4154 enacts that the fee-simple title to the land purchased will become absolutely vested in the purchaser if the taxpayer, its owner, did not redeem it within the time given him for that purpose, which, as we have seen, was then two years from the day of sale. The new act simply postpones that period by lengthening the time for redemption by the owner to five...