Russell v. Home Depot, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-12501 |
| Parties | SOREE A. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, v. HOME DEPOT, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
OPINION & ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 24) AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT (Dkt. 25)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Home Depot Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 24) and its motion to exclude Plaintiff Soree Russell's retained expert (Dkt. 25).
The motions have been fully briefed. Because oral argument will not assist in the decisional process, the motions will be decided based on the parties' briefing. See E.D Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2); Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Home Depot's motion for summary judgment. Because the Court's decision regarding summary judgment is dispositive of all of Russell's claims, Home Depot's motion to exclude Russell's expert is denied as moot.
This personal injury action arises from a slip and fall that occurred while Russell was shopping at a Home Depot store located in Detroit, Michigan. Russell went to Home Depot to purchase bags of mortar and concrete mix for a home-improvement project. Russell Dep. at 41- 44 (Dkt. 32-2). As Russell entered the store, an employee gave her a shopping cart; Russell placed her handbag and cane inside the cart and held onto the cart's handle for stability while walking. Id. at 63-64. Russell proceeded to enter the store, turned left to walk down the main aisle, and then turned right to walk down Aisle 18-where she was informed the mortar and concrete was located. Id. at 57-59, 68-70; Diagram of Travel Path (Dkt. 24-3).
Alone in Aisle 18, Russell located the mortar and concrete mix, which were packaged in two bags weighing 40 pounds and 60 pounds. Russell Dep. at 67, 71. Because Russell was unable to lift the bags, another customer shopping in a different aisle assisted her with loading the bags into her shopping cart. Id. at 67, 72-73. After the bags were loaded, Russell walked with the cart toward the back of the store. Id. at 74. As she walked, Russell's right foot “slid in a pile of sand, ” and she fell to the ground. Id. at 74, 81-82. Russell stated that after she fell, her right pant leg was covered in white dust or a sandy substance, and that her shoe was full of the sandy substance. Id. at 82, 85, 93, 102.
Before the other customer loaded the two bags into her cart, Russell observed nothing out of the ordinary in Aisle 18. Id. at 73-74. She did not observe the pile of sandy substance until she “slipped in it and fell.” Id. at 82. She did not determine the source of the sandy substance, id. at 90, nor did she recall the approximate dimensions or depth of the pile, id. at 92-94. Likewise, she did not know how long the sandy substance had been present on the floor. Id. at 90. When shown photographs taken on the date of her accident, Russell agreed that the floor was grey concrete and that she could see a white substance on the floor. Id. at 118; Photographs at PageID.224-225 (Dkt. 24-4). In the photographs, Russell also identified her footprint in the sandy substance. Russell Dep. at 119; Photographs at PageID.225.
When Russell got up after her fall, she walked toward the front of the store for assistance. Russell Dep. at 85. Nikita Hursey, an on-duty assistant store manager, responded to a call regarding Russell's fall. Hursey Dep. at 8, 14-15 (Dkt. 24-5). Hursey spoke to Russell, who reported that she slipped and fell on a sandy substance from a torn bag of concrete mix. Id. at 26.
The parties do not dispute that mortar and concrete mix are composed of dry, sandy material. See Pl. Counter-Statement of Material Facts ¶ 4 (Dkt. 33); Def. Resp. to Counter-Statement of Material Facts ¶ 4 (Dkt. 35). Hursey also inspected Aisle 18 but did not take pictures of the area. Hursey Dep. at 31, 33. She provided the following description of Aisle 18 on the day of the incident:
Well, the products are in the bay. There's [sic] pallets. Concrete comes on pallets so it's always on pallets. Because of the way it's handled customers yank it out. Some of them get opened. Some spill on the floor. So I don't exactly remember how everything was that day but I know in the bays that we had pallets where there was broken bags but not lying around on the floor, no.
Id. at 34. Although she acknowledged that there were broken bags of concrete mix on the pallets on the day of Russell's accident, Hursey did not recall counting the number of broken bags. Id.
Based on her inspection of the area, Hursey determined that nothing appeared “out of kilter” and that no remedial measures were necessary. Id. at 49.
In her complaint, Russell asserts a claim of ordinary negligence stemming from Home Depot's allegedly defective method of displaying its products and a claim of premises liability stemming from the presence of sandy substance in Aisle 18. Home Depot seeks summary judgment, arguing that Russell's claims sound exclusively in premises liability-for which Home Depot cannot be held liable given its lack of notice of the hazard and the fact that the hazard was open and obvious. Mot. at 11-17 (Dkt. 24).
A motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when there are “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[F]acts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine' dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party may discharge its burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
In claiming that it is entitled to summary judgment, Home Depot asserts three primary arguments. First, it contends that Russell is unable to maintain an ordinary negligence claim where the facts underlying the case sound exclusively in premises liability. Mot. at 11. Second, it argues that Russell fails to support her premises liability claim with evidence that Home Depot either created or was on notice of the sandy substance on the floor of Aisle 18. Id. at 12-16. Finally, Home Depot contends that the sandy substance was an open and obvious danger such that Home Depot owed no duty to protect Russell from this condition. Id. at 17-20.
As fully explained below, the Court agrees that Russell is precluded from asserting an ordinary negligence claim and that she has failed to adduce evidence showing that Home Depot either created or was on notice of the sandy substance in Aisle 18. Because these two findings are dispositive of Russell's claims, the Court need not confront Home Depot's remaining argument that the sandy substance presented an open and obvious danger.
The parties first dispute whether Russell may assert an ordinary negligence claim independent from her premises liability claim. Because Russell's injuries arise from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, Home Depot maintains that her claims sound exclusively in premises liability. Mot. at 11. Russell, by contrast, argues that she has independently asserted an ordinary negligence claim stemming from Home Depot's negligent design and maintenance of a product display. Resp. at 22-24 (Dkt. 33). Home Depot has the better part of the argument.
Although Russell's complaint asserts an ordinary negligence claim in addition to a premises liability claim, “[c]ourts are not bound by the labels that parties attach to their claims.” Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs., 822 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).[1] Instead, courts must determine the nature of an action “by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels . . . .” Adams v. Adams, 742 N.W.2d 399, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). “Michigan law distinguishes between claims arising from ordinary negligence and claims premised on a condition of the land.” Buhalis, 822 N.W.2d at 258 (citing James v. Alberts, 626 N.W.2d 158, 161-162 (Mich. 2001)). “If the plaintiff's injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence; this is true even when the plaintiff alleges that the premises possessor created the condition giving rise to the plaintiff's injury.” Id.
Russell's claims center on her injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on a sandy substance, an allegedly dangerous condition on Home Depot's premises. In connection with her ordinary negligence claim, Russell's complaint alleges that Home Depot had a duty “to use due care to maintain the safety of its store, ” that it negligently failed to design its displays in a manner “to minimize the risk of spills on the floor of the aisles, ” and that it failed to inspect its aisles for “hazardous conditions that posed an unreasonable risk of harm” to its invitees. Compl. at ¶¶ 17- 18 (Dkt. 1) (emphasis added). Even Russell's briefing confirms that her claims stem from an allegedly hazardous condition on the land, as she argues that her ...
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