Russell v. State

Decision Date20 February 2001
Parties(Mo.App. E.D. 2001) James R. Russell, Appellant v. State of Missouri, Respondent ED77936 0
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Hon. William L. Syler

Counsel for Appellant: Lisa M. Stroup
Counsel for Respondent: Andrea Mazza Follett

Opinion Summary: James Russell appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion, filed approximately three months after the court's final judgment in his Rule 24.035 post-conviction relief proceeding, in which Russell sought relief from a still-remaining felony conviction and sentence on the ground that his appointed post-conviction relief counsel had abandoned him by failing to include any request for relief with respect to that particular conviction and sentence in the amended motion for post-conviction relief.

Division One holds: This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The time for filing an appeal of the circuit court's Rule 24.035 judgment has passed. The subsequent motion alleging abandonment by post-conviction counsel amounts in effect to a successive Rule 24.035 motion. Such a claim of abandonment does not provide the basis for an independent motion proceeding separate and apart from the underlying Rule 24.035 motion proceeding itself. There is no statutory authority for an appeal from the denial of such a motion.

Richard B. Teitelman, Judge

James Russell (Movant) appeals from the circuit court's denial of his motion requesting relief from a felony conviction and sentence on the ground that his appointed Rule 24.035 post-conviction relief counsel abandoned him. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 2, 1997 Movant pled guilty to five felony counts in three separate cases in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County: three counts of forgery in cause number CR597-747FX, one count of passing a bad check in cause number CR596-1766FX, and one count of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in cause number CR597-884FX. Movant pled guilty to all of these charges based upon his reasonable belief that both the prosecutor and his attorney had promised that if he pled guilty he would not be sentenced until after being seen by his treating cardiologist and undergoing needed heart surgery. Movant's expectation that he would be treated for his heart condition and released on his own recognizance until recovering from surgery is clearly supported by the record.

That expectation was not met. Instead, on September 15, 1997, Movant was brought into court for sentencing. The court advised Movant that it would not defer sentencing, and that the Department of Corrections would "take whatever steps they think [are] necessary for whatever treatment that you may need when you arrive." The court then sentenced Movant to concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment on each felony charge, and Movant was delivered the next day to the Department of Corrections.

Movant filed a timely pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. He alleged that the plea agreement had been violated and that his pleas were not made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently because he had entered the pleas with the understanding that he would be seen by his own physician to have his heart condition evaluated, and receive treatment for his heart condition before being sentenced. Following appointment of counsel, an amended post-conviction relief motion was filed. The pro se motion, filed by Movant, included the case numbers of all the charges to which he had pled guilty. The amended post-conviction relief motion filed by appointed counsel, however, inadvertently omitted any reference to cause number CR597-884FX and the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. The record reflects that this omission was in no way Movant's fault, and was due solely to the negligence and oversight of appointed counsel.1

The circuit court denied the amended motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Movant appealed. We reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, noting that Movant's allegations were serious and not refuted by the record. See Russell v. State, 3 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). On January 11, 2000, following its hearing on remand, the circuit court granted all of the relief requested in Movant's amended motion for post-conviction relief. That is, the court vacated Movant's convictions and sentences with respect to the three forgery counts charged in CR597-747FX and the charge of passing a bad check in CR596-1766FX.2 However, since the charge of leaving the scene of an accident in CR597-884FX was never included or referenced in the amended motion for post-conviction relief, that conviction and sentence was not vacated and as a result Movant remained incarcerated.

Sometime later, Movant and appointed counsel became aware of the terrible mistake that had been made by failing to include any reference to CR597-884FX in the amended motion. On April 3, 2000, in an effort to redress that mistake, the Public Defender's office filed with the circuit court on Movant's behalf what we will refer to as the "abandonment motion."3 The abandonment motion asked the circuit court to find that appointed post-conviction counsel had in effect abandoned Movant by failing to include in the amended motion for post-conviction relief a request that the conviction and sentence in CR597-884FX be vacated. It asked that the court therefore either retroactively deem the amended motion for post-conviction relief to have originally included CR597-884FX, or in the alternative that Movant be allowed to file a new post-conviction relief motion with respect to that one cause number only. On April 4, 2000, the circuit court denied the motion. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

In his sole point on appeal, Movant contends the motion court erred in denying his claim that he was abandoned by post-conviction counsel due to counsel's failure to include a request in the amended post-conviction relief motion that his conviction and sentence in CR597-884FX, for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, be vacated. Citing Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1991) and Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991), Movant argues that counsel's failure in this regard constituted such a total default that it in effect amounted to "abandonment," thus entitling Movant under the narrow holdings of Sanders and Luleff to file an amended motion for post-conviction relief outside the normal time limits that apply to such motions. In response the State argues, inter alia, that Movant's point really amounts to a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel rather than abandonment, and that such claims are not cognizable on appeal, citing State v. Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 789, 799 (Mo. banc 1997). State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 928 (Mo. banc 1992), and Self v. State, 14 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000).

Before we may consider the merits of this issue, however, we must first determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction. We conclude that we do not. The State has filed a motion to dismiss the instant appeal. Both in that motion and in its Respondent's Brief, the State contends this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Movant's appeal because (1) a claim of abandonment by post-conviction counsel will not support either an independent motion proceeding at the circuit court level or an appeal of the denial of such a motion, and (2) this appeal, concerning the circuit court's ruling on Movant's ...

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  • Riley v. State
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2012
    ...imposed upon appointed counsel” under the rules.’ ” Pope v. State, 87 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (quoting Russell v. State, 39 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo.App. E.D.2001) (in turn quoting State v. Bradley, 811 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Mo. banc 1991))). The precise circumstances, in which a motion cour......
  • Shirley v. State
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    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 2003
    ...is tantamount to `a total default in carrying out the obligations imposed upon appointed counsel' under the rules." Russell v. State, 39 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized claims of "abandonment" in only three situations: (1) where counsel failed to ......
  • Riley v. State
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 2012
    ...imposed upon appointed counsel" under the rules.'" Pope v. State, 87 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (quoting Russell v. State, 39 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (in turn quoting State v. Bradley, 811 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Mo. banc 1991))).The precise circumstances, in which a motion co......
  • Waserman v. State
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    • March 20, 2003
    ...is tantamount to `a total default in carrying out the obligations imposed upon appointed counsel' under the rules." Russell v. State, 39 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo.App. E.D.2001) (quoting State v. Bradley, 811 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Mo. banc 1991)). "`Abandonment' is limited to situations where appointed ......
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