Russell v. State

• Decision Date: 19 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 93-CT-01109-SCT.,93-CT-01109-SCT.
• Citation: 729 So.2d 781
• Parties: Alvin Jude RUSSELL v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

729 So.2d 781

Alvin Jude RUSSELL v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 93-CT-01109-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 19, 1997.

Rehearing Denied November 26, 1997.

Michael W. Crosby, Gulfport, Attorney for appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Sp. Asst. Attorney General, Jackson, Attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PITTMAN, Justice, for the Court:

Russell was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal Russell argued that he was entitled to assert the defense of insanity and irresistible impulse, and that he should have been allowed to assert the defense of manslaughter. Russell argued that by failing to allow him to present expert and lay testimony on the issue of insanity and failing to allow him jury instructions on insanity and manslaughter, the trial court effectively prevented him from presenting his theories of defense.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the failure of the trial court to grant jury instructions on the defendant's theory of defense. This Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari filed by the State and now affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding the case for a new trial, but modifies the Court of Appeals' ruling on the evidentiary questions.

In seeking a writ of certiorari the State argued that the decision of the Court of Appeals holds that the testimony of the defendant alone is sufficient to require the court to give an insanity defense instruction. The State also argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that it was error not to give a manslaughter instruction has rendered a decision in conflict with prior decisions of this Court. After consideration, this Court finds that both of the propositions raised by the State are without merit.

Since this case will be retried, it is appropriate that we consider whether the expert testimony and lay testimony on the issue of Russell's insanity were wrongly excluded. Of particular concern is whether there was any basis for the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Cox's testimony in its entirety simply because the court found that Dr. Cox's testimony "did not support the ultimate conclusion of insanity." The second area of concern was the Court of Appeals' reliance on Porter v.. State, 492 So.2d 970 (Miss.1986), in finding that the court did not err in refusing to allow the lay witnesses to testify. Porter provides that a lay witness must testify as to a defendant's sanity at the time of the witness's observation, and that if the lay witness does not observe the defendant at the moment of the crime, the witness may not give opinion testimony concerning the defendant's sanity at the moment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

At the time of the shooting, Russell was forty-eight-years old and had many physical and emotional problems. He had been diagnosed as having a tumor on his pituitary gland which caused him to be confused and disoriented. He was also suffering from depression. He had left his employment with IBM after twenty-four years on early retirement as a result of the company downsizing and his fear that he would be laid off without any income if he did not choose retirement. A subsequent business venture with his wife failed. As a result of the strain caused by these problems, Russell's wife, Rebecca, left him and served him with divorce papers.

On the day of the incident, Russell and his wife met at a bank to withdraw money from a joint bank account. When Rebecca arrived Russell went to her car and started talking to her about agreeing to split everything equally. Russell thought that she had been irrational in her demands and influenced by her lawyer. Rebecca said that she would discuss it with her lawyer and turned to walk toward the bank. Russell testified that he did not know or remember what happened next, except he heard a gunshot and realized he had a gun in his hand. Russell then shot his wife again as she lay on the ground. Russell testified that he did not understand why he shot her again.

Throughout Russell's testimony, defense counsel solicited testimony regarding Russell's state of mind and sought to show why the verbal exchange between him and his wife would have triggered such a reaction. The court sustained the prosecution's objections to this testimony.

The defense sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Aris W. Cox, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Cox's testimony was proffered, out of the presence of the jury. His testimony was not offered to show that Russell was insane but "to establish the condition and mental state and the affect of this medical condition on his emotion and reasoning ability." Defense counsel understood that he would not be able to get into Dr. Cox's opinion on irresistible impulse based on the court's previous ruling on that question.

On proffer of this testimony, Dr. Cox expressed the opinion that Russell had an organic mental disease and that he suffered from an irresistible impulse which overwhelmed his reason, judgment and conscience. On cross-examination Dr. Cox testified that Russell did not suffer from a mental disease or defect sufficient in intensity to rise to the level of the M'Naughton standard. Dr. Cox stood by his opinion that Russell was able to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the shooting. The trial judge concluded that the testimony of Dr. Cox was not admissible because the doctor could not conclude that Russell did not know the difference between right and wrong, and thereby lay the proper predicate for an insanity defense.

Russell, through his attorney, expressed the intention to prove an insanity defense based on lay testimony. He shot Rebecca on September 17, 1992. He testified that he had been employed by IBM, a company known for its long standing policy of no layoffs, for twenty-four years, after which, in July 1992, he was compelled to take leave with a single lump-sum payment. With his wife, he invested a substantial portion of it in a business that turned out to be a confidence scheme, resulting in significant loss. It was only a few days prior to the event that his wife left him and filed for a divorce. Although he testified that he was not aware of shooting her until after he fired, he was severely restricted by the court in testifying as to his medical condition, medication that he was taking, and his state of mind. Russell sought to introduce testimony from his brother, Wayne Russell, and sister, Carole Haynes, as to his mental state. Carole Haynes testified in proffer as to her observations of and conversations and meetings with her brother and gave her opinion that he did not know the difference between right and wrong at the time of the shooting. Wayne Russell proffered similar testimony, but had had less frequent contact with his brother, the defendant. Carole Haynes said that she normally spoke with Russell at least twice a month and that in the two months prior to the shooting she had spoken with him four or five times per week. She spoke with him the day before the shooting. She testified to depression, loss of short term memory as to common events and disorientation as to time and place. She described him as being in a whirlwind. In her testimony she have specific examples to support her observations, all from a period of three or four weeks prior to the shooting. Neither she nor Wayne saw or had contact with Russell on the day of the shooting. The judge did not allow this testimony because these lay witnesses could not testify as to Russell's state of mind at the time of the shooting. In this way, the trial court prevented Russell from interposing any form of an insanity defense. The court also denied defense instructions dealing with manslaughter, deliberate design, and insanity.

ANALYSIS

In his appeal Russell presented two issues, which he stated as follows:

I. Was the Defendant entitled to assert the defense of insanity and irresistible impulse?

II. Should Alvin Russell have been allowed to assert the defense of manslaughter?

Insanity Defense

Mississippi courts apply the M'Naughton test in determining sanity. Westbrook v. State, 658 So.2d 847, 850 (Miss. 1995); Tyler v. State, 618 So.2d 1306, 1309 (Miss.1993); Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1181 (Miss.1990); Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 173 (Miss.1989). Simply put, "the test for insanity is whether the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time the act was committed." Roundtree, 568 So.2d at 1181. The determination as to a defendant's sanity is within the province of the jury, which may accept or reject expert and lay testimony. Tyler, 618 So.2d at 1309; Roundtree, 568 So.2d at 1181.

In Westbrook v. State, 658 So.2d at 850, this Court reaffirmed that the defense of irresistible impulse is not available in Mississippi. The Court quoted the following passage from Edmond v. State, 312 So.2d 702, 704 (Miss.1975):

This Court has recently (as it has done many times in the past), rejected the argument that one may escape responsibility for criminal acts done under some so-called uncontrollable urge or impulse. Admittedly, the M'Naughton test of criminal responsibility may not be a perfect means to test sanity of one charge with [sic] crime, but no better solution has been offered. Thus the test in this state remains the ability of the accused to realize and appreciate the nature and quality of his deeds when committed and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.

Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added in Westbrook). While this is not to say that an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse will not factor into the determination of legal insanity, such impulse must spring from a mental disease existing to such a high degree as to overwhelm the person and conscience, i.e., to raise it to the M'Naughton standard. Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 461 (Mis...