Russell v. Stewart
Decision Date | 27 June 1968 |
Citation | 30 A.D.2d 749,291 N.Y.S.2d 480 |
Parties | In the Matter of David L. RUSSELL, Petitioner, v. Richard E. STEWART, as Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, Respondent. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Mataraso & MacAffer, Matthew H. Mataraso, Albany, for petitioner.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Thomas G. Conway, Albany, for respondent.
Before GIBSON, P.J., and REYNOLDS, AULISI, STALEY, and GABRIELLI, JJ.
Proceeding under CPLR article 78 ( ) to review a determination of the Superintendent of Insurance revoking, after a hearing, petitioner's insurance broker's license pursuant to section 119 of the Insurance Law and denying his application for a bail bond agent's license pursuant to section 331 of the Insurance Law.
The Superintendent of Insurance pursuant to the sections of the Insurance Law here involved is given wide discretion in licensing insurance brokers and agents (Matter of Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 647--648, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71-- 72, 148 N.E.2d 287, 291--292), and thus if the Superintendent's determination is supported by substantial evidence it must be affirmed (Matter of Lynch's Bldrs. Restaurant v. O'Connell, 303 N.Y. 408, 103 N.E.2d 531). It is conceded that petitioner's insurance agency issued false FS-1 certificates in connection with one Thermond Herring, that he failed to remit a premium in the amount of $82 on an automobile liability policy issued to one Helen Perry by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company and that he had been censured for three prior violations, two involving mishandling of premium accounts and one for transacting business as a bail bond agent without a proper sub-license. On the basis of this record we cannot say that the Superintendent's finding that the petitioner had demonstrated 'his incompetency and trustworthiness to act as an insurance agent' was unwarranted. The Superintendent was not required to accept petitioner's explanation as to the cause of what befell him, particularly, that his office staff or office procedure was to blame for the false FS-1 certificates that were issued and the failure to remit the Perry premium, and, in any event, petitioner was responsible for the actions of his employees (16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 8702; see Matter of...
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