Rustad v. Rustad
| Decision Date | 03 January 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 36238,36238 |
| Citation | 377 P.2d 414,61 Wn.2d 176 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Henry RUSTAD and Charles Bruil, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for John E. Bruil and Ardell R. Bruil, minors, Appellants, v. Matheo O. RUSTAD, Christina Adela Rustad Scanson, Myrtle Malinda Rustad Rehling, Harry Leon Rustad et al., Respondents. |
MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless, Landon R. Estep, Seattle, for appellants.
Elliott, Schneider & Smythe, Auburn, for respondents.
This is a case in which the facts are not in dispute, and only a question of law is presented. That question is: Where husband and wife are living separate and apart because the wife is insane and confined in a mental institution in another state, is property acquired by the husband, other than by gift, devise, or bequest, community or separate property? The trial court held that it was the former.
The action is one to quiet title to certain parcels of land, situated in the state of Washington, which were deeded to the appellants by Marcus Rustad, who had come to live in Washington after his wife was committed to a mental hospital in North Dakota, and had purchased these properties in this state. The appellants are his relatives and knew that he was married and that his wife was incompetent and confined in a mental institution. No guardian had been appointed for her, and the deeds were signed by the husband only.
The respondents are the present guardian of the incompetent and the surviving children of Marcus and Matheo Rustad. Marcus Rustad died in 1953, and his estate was probated as community property, but the parcels of land involved in this action were not inventoried in the estate by the appellant Henry Rustad, who was the executor. Since the properties were deeded to the appellants, they have paid the taxes which have been assessed against them.
In urging their position that the community property law should not be held to apply in this instance, the appellants make much of a theory that the domicile of Matheo Rustad did not follow that of her husband when he moved to Washington, but remained in North Dakota, which has no community property law. Whatever may be the validity of this theory, it does not answer the question here. The appellants do not suggest that where husband and wife are domiciled in different states, an automatic dissolution of the marriage results, nor would such a suggestion be tenable.
It is the well-established rule that all questions as to the legal effect of a conveyance are determined by the law of the state of situs of the land. 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, 942, § 220.1; 1 Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (3d ed.) 378, § 122, and p. 453, § 148; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (Sup.) Wash.Anno. 93, Immovables, § 214 et seq.
In his treatise, at page 454, Judge Goodrich says:
'* * * It may be stated as a general rule that the validity of a disposition of real property depends upon the law of the state where the property is situated. Story states it broadly: 'All the authorities in England and America * * * recognize the principle in its fullest import, that real estate, or immovable property, is exclusively subject to the laws of the government within whose territory it is situate.'
In this state, the situs of the land in question, the applicable rules are:
(1) The community or separate character of real property is determined by the character of funds used in its purchase. Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914, 12 L.R.A.,N.S., 921.
(2) All property acquired by either of the spouses during coverture is presumptively community property, and the burden is upon the party who contends that it is separate property to prove otherwise. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125; Jones v. Duke, 151 Wash. 108, 275 P. 72.
(3) All property acquired after marriage, except by gift, devise, or descent, is community property. In re Allen's Estate, 54 Wash.2d 616, 343 P.2d 867, and cases cited therein. However, personal property acquired by a spouse while domiciled in a jurisdiction where, by law, the property was separate property, retains that character when it is brought within this state. Brookman v. Durkee, supra; In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628.
(4) The title to real estate acquired by a married man becomes fixed and vests at the time of its acquisition as separate or community property, unless changed in some manner recognized by law. In re Gulstine's Estate, supra.
(5)...
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