Ruth America Hart v. The Modern Woodmen of America. Ruth America Hart

• Decision Date: 08 July 1899
• Docket Number: 11155. 11156
• Citation: 57 P. 936,60 Kan. 678
• Parties: RUTH AMERICA HART v. THE MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA. RUTH AMERICA HART, as Guardian of Everett L. Hart, v. THE KNIGHTS OF THE MACCABEES
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

57 P. 936

60 Kan. 678

RUTH AMERICA HART v. THE MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.

RUTH AMERICA HART, as Guardian of Everett L. Hart, v. THE KNIGHTS OF THE MACCABEES

No. 11155. No. 11156

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 8, 1899

Decided July, 1899.

Errors from Sedgwick district court; D. M. DALE, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

Amidon & Conly, for plaintiffs in error.

Bentley & Hatfield, for defendants in error.

JOHNSTON J. DOSTER, C. J., concurring. SMITH, J., not sitting.

OPINION

JOHNSTON, J.:

On June 1, 1896, Ozro E. Hart applied for membership and insurance in the Modern Woodmen of America, and on June 5, 1896, a beneficiary certificate was issued to him, providing that while in good standing he was entitled to participate in the benefit fund in the amount not to exceed $ 3000, which was to be paid at his death to his mother, Ruth America Hart. On June 13, 1896, Ozro E. Hart also obtained a beneficiary certificate in the order of the Knights of the Maccabees in the sum of $ 3000, payable at his death to Everett L. Hart, his son. In the case of the Modern Woodmen of America, it was expressly provided that the certificate should be void and all benefits which might have accrued absolutely forfeited if the insured should die "by his own hands, whether sane or insane." In the application Hart was asked if he understood that the order did not indemnify against death by suicide, to which he made an affirmative answer, and it was provided that the statement should constitute a part of the insurance contract.

In the case of the Knights of the Maccabees, the certificate provides that when the applicant becomes a member of the order he is entitled to the rights and benefits of the same subject to the provisions of the laws of the order. The laws of the order expressly provide that no benefits shall be paid on account of the death of a member when death is "the result of suicide within one year after admission, whether the member so taking his own life was sane or insane at the time." On the certificate itself is printed this provision of the law, exempting the order from liability if the member commit suicide within one year after admission to the order, whether sane or insane. The application of Hart also contains this declaration: "I also agree that should I commit suicide within one year from the date of my admission into the order, whether sane or insane at the time this contract shall be null and void." And he further stipulated that the application and laws of the order should constitute a part of the certificate.

Within a few days after his admission into the orders and the taking out of the beneficiary certificates, Ozro E. Hart committed suicide, and the facts with reference to the suicide were agreed on between the parties and are as follows:

"The said Ozro E. Hart was married on the 4th day of July, 1889, and lived and cohabited with his wife until the time of his death, and that his wife was the mother of said Everett L. Hart and he the father of said child; that on the night of the 19th or 20th day of June, 1896, the said Ozro E. Hart first learned and discovered that his wife and one Pitt were occupying the same bed and illicitly cohabiting together, and that his said wife was guilty of adultery with the said Pitt, and that the said knowledge and information of the infidelity of his wife affected the mind of said Hart to such an extent and in such a manner that his reasoning faculties became so impaired that he, the said Ozro E. Hart, became unable to understand the moral character of his acts and became insane, and while in such condition of mind, and while being so insane, he shot and killed his said wife, then turned the pistol on himself, and shot and killed himself, in the city of Wichita, Sedgwick county, Kansas, on June 21, 1896.

In the trial the principal controversy was whether the self-destruction of Hart exempted the orders from liability, and the decision in each case was in favor of the defendant. While there is some contention to the contrary, it is clear that an exception as to non-liability because of death by suicide, whether sane or insane, is a part of each of the insurance contracts under consideration. In one case it is plainly written on the face of the certificate, and in the other it is clearly provided for in the application and by-laws, which are referred to and made a part of the certificate, which together show the contract of the parties and that the exception is included.

Much diversity of judicial opinion has arisen as to the effect of the suicide of the insured. The supreme court of the United States has distinctly held that intentional self-destruction by the insured while sane is not a risk covered by a life-insurance policy, even when the policy contains no exception as to such a death, and it was there said that such a risk could not be legally covered by an insurance contract as it would be against public policy to make such a contract. (Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 18 S.Ct. 300, 42 L.Ed. 693; Supreme Commandery Knights Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466.) Other authorities hold that where life insurance is effected for the benefit of wife or children the suicide of the insured while sane is not a defense, in the absence of a condition or exception to that effect in the policy. (Fitch v. American Popular Life Ins. Co., 59 N.Y. 557; Darrow v. Family Fund Society, 116 N.Y. 537, 22 N.E. 1093; Mills v. Rebstock, 29 Minn. 380, 13 N.W. 162.) The supreme court of Wisconsin has held that intentional suicide while sane does not avoid a life-insurance policy in the absence of any provision therein to that effect, if third persons are beneficiaries. (Patterson and others v. Natural Premium...