Ruth v. Westinghouse Credit Co., Inc., Civ-74-110-E.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. Civ-74-110-E.,Civ-74-110-E.
• Citation: 373 F. Supp. 468
• Parties: Shirley RUTH and David Ruth, Plaintiffs, v. WESTINGHOUSE CREDIT CO., INC. and Mathis Brothers Furniture, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

373 F. Supp. 468

Shirley RUTH and David Ruth, Plaintiffs, v. WESTINGHOUSE CREDIT CO., INC. and Mathis Brothers Furniture, Inc., Defendants.

No. Civ-74-110-E.

United States District Court, W. D. Oklahoma.

March 22, 1974.

David A. Walker, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiffs.

Collier H. Pate, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EUBANKS, District Judge.

This case was removed from the District Court in and for Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, upon the petition of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs had brought suit against the Defendants under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681p to recover $690.00 actual damages by virtue of alleged false credit representations of the Defendants. The Petition further alleged that the false representations were wilful and malicious on the part of the Defendants and that same were designed to cause injury to the Plaintiffs, for which false representations the Plaintiffs seek $25,000.00 in punitive damages. The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Remand to the state court.

Subchapter III of the cited statute, §§ 1681-1681t, deals with "Credit Reporting Agencies". It recites the permissible uses of consumer reports, the disclosures respecting them, the conditions of disclosures to consumers, and the requirements on users of consumer reports.

The Statute provides in pertinent part:

Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of —

(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure (2) such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n

The Statute further provides that:

An action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years from the date on which the liability arises . . . 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681p

The Statute did not amend the Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a), which provides, with exceptions not pertinent here, that any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the Defendant.

The Courts have uniformly held that a state court is a "court of competent jurisdiction" in which an action may be brought to enforce liability imposed by a federal statute. Liability is imposed by the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The issue to be determined herein is whether the case, removed by Defendants from the state court to this Court, should, on Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand, be remanded to the state court. No reported case touching the issue has been brought to the attention of the Court by counsel. Nor has the extended research of the Court disclosed such a case. Moreover, no answer has been found in the legislative history of the Statute.

There is no federal statute comparable in the language used. The most comparable language appears in the Fair Labor Standards Act. It provides that "action to recover such liability liability under the Act may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). Repeatedly the courts have held that actions brought in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act are not removable to the federal court. Not infrequently the courts have remanded removal cases to the state court on their own motions.

The reasoning of the courts in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act is persuasive here. The thrust of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is the protection of credit consumers. It was not amendatory of existing statutes. It treats with the disclosure of consumer credit cost, credit advertising, restrictions on garnishment and credit reporting agencies. It imposes liability for violations and gives a right of action to injured parties in the federal district courts or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.

It has been uniformly held that a state court is a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of this Statute. In Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., (Mo., 1941) 40 F.Supp. 364, 365, in interpreting the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act which authorizes an action to recover liability to be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction, Judge Otis held that an action under the Act instituted in a state court is not a removable case.

The amounts involved usually are small. The places in which federal courts are held are few. They are only to be found in the larger cities. If it was not intended that state courts should have jurisdiction of these cases, then Congress made this act of slight value to working men, who might easily bring suit in a justice court or other state court in the neighborhood in which they live, but who, if they had to go to some distant city to prosecute the case, would, in effect, be prohibited from seeking any remedy. p. 365

In Kuligowski v. Hart, (Ohio, 1941) 43 F.Supp. 207, where an action to recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act involved only fact questions, the Court held that the ...