Rutherford v. Randal
| Decision Date | 30 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. B-8335,B-8335 |
| Citation | 593 S.W.2d 949 |
| Parties | Mary RUTHERFORD et al., Petitioners, v. C. M. RANDAL et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Jennings, Montgomery, Dies & Turner, Elton M. Montgomery, Graham, for petitioners.
D. J. Brookreson, II, Seymour, for respondents.
This case involves the interpretation of a 1938 mineral deed in order to determine the interests conveyed by that deed.
C. M. Randal, and the successors in interest to other original grantees, 1 brought suit in trespass to try title against Mary Rutherford, and the other successors in interest to the original grantor, 2 Clifford Rutherford.
Randal claimed that the mineral deed contained conflicting provisions regarding the interest conveyed. Randal further claimed that the deed should be interpreted as conveying to the grantees a 1/24th interest in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in and under a tract of land in Young County.
The trial court rejected this contention, and granted Mary Rutherford's motion for summary judgment. The holding was that only a 1/240th interest in the minerals had been conveyed. The court of civil appeals reversed this summary judgment, and remanded the case for a trial to determine the grantor's intent. 577 S.W.2d 368.
In reversing, the court of civil appeals held that there was a factual dispute about the extent of mineral interests that the grantor intended to convey. The court of civil appeals further held that extrinsic evidence could properly be considered to determine that intent.
We agree with the judgment of the trial court and disagree with the holding of the court of civil appeals. We hold that the deed unambiguously conveys only a 1/240th mineral interest to Randal. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence concerning the grantor's intent is not admissible to challenge the terms of the deed. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals, and affirm the summary judgment granted by the trial court.
On February 1, 1938, Clifford and Maggie Rutherford executed a deed of mineral interests to C. M. Randal, and others. It provided, in pertinent part:
That we, Clifford Rutherford and wife Maggie Rutherford . . . do grant, sell, convey, assign and deliver unto the said Grantees an undivided one two-hundred fortieth (1/240) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced from the following described land situated in Young County, Texas, to wit:
. . . (Legal description). For a better description of said land reference is hereby made to deeds of record in the Deed Records of Young County, Texas, and the interest hereby conveyed in said land is that portion that the grantor, Clifford Rutherford, received from his deceased parents. (Emphasis added).
Randal claimed that this deed operated to convey a 1/24th mineral interest in the specified land, rather than the 1/240th mineral interest specifically enumerated in the granting clause. In support of this contention, Randal pointed out, and it was undisputed, that at the time of this conveyance Clifford Rutherford, the grantor, actually owned a 1/24th mineral interest in the land. 3 In light of this circumstance, Randal focused on that portion of the deed that declared: "the interest hereby conveyed in said land is that portion that the grantor, Clifford Rutherford, received from his deceased parents." Randal contended that this clause of the deed conflicted with the specific conveyance set forth in the granting clause. The granting clause purported to convey a 1/240th mineral interest, whereas the subsequent clause, according to Randal when read in light of the existent facts at the time of execution, purported to convey a 1/24th mineral interest.
Randal claimed that the effect of these two provisions was to create an ambiguity in the deed, thus permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence to discover Clifford Rutherford's original intent. 4 In arguing that the deed was ambiguous, Randal relied mainly on Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956).
In Smith, a successor in interest to the grantee sued a successor in interest to the grantor, seeking to establish his right to a 1/4th mineral interest in the northeast quadrant of a certain tract of land. In the deed, the grantor had conveyed an undivided 1/2 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the southeast and northwest quadrants of that tract of land. There was no explicit grant concerning the northeast quadrant. In a subsequent paragraph, however, the deed provided:
The parties however intend this deed to include and the same is hereby made to cover and include not only the above described land, but also any and all other land and interest in land owned or claimed by the Grantor in said survey . . . . (Emphasis added)
In Smith, it was undisputed that, at the time of execution of this deed, the grantor owned an interest in the northeast quadrant of the tract of land.
In light of this intent clause, expressing that the parties intended the conveyance to include all of the grantor's interests in the tract of land, this court held that there was an ambiguity as to the extent of the grantor's interest that was conveyed. Accordingly, the grantor's successors in interest were permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning the grantor's intent.
Relying on Smith, Randal argues that extrinsic evidence is similarly admissible in this case. A close look at the facts in Smith, and the deed provisions in this case, however, demonstrate the error of this argument. In the instant case, the recital that the conveyance is the portion previously conveyed by Clifford Rutherford's parents is no more than a description of the lands wherein the mineral interests are located. The clause that allegedly creates the ambiguity...
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