Ruthven v. Am. Fire Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 22 October 1894 |
Citation | 60 N.W. 663,92 Iowa 316 |
Parties | RUTHVEN ET AL. v. AMERICAN FIRE INS. CO. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Palo Alto county; George H. Carr, Judge.
Action at law upon a policy of fire insurance. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.R. W. Barger and McCarty & Linderman, for appellant.
B. E. Kelly and Soper, Allen & Morling, for appellees.
On the 30th day of April, 1891, the defendant issued to plaintiffs its policy of assurance, insuring them against loss or damage by fire for the period of one year upon an ice house situated in Palo Alto county. On the 15th day of October, and during the life of the policy, the building was totally destroyed by fire. The company having failed and neglected to pay the loss, this action was brought to recover the amount of the policy. Upon the trial of the case in the court below it was conceded that the property was destroyed by fire, and was worth more than the amount called for by the policy. It was also admitted by the plaintiffs that they did not give the preliminary notice and proof of loss required by the policy and by McClain's Code, § 1734, but they averred that the defendant, through its officers and agents, had waived the same. At the conclusion of the testimony for plaintiffs, defendant moved for a verdict, on the ground that no such waiver had been proved. The court overruled this motion, and this ruling is assigned as error. Ingersoll, Howell & Co., of Des Moines, were the local agents of the defendant, who issued the policy in suit. They had the power “to receive proposals for insurance against loss or damage by fire, to name rates, receive premiums, and to countersign, issue, renew, and consent to the transfer of policies of insurance, signed by the president and secretary of the company, subject to the regulations of the company and the instructions of its officers.” The evidence also shows that they sometimes received notices and proofs of loss, and forwarded them to the defendant company. Shortly after the fire, and on the same day, one F. H. Giddings, through whom the policy of insurance was procured, at the request of one of the plaintiffs, sent to Ingersoll, Howell & Co. the following telegram: On the next day he wrote as follows: In a few days thereafter, Giddings received a reply to these communications from Ingersoll, Howell & Co., which stated, in effect, that they had received the letter and telegram, and would have the adjuster come in a few days. On receipt of the letter and telegram from Giddings, Ingersoll, Howell & Co. “mailed the usual notice of loss to the company.” On the 19th day of October a man by the name of Werniemont, who was the adjusting agent of the Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Company, which was also interested in the loss, appeared upon the scene, and made estimates of the material and workmanship on the building, figured the dimensions of and located the buildings. The authorities and powers of this agent will be referred to hereafter. Nothing further being heard from the company, Giddings, at the request of plaintiffs, again wrote or telegraphed Ingersoll, Howell & Co. regarding the loss, and on December 11th received the following telegram: And a few days thereafter received the following letter: C. N. Miller is a special agent and adjuster of the defendant company, living at Des Moines. Whether he is a general adjuster, or acts as such in special cases, does not clearly appear. Immediately upon receipt of the notice of loss from Giddings, Ingersoll, Howell & Co. notified Miller of the loss, and a short time thereafter Miller and Werniemont came into the office of Ingersoll, Howell & Co., and it was there arranged between them that Werniemont should go and investigate the plaintiffs' loss, and report to the defendant company. Werniemont went pursuant to their arrangement, and made the investigation before stated. Some time in January, 1892, and afterthe 60 days had expired for making proofs of loss, Miller himself went to Ruthven, where plaintiffs lived, and there had a conversation with the plaintiffs, in which he stated in substance that he did not wish to go to the site of the property; that he had seen Werniemont before he came up, and had a talk with him after he went back, and that he was satisfied that it was all straight and right, and ought to be paid, but that plaintiffs ought to commence an action against the ice company for their negligence in destroying the property, and if they (plaintiffs) fought them they would take care of us (plaintiffs); that Werniemont had come to investigate the liability of the ice company when he was first there. Miller did not agree to pay the loss at any time, however, and did not agree to do anything until plaintiffs had tried to recover from the ice company.
The foregoing facts are established by plaintiffs' testimony, and are relied upon to prove a waiver of the provisions of the policy requiring notice and a statement of the loss within 60 days from the date of the fire, and of the statute requiring practically the same thing. The defendant introduced no testimony, and the question in the case is, do these facts establish a waiver? The policy required this statement of loss to be filed within 60 days after the fire, unless such time was extended in writing by the company, and provided that the statement should be signed and sworn to by the insured, and should state the time and origin of the fire, according to his best belief, the interest of the assured in the premises, etc. The statute (McClain's Code, § 1734) requires the assured to give notice in writing, accompanied by an affidavit stating how loss occurred, and the extent of the loss, within 60 days from the time the loss occurred. These matters were conditions precedent to a right of recovery on the policy, and, unless waived, a failure to comply with them is fatal. The policy also provided: ...
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