Rutledge v. Rutledge
Decision Date | 01 February 2005 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0777-04-4. |
Citation | 608 S.E.2d 504,45 Va. App. 56 |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | Kathleen D. RUTLEDGE v. Ronald L. RUTLEDGE. |
Jennifer E. Mandell (Richard L. Downey; Richard L. Downey & Associates, Fairfax, on briefs), for appellant.
Michael Kevin Murphy (Law Offices of Michael Kevin Murphy & Associates, on brief), for appellee.
Present: BENTON, BUMGARDNER and KELSEY, JJ.
Kathleen D. Rutledge contends the trial judge erred in ruling that her marital property settlement agreement prohibited the trial judge from exercising discretionary authority to award attorney's fees to her in a post divorce proceeding to modify spousal support. We hold that because the agreement expressly provides for attorney's fees in some instances but does not do so for modification proceedings, the trial judge did not err.
Kathleen D. Rutledge and Ronald L. Rutledge were divorced by a final decree entered on July 15, 1999. The final decree "affirmed, ratified, and incorporated" the parties' property settlement agreement. Pertinent to this appeal, the property settlement agreement provides that "[t]he husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $1,300.00 per month for her maintenance and support" and also provides for modification of the spousal support as follows:
Upon the petition of either party upon a material change of circumstances in a manner which is consistent with . . . Code Section 20-107.1 . . ., a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be able to modify by increasing or decreasing or terminating or reserving the right to spousal support as the circumstances may make proper.
Four years after entry of the final decree, the wife filed a petition in the circuit court to increase spousal support, alleging a material change in circumstances and requesting an award of attorney's fees. The husband denied that a material change in circumstances had occurred, denied the wife was entitled to any relief, and requested dismissal of the petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and he increased spousal support to $2,000 per month. The trial judge also found that an award of attorney's fees "does not contravene any provision of the agreement" and awarded the wife her attorney's fees.
The husband filed a motion to reconsider the award of attorney's fees. In his motion, the husband asserted that the following provisions of the agreement contain the only basis for an award of attorney's fees:
The husband argued that Code § 20-109(C) restricts the trial judge's authority to award attorney's fees to the terms of the agreement.
The wife responded that the trial judge had inherent authority, pursuant to Code § 20-109(A), to award attorney's fees in spousal support modification proceedings. She also argued that, in any event, paragraphs 11(C) and 12(B) are silent regarding the issue of attorney's fees in modification proceedings and, therefore, the "right to seek fees in this case has not been waived or limited by the terms of their agreement."
The trial judge granted the motion to reconsider. In pertinent part, he ruled as follows:
The wife appeals from the order denying her request for attorney's fees.
The parties agree that the resolution of this case turns upon the application of Code § 20-109. The portions of the statute pertinent to this appeal are as follows:
The wife contends the limiting language in Code § 20-109(C) — "no decree . . . directing the payment of . . . counsel fee . . . shall be entered except in accordance with that . . . contract" — should be read to mean that the trial judge is authorized to grant her attorney's fees unless the agreement forbids it. Thus, she argues that because the agreement "did not address the issue of an award of attorney's fees incurred by either party as an incident to a post-divorce proceeding for modification of spousal support . . ., Code § 20-109(C) did not restrict the trial court's power to award such attorney's fees."
We disagree. Subsection A and C of the statute are interrelated. In analyzing these subsections, we have held that, although "Code § 20-109(A) empowers trial courts to modify a spousal support award, . . . Code § 20-109(C) expressly limits the court's authority . . . according to the terms of a stipulation or contract signed by the parties." Blackburn v. Michael, 30 Va.App. 95, 100, 515 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1999). Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that, when the parties' agreement has been affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into the final decree of divorce, "`[Code] § 20-109 restricts the court's jurisdiction over awarding "alimony, suit money, or counsel fee" to the terms of the contract.'" Thomas v. Thomas, 216 Va. 741, 743, 222 S.E.2d 557, 559 (1976) (quoting McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 Va. 365, 368, 177 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1970)). As these cases hold, the statutory language of Code § 20-109(C) restricts the judge to decreeing according "to the terms" of the agreement. In the context of this statute, which provides that "no decree or order directing the payment of . . . counsel fee . . . shall be entered except in accordance with that contract," the words, "except in accordance with that . . . contract," are not ambiguous. The plain meaning of these words is not susceptible to another understanding. See, e.g., In re Coane's Estate, 310 Pa. 138, 165 A. 2, 4 (1933) ( ).
Although our decisions and the decisions of the Supreme Court have not always used consistent language in applying Code § 20-109, we have never intimated that subsection C permits a trial judge to grant relief in derogation of the terms of the parties' agreement. For example, in White v. White, 257 Va. 139, 509 S.E.2d 323 (1999), where the final decree of divorce incorporated a settlement agreement that obligated the husband to pay the monthly mortgage payments on a residence to a bank, the trial judge ruled that the husband was in contempt for failing to make the mortgage payments to the wife after she sold the residence several years following the divorce and after the bank received from the sale proceeds the balance due on the mortgage. Id. at 142-43, 509 S.E.2d at 324. Reversing that decision, the Supreme...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Williams v. Williams, Record No. 1176-08-2 (Va. App. 7/21/2009)
...§ 20-109(C), a trial court is bound by the parties' agreement regarding the payment of attorney's fees. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 60-66, 608 S.E.2d 504, 506-09 (2005). Subsection C restricts the court's jurisdiction such that it can "enter `no decree or order directing the payme......
-
Courtney v. Courtney, Record No. 2124-05-1 (Va. App. 6/20/2006)
...§ 20-109(C)] permits a trial judge to grant relief in derogation of the terms of the parties' agreement." Rutledge v. Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 62, 608 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2005). The stipulation expressly provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs should either party "be required to re......
-
Stacy v. Stacy, Record No. 0863-07-3 (Va. App. 4/22/2008)
...language of Code § 20-109(C) restricts the judge to decreeing according to the terms of the agreement." Rutledge v. Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 61-62, 608 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations However, in cases involving cohabitation, remarriage, or death, the stipula......
-
Nadolski v. Nadolski, Record No. 1781-07-2 (Va. App. 7/29/2008), Record No. 1781-07-2
...20-109(C). Courts must enforce contractual provisions for attorney fees in the same manner as any other terms. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 62, 608 S.E.2d 504, 507 (2005). The parties' agreement contained terms concerning attorney fees and costs, as quoted above. The agreement stat......