Rutledge v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.

Citation218 Ark. 510,237 S.W.2d 469
Decision Date12 March 1951
Docket NumberNo. 4-9400,4-9400
PartiesRUTLEDGE v. UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORP.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

R. W. Tucker, Batesville, for appellant.

Chas. F. Cole, Batesville, for appellee.

WARD, Justice.

C. D. Rutledge filed a suit in circuit court to recover damages from Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation for the wrongful conversion of an automobile. The material part of the complaint states: 'That on or about July 10th, 1949 defendant, Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation and its agents and employees unlawfully took possession of said automobile without any authority or right, and without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and converted the same to its own use'; the defendant entered a general denial. At the close of the testimony the court sustained defendant's motion for an instructed verdict, from which plaintiff appeals.

The issue before the lower court was whether there was an unlawful conversion, and the only issue before us is; was there sufficient evidence to make a jury question.

Rutledge bought a Lincoln automobile November 10, 1948 in the State of Georgia and (by his wife) signed a conditional sales contract which was accepted by the Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation. After making six monthly payments he moved to Batesville, Arkansas, with the knowledge and consent of the Credit Corporation. He was behind with his payments and applied to the local credit office for re-financing, without success. Some days later Gid Massey, an employee of the local agent, found the car at a filling station and took the keys. Then he went to appellant's home which was just behind the filling station and there he had a conversation with appellant and his wife about the possession of the car. He told them he had been instructed to take it and would store it in a local garage and would cooperate with them if they could find a buyer. Appellant did not give his permission but he did not object. Massey then drove the car to appellant's house where Mrs. Rutledge removed some personal effects from the car. Mrs. Rutledge looked after business affairs for appellant because he was afflicted.

The following are excerpts from Mrs. Rutledge's testimony.

'Q. At any time did you consent? A. He didn't ask for my consent he just told me he was taking it.'

'Q. You didn't object to his taking the car? A. There was no way to object.

'Q. He didn't get it by any trick or through fraud? A. No he just came and told me he had taken it.

'Q. You didn't offer any objections? A. I couldn't object. He told me what he was doing.'

The nephew of appellant testified that appellant and his wife told him (before the alleged conversion) that they were going to lose the car if they did not make the payments; that he took a boy to Rider's garage (where the car was stored by the Credit Corporation) to buy the car; he looked at it and seemed to like it and went to appellee's local office to see if he could drive it and was told he could not because it was not insured, but to come back later and an employee would go with him and drive him; but the boy bought another car that same afternoon and never went back to appellee's office. Appellant's brother testified that a man came up from Little Rock to look over the car and that he did so and that he started the motor and ran it; said he would buy it if it drove all right; he told the man the C. I. T. had charge and that he went to see the C. I. T. man and was told he could...

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4 cases
  • James v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • February 7, 1994
    ...in process. Id. at 720 (citing Manhattan Credit Co., Inc. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961), Rutledge v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 218 Ark. 510, 237 S.W.2d 469 (1951)). This difference between not consenting to repossession and actually objecting to repossession is perhaps......
  • Union Motor Co. v. Tait, 5-560
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1955
    ...Ellis v. Smithers, 206 Ark. 247, 174 S.W.2d 568. An example of peaceable repossession or 'taking' is Rutledge v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 218 Ark. 510, 237 S.W.2d 469, 470. The contract authorized the seller to take possession "without [any] legal process" in the event of defa......
  • Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 5-2278
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • January 9, 1961
    ...upon our holdings in Berham v. Standridge, 201 Ark. 1143, 148 S.W.2d 648; Ellis v. Smithers, supra, and Rutledge v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 218 Ark. 510, 237 S.W.2d 469. we find however that these cases are not in conflict with what we have heretofore said. In the Barham case......
  • Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 31, 1982
    ...without any breach of the peace, id. In particular, the Supreme Court of Arkansas discussed the case of Rutledge v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 218 Ark. 510, 237 S.W.2d 469 (1951). In Rutledge, the court found no breach of the peace when the repossessor acquired keys to the automobile, c......

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