Rutter v. Janis

• Decision Date: 25 February 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20122
• Citation: 334 Conn. 722,224 A.3d 525
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Casey Leigh RUTTER v. Adam JANIS et al. Nancy Beale, Administratrix (Estate of Lindsey Beale) v. Luis Martins et al. Jason Ferreira v. Luis Martins et al.

334 Conn. 722

224 A.3d 525

Casey Leigh RUTTER

v.Adam JANIS et al.

Nancy Beale, Administratrix (Estate of Lindsey Beale)

v.Luis Martins et al.

Jason Ferreira

v.Luis Martins et al.

SC 20122

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 23, 2019

Officially released February 25, 2020

James J. Healy, with whom were Joel T. Faxon and Alinor C. Sterling, and, on the brief, J. Craig Smith, Cynthia C. Bott and Nathan C. Nasser, for the appellants (plaintiff in each case).

James F. Shields, with whom was David M. Houf, for the appellee (defendant Danbury Fair Hyundai, LLC).

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Vertefeuille, Js.^*

MULLINS, J.

Subject to certain requirements, General Statutes § 14-60(a) permits motor vehicle dealers to temporarily loan a dealer license plate to, inter alia, the purchaser of one of their vehicles while that purchaser's registration is pending, but "for not more than thirty days in any year ...."¹ The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, for purposes of calculating that thirty day period, the "first day" is the date on which the dealer loans the plate to the purchaser or the first full calendar day thereafter.

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs in this joint appeal, Casey Leigh Rutter, Nancy Beale, as administratrix of the estate of Lindsey Beale, and Jason Ferreira, each commenced an action against the defendant Danbury Fair Hyundai, LLC,² a motor vehicle dealer whose dealer license plate was displayed on one of the vehicles involved in the accident. The trial court concluded that the accident occurred on the last day of the thirty day limitation period of § 14-60(a) because the day during which the defendant loaned the plate was not included in the calculation of the thirty day period. The Appellate Court agreed and affirmed the judgments of the trial court; see Rutter v. Janis , 180 Conn. App. 1, 5, 182 A.3d 85 (2018) ; and we granted certification, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly excluded the date of the loan when calculating the thirty day loan period. See Rutter v. Janis , 329 Conn. 904, 185 A.3d 594 (2018).

We agree with the Appellate Court that the day of the loan does not count toward the thirty day limitation period of § 14-60(a). In particular, we conclude that the legislature's unqualified use of the term "days"—a term that has a well established legal meaning in our jurisprudence—indicates that it intended the thirty day period to be measured in terms of full calendar days. Therefore, because the day of the loan was a "fraction" of a day rather than a full calendar day, it must be excluded. This construction is consistent with this court's long recognized policy that, when calculating statutory and other deadlines, "the day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained ... is to be excluded from the calculation ...." Weeks v. Hull , 19 Conn. 376, 382 (1849). This court established, and has consistently adhered to, this rule as a matter of policy in order to ensure uniformity and predictability in the computation of deadlines, and we see no reason why it should not be applied to § 14-60(a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following undisputed facts. "On May 9, 2013, Luis Martins and his father, Jorge Martins, purchased a 2013 Hyundai Veloster automobile from the defendant. Because the defendant had not received the automobile manufacturer's certificate of origin, the parties could not complete the transfer of Luis Martins' motor vehicle registration from his previous vehicle ... to the new vehicle. The defendant loaned a dealer number plate to Luis Martins while the registration process was pending. The defendant and Luis Martins signed [a "Temporary Loan of Motor Vehicle" agreement (loan agreement) ] at approximately 7 p.m. on May 9, 2013.³

"On June 8, 2013, at approximately 3 p.m., Luis Martins, while driving the Hyundai Veloster automobile, was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Danbury. As a result of the accident, his passengers, Lindsey Beale, Casey Leigh Rutter and Jason Ferreira, sustained traumatic injuries; Beale died from her injuries. At the time of the accident, the Hyundai Veloster automobile displayed the dealer number plate belonging to the defendant." (Footnote added.) Rutter v. Janis , supra, 180 Conn. App. at 5, 182 A.3d 85.

In separately filed complaints, the plaintiffs asserted a number of claims in support of their theory that the defendant was liable for the damages resulting from the June 8, 2013 accident, and Rutter included a claim that the defendant had loaned the dealer plate to Luis Martins in violation of § 14-60. Thereafter, the defendant filed a substantially similar motion for summary judgment in each case, asserting that it was not liable because its loan of the dealer plate met the requirements of § 14-60, and that the accident occurred "twenty-nine days and [twenty] hours after the plates were loaned out, and thus well within the thirty day period of time required by [ § 14-60(a) ]." Each plaintiff filed a substantially similar opposition, asserting, inter alia, that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant complied with the requirements of § 14-60(a), and also that the loan agreement exceeded the thirty day time limit because it permitted Luis Martins to return the plate as late as June 9, 2013, which was, "at a minimum, thirty-one days" after the defendant loaned the plate.⁴

The trial court granted each of the defendant's motions and rendered judgment in each case for the defendant, concluding that the defendant complied with § 14-60. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court reasoned that the date on which the defendant loaned the plate to Luis Martins—May 9, 2013—did not count toward the thirty day limit. Therefore, using May 10 as "day one," and measuring the thirty days against the date of the accident,⁵ the court concluded that the accident on June 8, 2013, occurred on the thirtieth day after the defendant loaned the plate, within the thirty day time limit of § 14-60(a). Rejecting the plaintiffs' other arguments in opposition to summary judgment, the court ruled that the defendant "complied with [§] 14-60 ... and is protected from liability for the accident."

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgments of the trial court to the Appellate Court, which affirmed those judgments, concluding, inter alia, that the court properly excluded the day on which the loan was made when computing the thirty day time limit under § 14-60(a).⁶ See Rutter v. Janis , supra, 180 Conn. App. at 14, 182 A.3d 85. Counting May 10, 2013—the day after the loan agreement was executed—as the first day, the Appellate Court concluded that "[t]he accident on June 8, 2013, occurred not more than thirty days following the loan agreement and, therefore, was within the statutory time limit set forth in § 14-60(a)."⁷ Id.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly excluded the date of the loan from the computation of the thirty day period under § 14-60(a) because (1) the text of § 14-60(a) indicates that the legislature intended it to be included, and (2) the parties to the loan agreement—that is, Luis Martins and the defendant—intended for the loan period to begin running on the date the loan agreement was executed, May 9, 2013. We find neither argument persuasive.

We begin with our standard of review. " Practice Book [§ 17-49 ] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.... Finally, the scope of our review of the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg , 316 Conn. 809, 820–21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly failed to count the date on which the defendant loaned the plate to Luis Martins as the first day of the thirty day limitation period because the plain terms of § 14-60(a) require that date to be included. We disagree.

Because resolution the plaintiffs' claim requires us to construe § 14-60(a), we begin with the general principles of statutory construction that guide our analysis. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. , 333 Conn. 30, 45–46, 213 A.3d 1110 (2019). "Issues of statutory construction ... are...