RW v. Schrein
| Decision Date | 19 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S-00-811, No. S-00-808, No. S-00-810, No. S-00-809, No. S-00-812. |
| Parties | R.W. et al., Appellants, v. Daniel B. SCHREIN, M.D., Appellee, and The Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Garnishee-Appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
James E. Harris and Britany S. Shotkoski, Omaha, of Harris, Feldman Law Offices, for appellants.
Mark A. Christensen and Pamela K. Epp, Lincoln, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, P.C., for garnishee-appellee.
As children, the five appellants in these actions were patients of Daniel B. Schrein, M.D., who was then a pediatrician practicing in Omaha. Now adults, appellants brought actions to recover damages for sexual abuse perpetrated upon them by Schrein under the guise of medical treatment. After obtaining default judgments against Schrein, appellants commenced these garnishment proceedings against The Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana (Medical Protective), Schrein's professional liability insurer. The district court for Douglas County determined that the claims were not covered under the policy and entered summary judgment in favor of Medical Protective. Appellants perfected these appeals, which we moved to our docket and decide together in this opinion because the dispositive issues are common to each.
This controversy is before us for the second time. In Medical Protective Co. v. Schrein, 255 Neb. 24, 582 N.W.2d 286 (1998), Medical Protective sought a declaratory judgment determining that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Schrein with respect to the claims of five former patients that they were sexually abused by Schrein during purported examinations or treatments. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Medical Protective based upon its determination that Schrein's conduct was not within the scope of professional services as contemplated by the insurance policy. The individual claimants appealed, but Schrein did not cross-appeal. This court held that declaratory judgment with respect to the claimants was improper because the facts pertaining to the issue of coverage had not yet been developed. We noted that the record did not reflect "the specific claims that may be brought against Schrein, e.g., whether the claims involve solely sexual acts or intentional torts, or include other acts or professional negligence." Id. at 30, 582 N.W.2d at 291. We further noted that we lacked "the requisite knowledge of what discovery may reveal or, more importantly, what verdict may be rendered by the fact finder." Id. We concluded that declaratory relief with respect to the claimants was not necessary because "[a]ny of Medical Protective's defenses or assertions of noncoverage can be presented without any consequential harm to Medical Protective if or when any of the claimants seeks to garnish policy proceeds as a result of a judgment against Schrein." Id. at 31, 582 N.W.2d at 291. However, we determined that because the claimants lacked standing with respect to contractual issues between Medical Protective and Schrein, including the existence of duties to defend or indemnify, our holding did not affect the declaratory judgment rendered in favor of Medical Protective against Schrein.
Appellants herein filed separate actions for professional malpractice against Schrein. Appellant R.W. filed a petition on November 23, 1998, alleging he was Schrein's patient from 1972 to 1990. R.W. alleged that in January 1987, Schrein diagnosed him with and was treating him for recurring meatitis. He alleged that at approximately that time, he developed an antibiotic-induced scrotal infection which Schrein diagnosed as excoriation of the scrotum. R.W. alleged that during an examination, Schrein applied ointment to R.W.'s penis and manipulated it to the point of ejaculation. After commenting about needing to do a sperm count, Schrein forced R.W. to ejaculate again.
Appellant G.N. filed a petition on November 23, 1998. G.N. alleged that he was Schrein's patient from 1986 to 1990. G.N. alleged that from the time he was 11 years old, Schrein would have him sit nude on Schrein's lap while Schrein stroked his body and discussed sexual behavior. G.N. alleged that in 1989, Schrein treated him for meatitis during a physical examination and asked that he return for a followup visit. He alleged that in February 1990, Schrein had him sit on Schrein's lap while he performed a procedure involving insertion of a metal rod into G.N.'s penis.
Appellant C.T. filed a petition on November 23, 1998. C.T. alleged that she was Schrein's patient from 1979 to 1990. She alleged that during the course of examinations, Schrein would have her sit on his lap while nude and would discuss sexual behavior. C.T. alleged that in 1989, while conducting her first pelvic examination, Schrein fondled her breasts, inserted his fingers in her vagina, and manipulated her vulva. C.T. further alleged that before she got dressed, Schrein had her sit on his lap while he tickled her thighs and asked if she had any boyfriends and if she was sexually active.
Appellant L.N. filed a petition on November 23, 1998. L.N. alleged that during the course of examinations, Schrein would have her sit on his lap nude while he stroked her body and discussed sexual behavior. L.N. also alleged that during examinations, Schrein digitally penetrated her vagina, watched her dress and undress, and made her turn around in front of him when she was nude.
Appellant M.M. filed a petition on October 1, 1998. M.M. alleged that in 1990, when he was 13 years old, he went to Schrein for a routine medical evaluation and treatment concerning the medical condition of being overweight. M.M. alleged that during this visit, Schrein performed a physical examination and diagnosed urinary meatitis. According to the petition, Schrein applied an ointment to M.M.'s penis and manipulated it to the point of ejaculation.
The petitions of all of the above appellants alleged that Schrein knew or should have known that his minor patients were especially vulnerable and readily subject to manipulation and control by their physician. The petitions alleged that this emotional reaction of a patient toward a physician is referred to in the medical community as "transference" and that Schrein had a duty to properly recognize and manage transference as it developed. Each petition alleged that Schrein had a professional, fiduciary, and ethical duty to avoid sexual contact and that his failure to do so fell below the standard of care. Each petition also alleged that Schrein failed to provide proper medical treatment for the conditions presented and performed unnecessary medical examinations and treatments.
Schrein was served by publication in all of the above actions. He failed to answer or appear, and default judgments were entered against him in each case. Each judgment recited that sexual contact with a patient by a fiduciary caused the harm for which damages were sought. The default judgments, which were prepared and submitted by counsel for appellants, also recited that "the acts and omissions of Defendant Schrein arose out of his medical treatment of [appellants] during the course and scope of professional services" in violation of the standard of care.
On March 25, 1999, each appellant issued summons in garnishment upon Medical Protective, alleging that he or she believed Medical Protective held property, in the form of a liability policy, belonging to Schrein. In its answers to the garnishment interrogatories, Medical Protective denied that it held property of Schrein and alleged that its policy of insurance issued to Schrein did not cover payment of damages which were not based upon professional services and that any coverage was further excluded because damages incurred by appellants were the result of criminal, willful, or sexual acts. Appellants each filed applications to determine garnishee liability. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1030 (Reissue 1995). All parties filed motions for summary judgment. In orders dated July 28, 2000, the district court granted Medical Protective's motions for summary judgment in all five garnishment proceedings. Appellants filed timely appeals, and we granted their respective motions to bypass. The cases were consolidated for oral argument.
Each appellant assigns, restated, summarized, and consolidated, that the district court erred in (1) allowing Medical Protective to collaterally attack the underlying judgments against Schrein; (2) determining that Medical Protective had a right to assert policy defenses against Schrein in the garnishment proceedings; (3) determining that appellants' claims did not arise from the rendering of "professional services" by Schrein and were therefore not covered under the professional liability insurance policy issued by Medical Protective; (4) determining that there was no coverage under the policy for the additional reason that the claims against Schrein fell within specific coverage exclusions for criminal, willful, or sexual acts; and (5) determining that public policy did not compel that Schrein's victims be compensated.
In addition, R.W. further assigns that the district court erred in (1) finding that his claim against Schrein was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) failing to find that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,156 (Reissue 1995) was applicable and that his petition was timely filed pursuant thereto, (3) failing to find that his petition and malpractice suit against Schrein relate back to the filing of the declaratory judgment, and (4) failing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel against Medical Protective as it relates to the statute of limitations.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is...
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