Ryan for the Estate of Spiegelhalter v. Spiegelhalter, WD58466
| Decision Date | 22 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | WD58466 |
| Parties | Beverly Sue Ryan, P.A. Conservator for the Estate of Ruth Spiegelhalter, Respondent v. William Spiegelhalter, et al., Respondents and Gary and Teresa Gabel, Appellants. WD58466 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Clay County, Hon. Larry D. Harman
Opinion Summary: Conservator of disabled woman's estate brought action for discovery of assets against woman's children. The circuit court found in favor of all of woman's children except for the appellants, one daughter and son-in-law, relating to a condominium.
Court holds: 1) The affirmative defense of statute of limitations was not alleged with particularity.
2) The Conservator's pleadings were sufficient to state a claim for relief.
3) The probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over claim that the appellants adversely withheld or claimed money that belonged to woman's estate after transfer of the condominium.
4) The probate's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Pursuant to section 473.340, RSMo 2000, Conservator of incapacitated woman's estate (respondent) was granted judgment in probate court against woman's daughter and son-in-law (appellants) relating to proceeds withheld from the sale of real estate. The facts in this case were hotly contested and are highly unusual. The facts are set out in the next section, but the reader is now advised: 1) the daughter and son-in-law of the disabled and incapacitated woman attempted to sell the woman a condominium in which to live some time after she had suffered a debilitating stroke though before she was declared incapacitated and disabled; 2) there were three separate contracts for sale or transfer of title drawn up by sellers and executed by the parties (creating a vital issue at trial as to which one, if any, actually was effective); 3) it is unclear whether the daughter and son-in-law ever had legal title to transfer; the deed was never executed by them during the time in question to the woman; 4) the woman paid a substantial amount of money as a down payment and several years of monthly payments to the Appellants.
Appellants challenge the discovery of assets judgment, arguing that the probate court was in error: 1) because of the expiration of two statutes of limitations; 2) because the Conservator's pleadings were insufficient to state a cause of action; 3) because the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; and 4) because there was not substantial evidence that Appellants adversely withheld or claimed an interest in the real estate.
Beverly Sue Ryan, Public Administrator of Clay County, was appointed conservator (hereafter Conservator) of Ruth Spiegelhalter's1 estate because Ruth was declared legally disabled and incapacitated by the probate division of the Clay County Circuit Court on February 6, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the Conservator filed a petition for discovery of assets, accounting, and other relief in the probate division against all of Ruth's children. The probate court found in favor of all of the children except for one claim, on which it ruled against Ruth's daughter and son-in-law, Appellants Teresa and Gary Gabel (hereafter Appellants or either Gary or Teresa Gabel).
The count against Appellants involves a condominium at 7140 Kingston Court in Clay County. Legal title to the property was originally in the name of Ron Topham, Gary Gabel's joint-venture partner, or in the name of the Kingston Court Development Corp. Prior to Ruth's incapacity, three contracts may have been drawn to sell that condominium to Ruth, though there are allegations that Teresa may have signed Ruth's name, either at Ruth's direction or in forgery. Appellants state that Ruth was unable to perform under any of the contracts. The court, however, found that Ruth paid the Gabels a $49,000 down payment and that the Gabels carried an $11,000 note on the property. The court also found that legal ownership was never transferred to Ruth. Nonetheless, Ruth lived in the condominium from December of 1988 until she was unable to care for herself in 1997. During the time she was in the condominium, Ruth paid Appellants $235 each month on the $11,000 note.
In 1995 or 1996, the Spiegelhalter children held a family meeting and discussed who should buy the Kingston Court condominium after it was discovered that title had not been transferred to Ruth and that the title remained in the name of the Kingston Court Development Corp. John Spiegelhalter, a son of Ruth, agreed to purchase the condominium for $85,000, and paid $35,000 (by taking out a second deed of trust on his own home) to the Appellants to clear an encumbrance that was on the condominium.2 John did not pay anyone the remaining $50,000. The probate court noted that this transaction occurred on an unknown date.
John testified that even though the selling price of the condominium was $85,000, his only obligation was to pay $35,000 so that the property would be free of encumbrances. Ruth resided in the condominium and paid "rent" to John until June of 1997 when she moved into a nursing home. John applied that "rent" towards his $35,000 deed of trust.
In 1998, John sold the condominium for $101,000. He paid to the Conservator approximately $55,000 for Ruth's "interest" on the property, and the rest went to cover the $35,000 lien and closing costs and taxes that John had incurred (approximately $10,000). The trial court assessed a $36,502.54 judgment plus interest against the Gables, citing its inherent power to adjust the equities between parties without strict adherence to any determined form and to shape the remedy to meet the demands of justice.
Neither the Appellants nor the Conservator contests the $36,502.54 as being the correct net amount owed Ruth's estate, if indeed the Gables are liable to the estate.
Appellants essentially assert four points on appeal, three of which, if granted, would affect the outcome of the case for procedural reasons and thus are addressed first. First, Appellants argue that two statutes of limitations bar consideration of the contracts under either section 516.110, RSMo 2000,3 or section 516.120 because the contracts were dated January 15, 1988 and December 3, 1988, and the Conservator's suit was filed December 11, 1998. Second, Appellants argue that the Conservator's pleadings were insufficient to state a cause of action against them for discovery of assets. Third, Appellants argue that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the count against them because it involves claims for common-law tort claim or breach of contract. Finally, Appellants argue that there was not substantial evidence that they adversely withheld or claimed an interest in the Kingston Court condominium.
This court first addresses Appellant's argument that the Conservator's action is barred by two statutes of limitations, section 516.110 () and section 516.120 (). Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it must be alleged with particularity. Rule 55.08. "A party desiring to avail himself of the statute of limitations must plead the particular statute upon which he relies." Alvarado v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Mo. App. 2000). Even more stringent is the requirement that "one seeking to take advantage of the statute of limitations 'must plead the very provision on which he depends.'" Modine Mfg. Co. v. Carlock, 510 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo. 1974)(citation omitted).
In the case at bar, Appellants pleaded the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, but they did not comply with Rule 55.08. Instead, Appellants' affirmative defense stated only that "the applicable statute of limitations bars Plaintiff from make [sic] any claim as alleged in Count X of Plaintiff's Petition against these Defendants and such Petition should be dismissed." This allegation is bereft of particularity: it specifies neither the statute of limitations in question nor the specific provision. Because the affirmative defense fails for lack of specificity, this point is denied.
Although not a separate point, Appellants complain at various times that the Conservator's pleadings were insufficient because she failed to allege that the Appellants adversely withheld property from Ruth's estate and she did not set forth whether she was asserting a claim for breach of contract or fraud.
In a discovery of assets claim, the petition shall describe the property, if known, and shall allege the nature of the interest of the petitioner; it shall also allege that title or possession of the property, or both, are adversely withheld or claimed. Section 473.340.1. The rules for petitions for discovery of assets are governed by the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 473.340.2. However, "the strict rules of pleadings in circuit court petitions do not apply to probate proceedings." In re Miller, 9 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Mo. App. 2000)(citation omitted). Instead, the pleadings must "give reasonable notice of the nature and extent of the claim." In re Woodrum, 859 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Mo. App. 1993)(emphasis added). See also In re Foster, 878 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Mo. App. 1994).
In her count against Appellants, the Conservator alleged that "$49,000 was removed from a bank account of Ruth Alice Spiegelhalter and paid to [the Gabels] toward the purported purchase of said residence and that [the Gabels] agreed to carry an $11,000 note for the balance of the purchase price." The Conservator also alleged that Appellants never owned the residence because title was vested in Topham and his wife. The Conservator further alleged that Ruth was damaged as a result of Appellants' failures to alert Ruth as to the correct titleholder and to...
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