Ryan v. Clark Equipment Co.
| Decision Date | 08 January 1969 |
| Citation | 268 Cal.App.2d 679,74 Cal.Rptr. 329 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Nora RYAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas G. Ryan, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 24356. |
William J. Connolly, W. Urie Walsh, San Francisco, for appellant.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, San Francisco, for respondent.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff is administratrix of the estate of Thomas G. Ryan, deceased, and she is also his surviving spouse. The question presented is whether the trial court was correct in applying the monetary limitations of the Oregon Wrongful Death Act in such a way as to bar any recovery to plaintiff in this case. We have concluded that the controlling law was correctly chosen and applied by the trial court.
On October 25, 1960, in Lane County, Oregon, plaintiff's decedent was killed while operating a Michigan front-end loader in the course of his employment with the Green Construction Company and the Tecon Corporation. Following his death plaintiff received a total of $35,000 ($26,000 for herself; $5,000 for one minor daughter; $4,000 for the other minor daughter) from decedent's two employers in settlement of her rights under the Employer's Liability Act of the State of Oregon. On October 20, 1961, in exchange for the $35,000 received, plaintiff executed covenants not to sue the employers on behalf of herself and her daughters. Thereafter, on October 23, 1961, plaintiff filed this suit against defendant, the manufacturer of the Michigan front-end loaded which plaintiff's decedent was operating at the time of his death, alleging negligence in design and manufacture and breach of warranty. Decedent, plaintiff and both children were residents of Oregon on the date of the fatal accident, and plaintiff and her daughters presently retain their residence in Oregon. Defendant is a Michigan corporation doing business in California. At the time of decedent's death and at the time this action was filed, the Oregon statute limited recovery for wrongful death to $20,000. 1 (Ore.Rev.Stat., § 30.020.)
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that under the law of Oregon the $35,000 received by plaintiff would be a setoff to the $20,000 wrongful death limitation, and consequently any possible recovery would be extinguished and any award of damages would be impossible. The court ruled (1) that Oregon law governed the case; (2) that plaintiff made a settlement in the amount of $35,000 for herself and her daughters under the Oregon Employer's Liability Act; (3) that settlement with a joint tort-feasor under the Employer's Liability Act may be set off against any claims under the Oregon Wrongful Death Act which limits recovery to $20,000; and (4) that consequently there was no triable issue of fact on the matter of damages.
On this appeal plaintiff states her contentions as follows: (1) The court should apply the law of Michigan, 2 the state of manufacture of the machinery, a state which has no limit on potential recovery in a wrongful death action; (2) that even if Oregon law is applied to the case, defendant is an independent tortfeasor whose liability was not extinguished by plaintiff's settlement of her rights under the Oregon Employer's Liability Act. In order to reach the second of plaintiff's arguments, we must, of course, first decide if the trial court was correct in applying the law of Oregon.
Plaintiff's initial proposition is that in matters of products liability, because the state of maunfacture can best regulate the manufacturing process through legislative controls and inspections, the law of such state should be applied when a choice of law problem is presented. Plaintiff also argues that such a rule would promote uniformity in conflicts law, and maintains, in addition, that the actual breach of duty to plaintiff took place in Michigan. However, plaintiff does not cite any authority for her position that the state of manufacture is the crucial state in a products liability case, nor has any such authority been found. 3
On the other hand, there is significant authority to support the trial court's choice of law in the instant case. It is true that the application of Oregon law is not compelled automatically simply because the accident occurred in Oregon. As the court said in the leading case of Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 555, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 34, 432 P.2d 727, 730, '(T)he law of the place of the wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort actions brought in the courts of this state.' (See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 A.C. 1, 5--6, 64 Cal.Rptr. 440, 434 P.2d 992.) Reich makes it clear that in each tort case where a choice of law problem is involved the forum court 'must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states' (at p. 553 at p. 33 of 63 Cal.Rptr., at p. 729 of 432 P.2d), and thus 'determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved.' (P. 555, p. 34 of 63 Cal.Rptr., p. 730 of 432 P.2d; see also Schneider v. Schimmels, 256 Cal.App.2d 366, 373, 64 Cal.Rptr. 273; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 68 A.C. 1, 7, 64 Cal.Rptr. 440, 434 P.2d 992.)
In the instant case plaintiff and her children are residents of Oregon, and the accident took place in Oregon; only the allegedly improper manufacture by defendant occurred in Michigan. This conduct of defendant is not determinative of a choice of law question. As stated in Reich, (Reich, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 556, 63 Cal.Rptr. at p. 35, 432 P.2d at p. 731.) Here, Oregon is the only state which has any real interest in how the decedent's survivors are to be compensated. Accordingly, we conclude that under the test of Reich the interests of the involved states and the litigants compel the application of Oregon law to this case. Oregon's interest in the compensation of her residents for wrongful death overrides any possible concern of Michigan in the regulation of the activities of manufacturers. Neither California nor Michigan has any interest in extending to Oregon residents any greater rights than are afforded by the state of residence. (See Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 A.C.A. 811, 816, 69 Cal.Rptr. 56.) Moreover, to apply the law...
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