Ryan v. Di Paolo
| Decision Date | 31 March 1943 |
| Parties | RYAN v. DI PAOLO. BLISS v. SAME. MARSHALL v. SAME. SWEENEY v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Actions by Ethel Ryan, Mildred Bliss, Julia Marshall and Evelyn M. Sweeney against Arthur DiPaolo for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. From orders of Appellate Division vacating findings for plaintiffs, and ordering judgments for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
Orders reversed and judgments for plaintiffs in accordance with findings of the trial judge to be entered.Appeal from District Court of Natick; W. R. Bigelow, Judge.
Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.
L. W. Farley and D. C. Kadra, both of Framingham, for plaintiff.
H. E. Cryan and J. A. Bradley, both of Boston, for defendant.
The operator of the automobile that was involved in a collision with an automobile in which the four plaintiffs were travelling along the Worcester turnpike, in Framingham, at 1 o'clock on the morning of November 27, 1940, took two of the plaintiffs to a hospital, where he described himself as Arthur DiPaolo, Waushakum Street, Framingham; he thereafter went to the police station in Framingham where, after a police officer took the registration number of his automobile, he made out and signed a written report in which he stated that the name of the owner and operator was Arthur DiPaolo and his residence was 84 Waushakum Street, Framingham. This report, which was made out in the presence of the police officer, gave a detailed account of the accident. The question is whether the trial judge was warranted in finding that the defendant was the operator of the automobile.
The defendant, who was described in the writs as of Framingham, did not objectto this description but filed an answer. He did not attend the trial.
The operator of the automobile knew that the plaintiffs, or at least some of them, had been injured by the collision, and in making the report, upon a blank with printed directions, to mail without delay to the registrar of motor vehicles, he was acting in accordance with G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 26. It might also have been found that he was apparently endeavoring to comply with G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 24, as amended, which required him to make known his name, residence and the number of his motor vehicle ‘after knowingly colliding with or otherwise causing injury’ to person or property. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 286 Mass. 256, 190 N.E. 513;Commonwealth v. McMenimon, 295 Mass. 467, 4 N.E.2d 246. Failure of an operator to make known his true name and residence would not comply with the statute. If he intended to conceal his identity it is unlikely that he would have gone to the police station and made a report of the accident. If he did make a report, it was extremely improbable that he would give a registration number of his automobile different from that known to the police officer who ‘saw him making out the report,’ or would falsely state the name and address of the owner and operator of the automobile, or would misrepresent himself to be another person who resided at a certain address in the same town in which the police station was located or, in making out the report, that he would assume the name and address of a fictitious person. Such an attempt would be immediately detected. Moreover, there is a presumption that the operator in giving his name and address was acting honestly and not in violation of law. Goddard v. Rawson, 130 Mass. 97;Doherty v. Ayer, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N.E. 677, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 816, 125 Am.St.Rep. 355;Conroy v. Mather, 217 Mass. 91, 104 N.E. 487, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 801; Copithorn v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 309 Mass. 363,35 N.E. 254.
This report does not seem to have been introduced by the defendant for any limited purpose. It thereby became entitled to probative effect as tending to prove the truth of the statements that it contained, including the name and address of the operator of the automobile. Damon v. Carrol, 163 Mass. 404, 40 N.E. 185;Hubbard v. Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 86 N.E. 356;Mignault v. Goldman, 234 Mass. 205, 125 N.E. 189;Gethins v. Breeyear, 252 Mass. 326, 147 N.E. 876;Ott v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass....
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...to permit the jury to find that the automobile bearing that number was the one registered in her name as owner. Ryan v. Di Paolo, 313 Mass. 492, 494, 495, 47 N.E.2d 941. In the case at bar there is evidence which was lacking in Kelly v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 52 N.E.2d......
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