Ryan v. Mayor, Etc., of City of New York

• Decision Date: 23 November 1897
• Citation: 48 N.E. 512,154 N.Y. 328
• Parties: RYAN v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

154 N.Y. 328

48 N.E. 512

RYAN

v.MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 23, 1897.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Kate Ryan against the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York. From a judgment of the appellate division (40 N. Y. Supp. 227) affirming a judgment entered on dismissal of the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

L. E. Warren, for appellant.

James H. Ward, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

Ryan, plaintiff's testator, sued to recover his salary as an inspector of masonry upon the New Aqueduct, in New York City, for a period of time from October, 1887, to December, 1889. He had been employed for a few months, when charges were made by the division and the chief engineers against him for intoxication and insubordination. In consequence, the board of aqueduct commissioners directed the chief engineer to ask for his immediate resignation. On October 28, 1887, he received the following letter: ‘Mr. William Ryan, Inspector-Dear Sir: I have to-day received from the chief engineer, Mr. B. S. Church, a letter stating that your case has been considered by the aqueduct commissioners at their meeting on the 26th inst., and they have asked that the resignation of William Ryan be demanded forthwith. I herebv call upon you for your resignation forthwith. Alfred Craven, Division Engineer.’ On December 19, 1889, he was served with formal notice of his dismissal from the service.

The question is whether the letter of October 28, 1887, operated, and was regarded by Ryan, as his discharge. That it was the intention of his superiors to terminate his employment cannot be doubted; but the appellant contends, in effect, that there was no actual discharge until the notice of December, 1889, and that whether what took place before that was understood by the parties to be a discharge was a question as to which the evidence furnished conflicting inferences, which should have been left to be settled by the jury. Hence it is argued that it was error for the trial judge to direct the verdict for the defendant. The evidence, however, was not, in our judgment, susceptible of any other inference than that Ryan understood that he was discharged in October, 1887, from the service. It is without conflict as to the occurrences and is to the effect that Ryan frequently called at the office of the aqueduct commissioners, and that he ‘wanted’ or ‘asked’ to be ‘reinstated.’ It was not shown that he reported for duty, or performed, or offered to perform, any services after receiving the letter of October 28, 1887. In the light of such evidence, what ground is there for the inference that Ryan understood that he was still in the service? Failure to report for duty and demands for reinstatement pointed but to the one conclusion, that he understood that he had been discharged; and had the jury given a verdict upon such evidence for the plaintiff, it would have been the duty of the court to set it aside, as being quite without support. There was no question...