Ryan v. Rutledge

• Decision Date: 02 June 1916
• Docket Number: No. 17566.,17566.
• Citation: 187 S.W. 877
• Parties: RYAN et al. v. RUTLEDGE et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

187 S.W. 877

RYAN et al. v. RUTLEDGE et al.

No. 17566.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 2, 1916.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1916.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; George C. Hitchcock, Judge.

Proceedings by Caroline Bradford Ryan and others against Robert Rutledge and others to contest a will. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Walter B. Douglas, of St. Louis, for appellants. Schnurmacher & Rassieur and Robert A. Holland, Jr., all of St. Louis, for respondents.

BOND, J.

I. This is a contest by the surviving sister, Caroline Ryan, née Bradford, of the will of Frank E. Bradford, who died on the 18th day of February, 1909, at the age of 51 years, unmarried and childless. The defendants are Robert Rutledge, executor and trustee named in the will, and the devisees and legatees.

At the time of his death, the testator owned a one-half interest in property on Eighth and Pine streets, St. Louis, the whole valued at $250,000, under lease for 99 years, earning $10,000 annual rental, and other real estate of the value of $170,000. By the terms of his will, dated September 27, 1907, and the codicil thereto, dated December 31, 1908, the beneficial interest in the Pine street property, for her life, was devised to the plaintiff Caroline Ryan, and to that end the legal title was vested in Robert Rutledge, as trustee, with full powers to sell, mortgage, or lease the same for any term, including 99 years, and extending beyond the period of the trust, to invest the proceeds in case of sale, and to pay the net income of the trust estate to plaintiff. The trustee was excused from giving bond. The testator devised the residue of his estate to Robert Rutledge and the respective presidents of the boards of trustees of the Third Baptist Church and the Delmar Baptist Church and to their successors, as such, forever, as trustees for the Baptist Orphans' Home, specifying their duties as such trustees. Robert Rutledge was also named as executor of the will of the testator, without bond.

The foregoing will was contested on the ground that the testator was an epileptic and mentally weak and infirm and subjected, when executing his will, to the undue influence of Robert Rutledge, who was his "agent and confidential friend and adviser and the manager of his property," and who fraudulently procured the execution of said will "in order to obtain the benefits and privileges given to him by said alleged will." The defendants answered, denying any undue influence, and averred that plaintiff, having taken certain bequests under the will, was thereby estopped from contesting its validity. On the trial the defendants, as proponents of the will, made formal proof of its execution and the testamentary capacity of the testator. Plaintiff adduced evidence that the testator had been afflicted with epilepsy since his childhood, and that such attacks were preceded and followed by dullness, apathy, and mental weakness, and rendered him unconscious while actually seized; but that, upon recovery from the seizure, he gradually attained mental normality and practical ability to attend to the ordinary affairs of life. This evidence was introduced on the theory that such affliction rendered the testator susceptible to the influence and dominance of his agent, adviser, and business manager, Robert Rutledge, at the time he executed his will. Plaintiff gave no evidence that said Rutledge in any way dictated the terms of the will or had any interest therein other than the provisions thereof giving him the trusteeships described in the will and the compensation incident to the performance of the duties imposed on him. The evidence further disclosed that Robert Rutledge was the agent and confidential adviser of plaintiff and the manager of his property and the collector of its income, and showed, also, that the plaintiff, upon the formal probate of the will, accepted a bequest of books and a release of an indebtedness amounting to $2,716.80, which was relinquished to her in the will. The trial court directed a verdict establishing the will and codicil. From a judgment in accordance, plaintiff duly appealed.

II. The question presented by this appeal is, not as to the weight of the evidence on the issue of undue influence, but whether there is any evidence, positive or presumptive, tending to prove that respondent Robert Rutledge exerted undue influence on the mind of Frank Bradford when making his will, so that the provisions of the instrument reflected the mind and purposes of said Rutledge, and not the intentions and designs of the testator. Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. loc. cit. 168 et seq. and cases cited, 145 S. W. 1155.

To sustain the affirmative of this view, it is insisted that Rutledge was the trusted agent and adviser of the testator and...