Ryan v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 27 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 10A04-9503-CV-82,10A04-9503-CV-82
• Citation: 659 N.E.2d 1088
• Parties: Beulah RYAN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. John RYAN, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1088

659 N.E.2d 1088

Beulah RYAN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. John RYAN, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 10A04-9503-CV-82.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 27, 1995.

Transfer Denied May 17, 1996.

Dennis R. Tackett, Tackett, Taurman & Sonne, New Albany, for appellant.

Linda B. Lorch, Lorch & Naville, New Albany, for appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Petitioner Beulah Ryan appeals a marriage dissolution decree challenging the trial court's determination that the antenuptial agreement was valid and the court's division of the marital estate in accordance with the antenuptial agreement.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Beulah raises two restated issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err by deciding that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable?

2. Did the trial court err by determining that the language of the antenuptial agreement was broad enough to encompass a waiver of either party's claim to the other's pension benefits?

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Ryan (John) and Beulah Dalby (Beulah) were married on October 23, 1971. At the time of their marriage, John was 43 years old; Beulah was 34 years old. Both parties were employed. Both John and Beulah had been married and divorced, and each had children from their former marriages. At the time of this marriage, John had assets worth approximately $15,000.00, including a house with a mortgage; Beulah had cash and stock assets of approximately $22,000.00.

One day prior to their marriage, John and Beulah met at Attorney Nicholas Leist's office regarding the preparation of an antenuptial agreement. Neither party had used Leist's services previously, and this was their only meeting with him. According to the testimony of the parties, Beulah told John that she would not see him anymore unless they got married, and John refused to get married without the agreement.

During the meeting, Liest explained to John and Beulah the different clauses which could be included in an antenuptial agreement. Liest asked John and Beulah about the nature of their assets and whether they wanted only the property they currently owned to remain separate or if they wanted the property they acquired during their marriage to remain separate. After the discussion, Liest's secretary typed the agreement while John and Beulah waited. When she was finished, the couple read the agreement and signed it in Liest's presence.

On June 23, 1992, Beulah petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. John filed a counter-petition and pled the existence of the antenuptial agreement alleging the agreement controlled the disposition of the parties' property.

On July 27, 1993, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the antenuptial agreement, which the court found to be valid on August 2, 1993.

In August 16, 1993, the trial court held a final hearing on John's counter-petition for dissolution. The order dissolving John and Beulah's marriage was filed on August 16, 1993.

Finally, after a change of judge, on June 30 and August 12, 1994, the court heard argument regarding the division of property. Prior to the introduction of evidence, Beulah requested that the court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 4, 1994, the trial court entered its order which states, in pertinent part:

3. The validity of [the antenuptial] agreement has previously been ruled upon by this Court. On August 2, 1993[,] Special Judge Robert Bennett found the agreement to be valid and enforceable as written. That order is the law of this case.

4. The parties throughout their marriage kept most of their property separate and divided the household expenses between them even though John Ryan's earnings were greater than Beulah Ryan's earnings. This practice, while peculiar, is consistent with the relationship of the parties established in the Antenuptial Agreement of October 22, 1971.

5. The only property held in joint name by the parties are four cemetery lots at Kraft-Graceland Memorial Park (which have a value of $2,400.00) and mineral rights in certain real estate identified at trial as the Hebron Church Road farm which are held as tenants in common.

* * * * * *

7. Since John Ryan has a considerably greater estate than Beulah Ryan, the cemetery lots should become the sole property of Beulah Ryan.

* * * * * *

IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that Beulah Ryan shall have as her sole property the four cemetery lots at Kraft-Graceland Memorial Park.

IT IS FURTHER CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that each party shall have as her or his sole property the tangible personal property now in her or his possession.

IT IS FURTHER CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that all property in the name of either property [sic] shall remain the sole property of that person.

(R. at 423-24)

Beulah appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

In a case in which the trial court has been requested to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, we do not set aside the court's judgment unless the judgment is clearly erroneous. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Greemann Real Estate (1987), Ind.App., 516 N.E.2d 1095, 1097, reh'g denied, trans. denied. A judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on the findings. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences to support them. Donavan v. Ivy Knoll Apartments Partnership (1989), Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 47, 50. In determining whether the findings and judgment are clearly erroneous, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the judgment. Agrarian Grain Co. v. Meeker (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 1189, 1191. A judgment is contrary to law if it is contrary to the trial court's special findings. Id.

I.

Beulah contends that the evidence clearly establishes that the antenuptial agreement is invalid for three reasons:

1. "The Agreement was made one day prior to marriage, with little or no disclosure of assets, and without opportunity for Beulah to seek legal assistance or advice."

2. "The Antenuptial Agreement cannot be considered valid, given the actions of the parties during the marriage."

3. "The evidence clearly establishes that the Antenuptial Agreement could not be enforced as valid, given its unconscionable circumstances and results."

Appellant's Brief at 34.

"Antenuptial agreements are to be construed according to principles applicable to the construction of contracts generally." Rose v. Rose (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 231, 236, trans. denied. To interpret a contract, a court first considers the parties' intent as expressed in the language of the contract. DeHaan v. DeHaan (1991), Ind.App., 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320, reh'g denied, trans. denied (1992); City of Evansville v. Old State Util. Corp. (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 1339, 1342. The court must read all of the contractual provisions as a whole to accept an interpretation which harmonizes the contract's words and phrases and gives effect to the parties' intentions as established at the time they entered the contract. Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 116, 121, reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Beulah asserts that "it is clear [from the case law] that for an Antenuptial Agreement to be valid, the court must look to the circumstances leading to its execution, and must consider whether the Agreement was read, discussed and understood in its entirety. It is abundantly clear that applying current law, the Antenuptial Agreement in this case is not valid." Appellant's Brief at 36. However, Beulah relies heavily on her own testimony, and our standard of review requires that we look to evidence which supports the judgment of the trial court.

The uncontroverted evidence reveals that John and Beulah discussed and decided that an antenuptial agreement was necessary before they married. Towards that end, the parties met at Leist's office a day before their marriage. Neither party had met Leist before; Beulah selected him from the telephone directory. After some discussion with Leist, John and Beulah signed the agreement in Leist's presence. The agreement identified the nature of the parties' assets and states that the parties have informed each other of their assets. Neither party spoke with the attorney outside the other's presence. John paid the attorney and both parties were given copies of the agreement.

In addition, John testified that during the meeting, Leist explained to them the different clauses that could be included in an antenuptial agreement. The attorney asked them the nature of their assets and whether they wanted only the property they currently owned to remain separate, or if they wanted the property they acquired during the marriage to remain separate. After the discussion, Leist's secretary typed the agreement for John and Beulah to sign. There is no evidence that either party was compelled or coerced to sign the agreement, or that John had unduly influenced Beulah or used his superior position to convince her to sign the agreement. See Womack v. Womack (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 481, 482 (no presumption of undue influence because of the relationship of husband and wife) and Matuga v. Matuga (1992), Ind.App., 600 N.E.2d 138, 141, trans. denied (time constraints and pressures before wedding do not give rise to an inference of undue influence). Although Beulah's recollections of the meeting with Leist is quite different from John's, and Beulah now asserts that she did not understand the terms of the agreement, the trial court could properly rely on the evidence before it to support the validity of the agreement.

Beulah also contends that the agreement cannot be considered valid, given the actions of the parties during marriage, relying on Kemp v. Kemp (1985),...