Ryan v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-CV-04032-LHK |
| Parties | JOSEPH RYAN, Plaintiff, v. SANTA CLARA VALLEY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Joseph Ryan ("Plaintiff") sues Defendants Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority ("SCVTA") and Joseph Fabela ("Fabela") (collectively, "Defendants"). ECF No. 37. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 41 ("Mot."). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.
SCVTA "is an independent special district agency that provides" public transportation services in Santa Clara County, California. ECF No. 37 (Second Amended Complaint, or "SAC"), ¶¶ 10, 23. Fabela is the General Counsel for SCVTA. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff was employed at SCVTA in the position of Senior Assistant Counsel. Id. ¶ 23.
SCVTA also employed an individual named David Terrazas ("Terrazas"). Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff "complained to management" during his time at SCVTA "that Terrazas was incompetent." Id. According to the SAC, "[t]he fact that Terrazas was a poor performer was widely known by management and recognized by [Fabela] and legal staff" at SCVTA. Id.
Terrazas was also a member of the Santa Cruz City Council. Id. ¶ 27. In June 2014, Plaintiff "published for one day an internet webpage entitled 'Anyone But Terrazas For City Council.'" Id.¶¶ 28, 45. Plaintiff published this on his Facebook page. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff's posting was "critical of Terrazas' campaign for re-election to City Council in 2014," and Plaintiff "cite[d] some misrepresentations listed on Terrazas' campaign web page, including the misrepresentation that Terrazas was a 'Transportation Manager,' rather than the true fact that he was a 'Labor Relations Supervisor'" at SCVTA. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff made the speech "on his own time, at night after working hours, using his own computer equipment." Id. ¶¶ 29, 43.
In February 2015, Terrazas alleged that SCVTA and Plaintiff "retaliated against Terrazas for whistleblower activity." Id. ¶ 26-27. The SAC does not identify Terrazas's "whistleblower activity," or how Terrazas was retaliated against.
Also in February 2015, Plaintiff informed Fabela that Plaintiff had made the webpage posting about Terrazas in June 2014. Id. ¶ 29. Fabela "was provided with a printout of the webpage." Id. Plaintiff "informed [Fabela] that the webpage was protected off-duty political activity." Id. Fabela did not take any action against Plaintiff at that time.
On June 3, 2015, Terrazas entered into a settlement agreement with SCVTA regarding the retaliation that Terrazas allegedly suffered. Id. ¶ 30. Nuria Fernandez ("Fernandez"), the General Manager of SCVTA, signed the settlement agreement with Terrazas on June 5, 2015. Id.
That same day, June 5, 2015, Fabela "informed [Plaintiff] that he would be terminated by [SCVTA] or that he could retire, but that [Plaintiff] must leave the office that day." Id. ¶ 31. "When [Plaintiff] asked [Fabela] why" he was being terminated, Fabela "replied that the actionwas taken for reasons previously discussed, referring to the previous discussion regarding Mr. Ryan's aforementioned webpage." Id. ¶ 31.
The SAC further alleges that Plaintiff is Caucasian, over the age of 40, and that he "suffered from a medical condition" during his employment that "substantially limited his ability to sleep, walk, stand, lift, bend, concentrate, tolerate substandard performance by coworkers and perform manual tasks at work and at home." Id. ¶ 33-34.
Plaintiff filed suit on July 18, 2016, against SCVTA, Fabela, and Fernandez. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's complaint alleged 22 causes of action against Defendants, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and violations of California state law. See id.
On September 29, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation regarding Plaintiff's filing of a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Specifically, the parties agreed that Plaintiff would dismiss Fernandez with prejudice, that Plaintiff would "[r]emove any and all allegations that Plaintiff was entitled to a 'Skelly' hearing, and that [SCVTA]'s failure to provide Plaintiff a 'Skelly' hearing constituted a due process violation." Id. Plaintiff also stipulated to dismiss the Complaint's twentieth cause of action. Id. The Court entered an Order granting the parties' stipulation on September 30, 2016. ECF No. 19.
On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 26. On that same day, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of Fernandez, ECF No. 27, which this Court granted on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 29.
On November 9, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation regarding Plaintiff's filing of a SAC, ECF No. 32, which the Court granted that same day, ECF No. 34.
On December 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed the SAC. The SAC alleged 13 causes of action against Defendants, including claims under § 1983 for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights, claims under § 1983 for violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, claims underTitle VII and FEHA for racial discrimination and retaliation, claims under the ADEA and California's Fair Housing and Employment Act ("FEHA") for age discrimination, claims under the ADA and FEHA for disability discrimination, and a claim for violation of California Government Code § 3202.
On January 13, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC or, in the alternative, a motion for more definite statement or a motion to strike. ECF No. 41 ("Mot."). On January 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposition and a request for judicial notice. ECF Nos. 47 & 48. On February 3, 2017, Defendants filed a Reply, a request for judicial notice, and oppositions to Plaintiff's request for judicial notice. ECF Nos. 49, 50, 51.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and a "court may look beyond the plaintiff's complaint to matters of public record" without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 2011). Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
If the Court concludes that a motion to dismiss should be granted, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," bearing in mind "the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendants move to dismiss all 13 claims raised in the SAC. Plaintiff's claims may be grouped into the following categories: (1) claims under § 1983 for violation of the First Amendment; (2) a claim under California Government Code § 3203; (3) claims under § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) claims for racial discrimination; (5) claims for age discrimination; (6) claims for disability discrimination; and (7) claims for retaliation for reporting racial discrimination. Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. The Court addresses each of Defendants' arguments below in turn.
Counts One and Two of Plaintiff's SAC allege that Defendants violated § 1983 by terminating Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment right to free speech.1 SAC ¶¶ 36-74. Plaintiff brings a claim against Fabela in his individual capacity, and aclaim against SCVTA based on Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. The Court first considers Plaintiff's claim against Fabela, and then the Court considers Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against SCVTA under Monell.
Count One of Plaintiff's SAC alleges that Fabela violated the First Amendment by terminating Plaintiff...
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