Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc.
Decision Date | 06 July 2007 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-0183-G. |
Citation | 497 F.Supp.2d 820 |
Parties | Michelle RYAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al., Plaintiff, v. STAFF CARE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Jeremi K. Young, The Young Law Firm, Amarillo, TX, J. Derek Braziel, Lee & Braziel, Jeffrey H. Rasansky, Rasansky Law Firm, Jessica M. Dean, Simon Eddins & Greenstone, Dallas, TX, Richard J. Burch, Bruckner Burch, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Mark A. Shank, James `Jim' Birch, Paul W. Denney, Hughes & Luce, Robert M. Behrendt, Theodore Carl Anderson, III, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.
Before the court are: (1) the motion by the plaintiffs Michelle Ryan ("Ryan") and Vanessa Moreno ("Moreno") (together "the Ryan plaintiffs") for notice to potential plaintiffs and conditional certification; and (2) the motion by the plaintiffs Dominick Rose ("Rose") and Walter Elliot ("Elliot") (together "the Rose plaintiffs") for notice to potential plaintiffs and conditional certification. For the reasons set forth herein, the motions are granted.
This case asserts violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by the defendants Staff Care, Inc. ("Staff Care") and Merritt, Hawkins & Associates ("MHA") (collectively, "the defendants"). Both defendants are in the business of placing healthcare professionals with healthcare providers, on either a temporary or permanent basis. See Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification [Doc. # 19] ("Ryan Motion for Notice") at 3-4; Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification [Doc. # 21] ("Rose Motion for Notice") at 3. Ryan worked for Staff Care as a sales consultant and for MHA as a marketing consultant. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification [Doc. # 24] ("Response to Ryan Motion for Notice") at 2. Staff Care formerly employed Moreno as a Sales Consultant. Id. Both Rose and Elliot are former recruiting consultants for Staff Care. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification [Doc. # 28] ("Response to Rose Motion for Notice") at 3.
According to the complaints,1 the defendants required the plaintiffs to work in excess of forty hours per week without compensating the plaintiffs at the required overtime rate. See Complaint — Collective Action ("Ryan Complaint") ¶¶ 1-2; Complaint — Collective Action ("Rose Complaint") ¶¶ 1-2. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants improperly characterized their positions as exempt from the FLSA overtime requirement. Ryan Complaint ¶ 14; Rose Complaint ¶ 16. Ryan, Moreno, Rose, and Elliot (collectively "the plaintiffs") brought their claims individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.
In their respective motions, the Ryan plaintiffs and the Rose plaintiffs seek for the court to conditionally certify an opt-in class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for all similarly situated individuals and to approve the notice to be sent to the potential plaintiffs. The court will treat both motions together.
Section 216(b) provides that "[a]n action to recover the liability prescribed in [§ 216(b)] may be maintained against any employer ... by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), a collective action maintained under the FLSA is pursued as an opt-in class. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (), with FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2)(B) (requiring that the notice to class members include a statement "that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded"); see also Lachapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) () . Collective actions under the FLSA are generally favored because such actions reduce litigation costs for the individual plaintiffs and create judicial efficiency by resolving in one proceeding of "common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged ... activity." See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989).
Previously, the Fifth Circuit has recognized two methods by which certification of an FLSA class can be approved. See Mooney v. Aramco Services Company, 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). The first approach requires a class certification process similar that of Rule 23. See id. at 1214; Shushan v. University of Colorado at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266-67 (D.Colo. 1990). Under this approach, class certification under the FLSA is identical to certification of a Rule 23 class. See Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 266-67. That is, to certify a FLSA class the plaintiff must establish numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representativeness. See FED. R. Cry. P. 23(a). Importantly, the Rule 23 approach places the burden on the plaintiff to establish that the potential class members are "similarly situated" under the language of § 216(b) prior to notice being sent to the potential class members.
The second approach recognized by the Fifth Circuit has come to be known as the two-stage certification process. See Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213. This approach satisfies the "similarly situated" requirement of § 216(b) with a two-stage analysis: (1) the notice stage; and (2) the certification stage. See id. at 1213-14. At the notice stage, the inquiry by the court is considerably less rigorous than the court's initial inquiry under the Rule 23 approach. See id. at 1214 (). "[T]he district court makes a decision — usually based only on the pleadings and affidavits which have been submitted — whether notice should be given to potential class members." Id. at 1213-14. If the court allows for notification, the court typically creates conditional certification of a representative class and allows notice to be sent to the potential opt in plaintiffs. Id. at 1214.
At the second stage of the two-stage process, the court determines whether the class should be maintained through trial. Typically, the second stage is precipitated by a motion to decertify by the defendant, which is usually not filed until discovery is largely complete. Id. By engaging in the two-stage approach, as opposed to the Rule 23 approach, "the court has much more information on which to base its decision, and makes a factual determination on the similarly situated question." Id. Should the court at this stage choose to decertify the class, the opt-in class members are dismissed from the suit without prejudice and the case proceeds only for the class representatives in their individual capacity. Id.
Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs move for the court to conditionally certify their class under the two-stage analysis, while the defendants argue that the Rule 23 approach is more appropriate. For its part, the Fifth Circuit since Mooney has not indicated a preference towards either approach.2 However, other judges in this district have applied the two-stage approach. See Aguilar v. Complete Landsculpture, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-0776-D, 2004 WL 2293842, at *1 (N.D.Tex. Oct.7, 2004) (Fitzwater, J.) ( ); Barnett v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., No. 3:01-C V-1182-M, 2002 WL 1023161, at *1 (Lynn, J.) ( ). Based on the Fifth Circuit precedent in Mooney and the history within this district regarding FLSA class certifications, the court adopts the two-stage approach. Thus, the question before this court is whether, under the lenient standard of the notice stage, the plaintiff, through their pleadings and affidavits, have demonstrated that the named plaintiffs are "similarly situated" to the potential class members.
For the class representative to be considered similarly situated to the potential opt in class members, the class representative must be similarly situated in terms of job requirements and similarly situated in terms of payment provisions. See Dybach v. State of Florida Department of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (11th Cir.1991). "The positions need not be identical, but similar." Barnett, 2002 WL 1023161, at *1 (quoting Tucker v. Labor Leasing, Inc., 872 F.Supp. 941, 947 (M.D.Fla.1994)). The "similarly situated" requirement of 216(b) is less stringent than the "similarly situated" requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 20 and 42. See Grayson v. K Mart Corporation, 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 982, 117 S.Ct. 435, 136 L.Ed.2d 332 (1996). "A court may deny a plaintiff's right to proceed collectively only if the action arises from circumstances purely personal to the plaintiff, and not from any generally applicable rule, policy, or practice." Donohue v. Francis Services, Inc., Civ. A. No. 041-170, 2004 WL 1161366, at *1 (quoting Whitworth v. Chiles Offshore Corporation, Civ. A. No. 92-1504, 1992 WL 235907, at *1 (E.D.La. Sept.2, 1992)).
In both of the proposed classes, the named plaintiffs have met their lenient burden of establishing that they are similarly situated to the potential class members. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lee v. Metrocare Servs.
...two different approaches to determine whether certification of an FLSA collective action can be approved. See Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F.Supp.2d 820, 823 (N.D.Tex.2007) (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palac......
-
Nieddu ex rel. Himself v. Lifetime Fitness, Inc.
...2008), citing Dybach v. State of Florida Department of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1567–68 (11th Cir.1991); and Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F.Supp.2d 820, 824–25 (N.D.Tex.2007). “A court may deny a plaintiff's right to proceed collectively only if the action arises from circumstances pure......
-
Jones v. Cretic Energy Servs., LLC
...situated in terms of job requirements and similarly situated in terms of payment provisions.”' Id. (quoting Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc. , 497 F.Supp.2d 820, 825 (N.D.Tex.2007) (citing Dybach v. State of Florida Department of Corrections , 942 F.2d 1562, 1567–68 (11th Cir.1991) ). “'A court may......
-
Heeg v. Adams Harris, Inc., Civil Action No. H–12–00684.
...action proceeding may “reduce litigation costs for the individual plaintiffs and create judicial efficiency.” Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F.Supp.2d 820, 823 (N.D.Tex.2007) (quoting Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989)). Once a court......
-
Table of cases
...Cir. 1995), §23:1.B.1.b Ryals v. Canales 767 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied), §37:3.C.1 Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc. , 497 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (N.D. Tex. 2007), §9:1.C.4 Ryan v. Superior Oil Co. , 813 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1991, writ denied), §§3:9, 3:9.A......
-
Table of cases
...Cir. 1995), §23:1.B.1.b Ryals v. Canales 767 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied), §37:3.C.1 Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc. , 497 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (N.D. Tex. 2007), §9:1.C.4 Ryan v. Superior Oil Co. , 813 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1991, writ denied), §§3:9, 3:9.A......
-
Chapter § 2-65 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b): Class Certification
...certification if they are sufficiently specific; it is the quality of the evidence, not its quantity.) • Ryan v. Staff Care, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (court decides to expand to national basis; affidavit of company executive admitted that change from exempt to non-exempt s......